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EU TRADE AgREEmEnTs AnD THE DUTy To REspECT HUmAn 
RigHTs AbRoAD: inTRoDUCTion To THE THEmE
Eva Kassoti and Ramses A. Wessel1 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE EU HUMAN RIGHTS 
CHARTER IN EXTERNAL SITUATIONS
With EU trade agreements – or in fact global trade in general – being more and 
more under attack in the context of debates on their (real or perceived) lack of 
attention for non-trade aspects such as human rights, social standards or en-
vironmental considerations,2 this collection of contributions aims to assess one 
specific aspect: the duty for the EU to respect human rights outside the terri-
tory of its Member States3 when it concludes trade agreements with third coun-
tries. In the literature, even though the broader issue of the EU’s human rights 
obligations in its external trade policies has received some (limited) attention, 4 
1 Eva Kassoti is Senior Researcher in International and EU Law, T.M.C. Asser Institute; 
Ramses A. Wessel is Professor of European Law at the University of Groningen. Both authors 
are members of the Governing Board of the Centre for the Law of European External Relations 
(CLEER).
2 See the many references in the contributions to this issue.
3 For the territory of the Member states to which the EU treaties apply, see Art. 52 TEU and 
Art. 355 TFEU. See also Dimitry Kochenov, ‘European Union Territory from a Legal Perspective: 
A Commentary on Art. 52 TEU, 355, 349, and 198-204 TFEU’ (2017) University of Groningen 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2017-05 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2956011> accessed 20 January 2020.
4 The seminal work on the topic is violeta Moreno-Lax and Cathryn Costello, ‘The Extrater-
ritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the 
Effectiveness Model’ in Steven Peers et al. (eds), The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary, (Hart/Beck 2014) p 657. See also more generally Lorand Bartels, ‘The EU’s Hu-
man Rights Obligations in relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects’ (2014) 25 EJIl 1071. 
Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in relation to Policies with Extraterritorial 
Effects: A Reply to Lorand Bartels’ (2014) 25 EJIl 1093. Aravind Ganesh, ‘The European Union’s 
Human Rights Obligations Towards Distant Strangers’ (2015) 37 Mich. J. Intl’ l. 475. By way of 
contrast, the question of the EU’s complicity in internationally wrongful acts committed by a third 
State, namely the violation of a number of human rights of individuals located in that third State, 
through the conclusion of trade agreements with that third State under the law of international 
responsibility has gained considerable traction over the last few years. See for example: Eva 
Kassoti, ‘The Legality under International Law of the EU’s Trade Agreements covering Occupied 
Territories: A Comparative Study of Palestine and Western Sahara’ (2017) CLEER Paper Series 
2017/3, <https://www.asser.nl/media/3934/cleer17-3_web.pdf> accessed 20 January 2020. Fran-
cois Dubuisson, ‘The International Obligations of the European Union and its Member States with 
regard to Economic Relations with Israeli Settlements’ (2014) <http://www.madeinillegality.org/
IMG/pdf/etude_def_ang.pdf> accessed 20 January 2020. For the procedural and evidentiary dif-
ficulties of proving complicity in international law, see Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein, ‘The Limits 
of Complicity as a Ground for Responsibility: Lessons Learned from the Corfu Channel case’ in 
Karine Bannelier, Theodore Christakis, and Sarah Heathcote (eds), The ICJ and the Evolution of 
International law: The Enduring Impact of the Corfu Channel Case, (Routledge 2012) pp 315 – 
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this question has remained largely unexplored. Recent developments have 
rekindled interest in the topic.5 More particularly, recent judgments of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases such as Front Polisario, 
Western Sahara, or Psagot,6 have provided a more solid basis for engagement 
with the issue of the EU’s duty to protect human rights outside the territory of 
its Member States. 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is the logical starting point to assess 
the Union’s duty to protect human rights. In contrast with some human rights 
instruments, the Charter does not contain a clause defining its territorial scope. 
Articles 52 TEU and 355 TFEU are of little avail in establishing the territorial 
scope of the Charter since they merely define the Member States’ territory to 
which the TEU and the TFEU apply.7 In a similar vein, the Charter’s applicabil-
ity has not been conditioned upon the threshold criterion of jurisdiction.8
In lieu of a jurisdictional clause, the Charter only contains a provision stipulat-
ing its field of application. Article 51(1) of the Charter specifies that the provisions 
of the Charter “are addressed to the institutions of the Union … and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”9 The wording of 
334; vladyslav Lanovoy, Complicity and its limits in the law of International Responsibility (Hart 
Publishing 2016) pp 101-103, 218-234. 
5 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘EU Trade Agreements and Human rights: From Extraterritorial to Territo-
rial Obligations’ (2018) 20 IClR 374. Antal Berkes, ‘The Extraterritorial Human Rights Obliga-
tions of the EU in its External Trade and Investment Policies’ (2018) 5 Europe and the World: A 
law Review 1. Sandra Hummelbrunner, ‘Beyond Extraterritoriality: Towards an EU Obligation to 
Ensure Human Rights Abroad’ (2019) CLEER Paper Series 19/02, p 23 <https://www.asser.nl/
media/679407/cleer_19-02_web.pdf> accessed 20 January 2020.
6 Respectively Case C-104/16 P, Council of the European union v. Front Polisario, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:973; Case 266/16, Western Sahara Campaign uK v Commissioners for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:118; Case C-363/18, organisation juive européenne and vignoble Psagot, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:954. For more insights into these cases, see Eva Kassoti, ‘The Council v. Front 
Polisario Case: The Court of Justice’s Selective Reliance on International Rules on Treaty In-
terpretation (Second Part)’, (2017) 2 European Papers 23; Eva Kassoti, ‘The ECJ and the Art 
of Treaty Interpretation’, (2019) CMlR 209. Eva Kassoti, Stefano Saluzzo (eds.), ‘What’s in a 
Name? The Psagot Judgment and questions of Labelling of Settlement Products’, (2019) 4 Eu-
ropean Papers 753. 
7 Moreno-Lax and Costello, op.cit., at 1664. For analysis of arts 52 and 355 TFEU, see Ko-
chenov, op.cit.
8 See for example Art. 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’): “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” European 
Convention of Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> accessed 20 January 2020. Art 2 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’): “Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant…” International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) <ht-
tps://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> accessed 20 January 2020. See 
also generally Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 
2015) pp 22-26. 
9 In the Explanations to the Charter it is also stressed that Art. 51 of the Charter “seeks to 
clearly establish that the Charter applies primarily to the institutions and bodies of the Union”, 
whereas Member States are only bound by the Charter “when they act in the scope of Union law.” 
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Article 51(1) of the Charter suggests that the application of the Charter has been 
defined exclusively rationae materiae:10 since the Charter applies to acts of the 
institutions of the Union and to national acts implementing EU law,11 the crux of 
the matter is whether a situation is covered by an EU competence.12 
In this sense, Article 51(1) of the Charter envisages a parallelism between 
EU action and application of the Charter.13 The only limitation contained in the 
relevant provision pertains to the material scope of the Charter – which has 
been limited in so far as action by Member States is concerned.14 As the Court 
explained in its seminal judgment in Akerberg Fransson: “[S]ituations cannot 
exist which are covered … by European Union law without those fundamental 
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails the ap-
plicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”15
This construction suggests that territorial criteria bear no relevance in the 
context of determining the applicability of the Charter.16 In this light, the model 
propounded by Moreno-Lax and Costello in 2014 still holds great explanatory 
force. According to them: “The scope of application ratione loci of the Charter 
is … to be determined by reference to the general scope of application of EU 
law, following autonomous requirements. The Charter applies to a particular 
situation once EU law governs it. There is no additional criterion, of a territorial 
character or otherwise, that needs to be fulfilled in this context.”17 As the con-
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17, p 32. For com-
mentary on Art. 51, see Ward, ‘Article 51’, in Peers et al. (eds), op.cit., 1413 at pp. 1413-1454. 
10 Thomas van Danwitz and Katerina Paraschas, ‘A Fresh Start for the Charter: Fundamental 
questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’, (2017) 35 Ford-
ham Int’l l. J. 1396 at 1399. According to Tridimas: “The Charter does not apply unless a situation 
is governed by Union law by virtue of a connecting factor other than the Charter … Nonetheless, 
within the ambit of EU law, there is no limitation rationae materiae in the scope of application of 
the Charter.” Takis Tridimas, ‘Fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU law, and the Charter’, 
(2014) 16 Cambridge Yearbook of European legal Studies 361 at 381. 
11 On what constitutes ‘implementation of Union law’ by the Member States, see general-
ly Benedikt Pirker, ‘Mapping the Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights: A Typology’, 
(2018) 3 European Papers 133. 
12 vivian Kube, Eu Human Rights, International Investment law and Participation: opera-
tionalizing the Eu Foreign Policy objective to Global Human Rights Protection (Springer 2019), 
at 34. For the relevance of a competence-based reading of the scope of the Charter, see the 
Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Opinion 1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:72, para 195:“[I]t is necessary 
to clarify that it follows from the second sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU, read in conjunction with 
Article 21 TEU, that the European Union must, when exercising the competences conferred on it 
by the EU and FEU Treaties, including those relating to the common commercial policy, respect 
fundamental rights, of which the principle of equal treatment forms part. The European Union is 
a union based on the rule of law in which all acts of its institutions are subject to review of their 
compatibility with, in particular, the Treaties, general principles of law and fundamental rights.”
13 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium Case, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, EU:C:2017:173, 
para 91. 
14 Ibid., para 97. Joined cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15P and C-10/15P ledra Advertising ltd et al v 
European Commission and European Central Bank, EU:C:2016:701, Opinion of AG Wahl, para 
85. 
15 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v. Akerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 21. See also 
Case C-390/12 Robert Pfleger and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:281, para 34. 
16 vivian Kube, (n 12), at 34-36. 
17 Moreno-Lax and Costello, op.cit., at 1679-1680. See also the Opinion of AG Mengozzi in 
the X and X v Belgium Case, op.cit.
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tributions to this special testify, recent case law of the Court still supports this 
starting point.
Furthermore, different EU instruments show that Union institutions remain 
bound by the Charter even when they act outside the territory of EU Member 
States. A prime example here is Regulation 2016/1624 on the European Border 
and Coast Guard.18 According to the Regulation, in performing its tasks, which, 
inter alia, expressly include training19 and co-ordination of border management 
activities on the territory of third States,20 the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency “shall guarantee the protection of fundamental rights … in accordance 
with relevant Union law” and “in particular the Charter.”21 More interestingly for 
present purposes, the Commission’s Guidelines on the analysis of human rights 
impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy measures22 lend further 
support to the argument advanced here. The Guidelines highlight that the pur-
pose of identifying human rights impacts is to assess “how trade measures 
which might be included in a proposed trade-related policy initiative are likely 
to impact: either on the human rights of individuals in the countries or territories 
concerned; or on the ability of the EU and the partner country/ies to fulfil or 
progressively realise their human rights obligations.”23 De Schutter stressed, in 
a 2016 study commissioned by the European Parliament, that this “confirms the 
understanding (illustrated by the Front Polisario case …) that fundamental rights 
that are binding in the EU legal order should be complied with also for the ben-
efit of individuals situated outside the territories of the Member States: such 
fundamental rights have in other terms, an ‘extraterritorial’ scope…”.24 In this 
context, it is also worthwhile noting that the Guidelines explicitly provide that: 
“Respect for the Charter of fundamental rights in Commission acts and initiatives 
is a binding legal requirement in relation to both internal policies and external 
action.”25
Overall, the existing case-law on the extraterritorial application of the Charter 
as well as several EU instruments support the conclusion reached above on 
the basis of a textual analysis of Article 51(1). Whether or not the EU institutions 
exercise their powers within the territory of the Member States is immaterial; 
what matters in the context of triggering the applicability of the Charter is wheth-
er the situation at hand is covered by an EU competence. 
18 Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard amending Regulation 2016/399 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation No 863/2007 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, Council Regulation No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, 
OJ[2016] L251/1.
19 Ibid., Art. 36(7). 
20 Ibid., Art. 54(1) – (3). 
21 Ibid., Art. 34(1). 
22 European Commission, Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact as-
sessments for trade-related policy measures, 2 July 2015, available at <https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf> accessed 20 January 2020.
23 Ibid., 2 (emphasis added). 
24 De Schutter, op.cit., at 2. 
25 Ibid. at 5. (emphasis in the original). 
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2. THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF THE DUTy TO PROTECT 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABROAD
The conclusion that the Charter equally applies to external action26 by the Union 
raises a number of new questions. Many of these questions have been ad-
dressed in a workshop that was organised jointly by the Centre for the Law of 
EU External Relations (CLEER) at the T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague, and 
the Interest Group ‘The EU as Global Actor’ of the European Society of Inter-
national Law (ESIL).27
A first question – addressed by Chloé Brière and Areg Navasartian in this 
issue28 – is how the CJEU relies on the principle of primacy of EU law and the 
general requirement to comply with EU primary law, including the EU Charter 
of Fundamental rights, to develop a new standard of review for the EU’s inter-
national agreements. After all, once concluded, international agreements become 
‘an integral part’ of EU law (to quote the Court in the classic Haegeman case29). 
A first way to ensure fundamental rights protection therefore is to use the pro-
cedure in Article 218(11) TFEU for an a priori check of the compatibility of the 
envisaged agreement with EU primary law. That this may, and in fact should, 
include a check with the compatibility of Charter provisions was recently con-
firmed by the Court in its Opinion on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement.30 ques-
tions of discrimination also emerged in relation to the CETA agreement between 
the EU and Canada.31 But not only through Article 218(11), also through other 
procedures the Court aimed to ensure a direct or indirect compatibility of EU 
external actions with the Charter. Examples revealing an increased attention of 
the Court in the application of fundamental rights in external relations include 
the Common Commercial Policy (by giving more attention to for instance sus-
tainable development and labour protection standards), and sanctions policy.
So, what does all of this mean for the extraterritorial application of EU fun-
damental rights? As we have seen, internally, the Court has ample opportunities 
to apply EU fundamental rights standards to concluded (or to be concluded) 
international agreements. Externally, however, the question is to what extent 
the Charter can be applied in the context of the EU’s trade agreements. As 
analysed by Katarzyna Szepelak,32 it has not been so easy to define the scope 
26 These days, the external dimension of the Union is visible not only in in its foreign policy 
and external action, but also in almost all internal policy fields. See for a recent overview of the 
main rules and principles: R.A. Wessel and J. Larik (Eds.), Eu External Relations law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (2nd edition), Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020.
27 The workshop took place on 11 December 2019 at the Asser Institute in The Hague. This 
CLEER Paper contains a selection of the papers that were presented there and that have further 
been developed on the basis of a review and discussion process.
28 Chloé Brière and Areg Navasartian, ‘Lex Generalis and the Primacy of EU Law as a Source 
of the EU’s Duty to Respect Human Rights Abroad: Lessons Learned from The Case-Law of the 
CJEU’, in this issue.
29 Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41.
30 Opinion 1/15 (Eu-Canada PNR Agreement) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:592, par. 70.
31 Opinion 1/17 (Eu-Canada CET Agreement) [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.
32 Katarzyna Szepelak, ‘Judicial Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and EU Trade Relations – Where Do We Stand Today?’, in this issue.
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of the extraterritorial application of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Charter, even 
if we, in principle, accept that the Charter’s rules are applicable to relations and 
situations beyond the EU’s borders. The Court seems reluctant to enter into 
in-depth analyses of fundamental rights elements in extraterritorial trade situa-
tions and arguments derived from the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights do not seem to suit the specificity of the review of EU trade agreements.
A next question then concerns to what extent trade agreements are actually 
fit to deal with fundamental rights. How does the EU understand its obligation 
to include fundamental rights in, in particular, the so-called ‘new generation’ of 
EU free trade agreements (FTAs)? The current – post-Lisbon – version of the 
Treaty does indeed offer a new normative impetus by linking the Common Com-
mercial Policy to the realisation of the values that are fundamental to the EU’s 
development. As argued by Isabella Mancini in her contribution to this issue,33 
a combined reading of Articles 207 TFEU and 21(1) and 3(5) TEU reveals a 
shift from the traditional understanding of the EU as a global trade actor that is 
expected to promote fundamental rights globally ‘through’ its trade agreement, 
to the protection of fundamental rights by the Union ‘in’ trade. While the new 
FTA’s as such do not contain a chapter on fundamental rights, they do provide 
a series of mechanisms aimed at their protection. Labour rights feature most 
prominently among the fundamental rights to be protected, with data privacy 
rights being referred to less frequently. yet, overall, the FTAs largely remain 
what they are: trade agreements. For Mancini this is a reason to argue that they 
are fundamentally flawed and that there is a compelling need to better under-
stand how trade agreements could intensify negative effects upon fundamental 
rights in the context of new technologies and business practices that underlie 
the dynamics of production and trade in goods and services.
A final question concerns the actual possibilities of individuals, living outside 
the EU, to directly challenge the legality of EU measures approving trade agree-
ments. In other words, how should the locus standi requirements, contained in 
Article 263(4) TFEU, be interpreted in that context? On the basis of, above all, 
the above-mentioned Front Polisario case, Stephen Allen’s contribution aims to 
answer that question.34 Irrespective of a consensus on the extraterritorial effects 
of EU fundamental rights, the proof of the pudding, one could argue, is in the 
actual possibilities of non-EU applicants to enforce these rights. The Front Polisa-
rio case revealed additional complications as here the Court was not confront-
ed with an ‘individual’ and partly had to rely on international law arguments to 
settle the legal status of the Polisario. While the Court in the end did not di-
rectly address the locus standi criteria in this situation, Stephen Allen argues 
that accepting admissibility would be in line with the Union’s commitment to 
contributing to the protection of human rights and the strict observance of inter-
national law. This implies that the EU courts must broaden their interpretation 
of the procedural prerequisites through which the legality of the EU’s external 
33 Isabella Mancini, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU’s External Trade Relations: From Promo-
tion ‘Through’ Trade Agreements to Protection ‘in’ Trade Agreements’, in this issue.
34 Stephen Allen, ‘Direct Challenges to EU Measures Adopting Trade Agreements: locus 
Standi and the Front Polisario’s Western Sahara Claims in the EU Courts’, in this issue.
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actions can be challenged by affected individuals, especially those who are 
located beyond the combined territory of its Member States.
While these four dimensions of the EU’s duty to respect human rights in 
external situations do not do justice to the many complexities underlying the 
notion, we hope they may serve as contributions to a debate that is far from 
over, and in fact, may just be starting considering the increasing number of 
external activities the Union is engaged in.
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Lex generaLis AnD THE pRimACy of EU LAW As A soURCE 
of THE EU’s DUTy To REspECT HUmAn RigHTs AbRoAD: 
LEssons LEARnED fRom THE CAsE-LAW of THE CJEU.
Chloé Brière* and Areg Navasartian**
With the deepening of European integration, the European Union has evolved 
into a key player on the global scene, aiming to project certain standards inter-
nationally, including concerning the protection of human rights.1 The promotion 
of human rights, which traditionally refers to the promotion of international law 
standards, notably enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has 
been proclaimed as an objective of the EU’s external action since the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Furthermore, the EU has introduced several decades ago human 
rights considerations in its relations with its external partners, whether being 
third countries, regional or international organisations.2 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a series of changes 
in the EU’s external relations, and it has impacted the norms that the EU pro-
motes externally. The entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(hereafter “the Charter”) as part of EU primary law has boosted the references 
made to this instrument in EU legislative instruments and policy documents.3 It 
also impacted the conduct of the EU’s external activities, as the promotion of 
human rights became more complex, potentially encompassing or being comple-
mented by the promotion of fundamental rights, which could be defined as the 
promotion of the EU’s internal values and rights.4 The Court of justice of the EU 
(hereafter the CJEU or the Court) played an instrumental role in this shift: through 
its case law, it turned the Charter into a standard for the judicial review of the 
EU’s external activities. 
The present contribution proposes to conduct an appraisal of this new dimen-
sion of the EU’s external action, through a detailed analysis of the recent case 
* Professor of EU law, and Post-doctoral researcher F.R.S. -F.N.R.S, Centre for European 
Law, Université libre de Bruxelles.
** Researcher, Centre for European Law, Université libre de Bruxelles.
1 See, for instance, the continuous reference to respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the objectives of the EU’s external relations, Art. J.1 (2) TEU (Maastricht); Art. 11 (1) 
TEU (Amsterdam) and Art. 21 (1) TEU (Lisbon). 
2 Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles 
and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM(95)216 final 
and the Council Conclusions of 29 May 1995, PRES/95/152. 
3 Communication from the Commission on the Strategy for the effective implementation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573 final. 
4 For a discussion of such distinction, see, e.g., R. Tinière, ‘L’influence croissante de la Charte 
des droits fondamentaux sur la politique extérieure de l’Union européenne’, Revue des droits 
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law of the CJEU addressing both the EU’s external relations and the duty to 
respect human rights abroad. It aims at unveiling how the CJEU relies on the 
principle of primacy of EU law and the general requirement to comply with EU 
primary law, including the Charter, to develop a new standard of review for the 
EU’s international agreements. The consequences the Court derives from po-
tential conflicts are also partially addressed. 
It is divided in two main parts, starting with a short reminder of the jurisdiction 
of the Court in external relations matters (part 1.), and followed by an analysis 
of the various scenarios in which the Court has relied on the Charter for review-
ing the international activities of the EU (part 2.). In conclusion, it argues for the 
emergence of the Charter as a new standard of protection of fundamental rights 
in the EU’s external relations (part 3.). 
1. AvENUES ALLOWING THE CJEU TO REvIEW THE COMPATIBILITy 
OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE TREATIES 
In general, the CJEU has an important role in the development of EU law, and 
it has – without surprise – also played this role in the field of EU external rela-
tions law. In addition to its important case law on the external competences of 
the EU, and their relations with the external competences of the Member States,5 
the Court has also been called upon to assess the compatibility of international 
agreements with EU law. 
To carry out such assessments, the CJEU has generally relied on diverse 
mechanisms of judicial review: the mechanism of advisory opinions (currently 
provided for by Article 218 (11) TFEU) and a system of legal remedies of gen-
eral application (annulment proceedings, infringements proceedings or requests 
for preliminary references originating from national courts). These mechanisms 
have generated a rich line of case law through which the CJEU greatly contrib-
uted to shaping the competences and role of the EU as an international actor. 
The first mechanism, specific to the EU’s external activities, gives the Court 
the power to review ‘envisaged international agreements’ before they become 
legally binding and examine their compatibility with the Treaties. This procedure 
allows the Court to consider, in abstracto and without being limited by the facts 
of any specific case, the constitutional legality of envisaged international agree-
ments.6 The Court itself stressed its preventive dimension.7 Complications would 
5 On this issue, see for instance I. Govaere, ‘External competence: what’s in a Name? The 
Difficult Conciliation between Dynamism of the ECJ and Dynamics of European Integration’, in 
P. Demaret, I. Govaere, and D. Hanf (eds.), European legal Dynamics/Dynamiques juridiques 
européennes (Peter Lang: 2007) at 461.
6 C. Eckes, Eu Powers under External Pressure. How the Eu’s External Actions Alter Its 
Internal Structures (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019) at 158. 
7 ECJ, Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol) [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:664, para. 6 and the case 
law referred to therein:  ‘Invalidation of the measure concluding the agreement because of an 
error as to its legal basis is liable to create, both at Community level and in the international legal 
order, complications which the special procedure of a prior reference to the Court, laid down in 
Article 300(6) EC, is specifically designed to forestall (see Opinion 1/75, pp. 1360 and 1361, and 
Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraphs 3 to 6).’
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indeed arise if, after the conclusion of the international agreement, the measure 
by which the EU ratified it would be declared invalid; the advisory procedure 
aims specifically at avoiding such complications. 
This competence has been recognised to the Court from an early stage. 
Already in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 1957, 
a specific provision foresaw that the Council, the Commission or a Member 
State could request the opinion of the Court on the compatibility of an envisaged 
international agreement with the Treaty (Art. 228 2nd indent EEC, Art. 300 (6) 
EEC after Amsterdam). The power of the Court was already important as it was 
provided that in case of a negative opinion, the agreement could not enter in 
force without a treaty revision (Art. 236 EEC). This procedure has allowed the 
Court to identify key aspects of EU external relations law, especially regarding 
the protection of human rights. It was for instance in Opinion 2/948 that the 
judges ruled out the competence of the Community to accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the basis of Article 235 EEC. They considered 
that it would entail a modification of constitutional significance of the fundamen-
tal rights protection system in the Community, which could only be brought about 
by way of Treaty amendment.9 Throughout the successive treaty revisions, this 
prerogative of the Court has not been questioned and new actors obtained the 
right to request such opinion, including the European Parliament (Art. 218 (11) 
TFEU), which they used regularly over the last decade.10 
The second mechanism for the CJEU to review the EU’s external activities 
is embedded in the architecture of the Treaties and the complete system of 
legal remedies it provides to ensure full respect and implementation of EU law. 
This system is composed of various legal proceedings, namely infringement 
proceedings, when a Member State fails to respect its obligations under EU law 
(Art. 258 to 260 TFEU); annulment proceedings, when an EU action is alleg-
edly in violation of the Treaties (Art. 263 and 264 TFEU) and the mechanism of 
preliminary references, which gives the Court the competence to answer ques-
tions regarding the validity and the interpretation of EU law arising in the context 
of disputes brought before national judges (Art. 267 TFEU). The combination 
of these legal remedies usually allows the CJEU to appreciate in concreto, and 
sometimes within the limits of the facts of the case, the compatibility of interna-
tional agreements with EU law. These remedies have offered numerous op-
portunities to the CJEU to shape the scope of the EU’s external competences, 
starting with the AETR judgment of 31 March 1971,11 following an annulment 
 8 ECJ, Opinion 2/94 (accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:140.  
 9 Ibid., para. 35.
10 For a recent analysis of the procedural dimension of this provision, an issue not covered by 
the present contribution, see, e.g., J. Helikoski, ‘The Procedural Law of International Agreements: 
A Thematic Journey through Article 218 TFEU’, 57 Common Market law Review 2020, 79-118. 
See also C. Flaesch-Mougin, ‘La Cour de Justice, acteur de l’ombre des négociations commer-
ciales internationales de l’Union européenne’, in J. Lebullenger and C. Debrock (eds), Generation 
TAFTA, les nouveaux partenariats de la mondialisation (PUR: 2018), at 165.
11 ECJ, Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities (European Agreement on Road Transport) [1971] ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. 
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proceeding initiated by the European Commission, in which the Court introduced 
the existence of implied external competences at the benefit of the EU. Simi-
larly, infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission allowed 
the Court, in the open Skies judgments, to clarify the distribution of compe-
tences between the European Economic Community and the Member States 
in concluding international air transport agreements.12 Preliminary references 
have also allowed the Court to review the compatibility of EU norms with inter-
national agreements, or to rule on the direct effect of the provisions of such 
agreements.13 These legal remedies are particularly interesting as they allow 
interested parties, being EU institutions or other actors, to challenge the valid-
ity and/or compatibility of an international agreement with EU law after its rati-
fication and entry into force, often via a challenge of an implementing act. Such 
remedies are thus essential that compliance with EU law can be ensured in the 
long term.
The combination of these mechanisms enabled the CJEU to play an essen-
tial role in the development of the EU as an international actor, and in shaping 
the rules governing its external activities. With the Lisbon Treaty, most of the 
legal rules identified in its case law have been codified in the EU treaties, such 
as the different possibilities for the recognition of an implied external competence 
to the EU.14 
Furthermore, the CJEU continues to play the role of a constitutional court in 
the field of EU external relations, reviewing the compatibility of international 
agreements with EU primary law and sanctioning those who are incompatible 
with it. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the work of the CJEU 
in the field of external relations has been particularly dense and important. In 
the past decade, the CJEU has notably introduced new standards to review the 
compatibility of the EU’s external activities with EU primary law. In this regard, 
the increasing use of the Charter as a tool to conduct such a review is particu-
larly noticeable. 
The Charter is a rather unique instrument, and it occupies a specific place in 
the array of EU norms. Not fully integrated in the Treaties – as was envisaged 
in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – the Charter has still been 
granted the same legal value as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU) and forms an in-
tegral part of EU primary law. Although the Charter is of a complex substance, 
distinguishing between principles and rights, the CJEU has been increasingly 
called upon to interpret its provisions. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
12 ECJ, Joined cases C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-475/
98 and C-476/98, Commission v. united Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, luxem-
bourg, Austria, Germany (open Skies) [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:624 to EU:C:2002:631.
13 See, e.g., ECJ, Case 181/73, R. & v. Haegeman, [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:41 (EEC interna-
tional agreements forming an integral part of the EEC legal order); or ECJ, Case 12/86, Meryem 
Demirel [1987] ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (direct effect of a provision of the Association Agreement 
with Turkey and incompetence of the Court to review the compatibility of national legislation with 
the ECHR). 
14 See for instance Art. 3 (2) TEU, or Art. 216 (1) TFEU. 
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Lisbon, the Luxembourg judges have begun – albeit with some mishaps15 – to 
rely on it as a source of rights and obligations binding on the EU institutions, 
agencies, bodies and offices, and the EU Member States when they implement 
EU law.16 This increased reliance of the Court on the Charter as a standard for 
judicial review is also noticeable in the field of EU’s external relations law. We 
will explore in the next part how in this specific field the CJEU is making more 
and more references to the Charter.
2. THE vARIETy OF THE CJEU’S USES OF THE CHARTER AS A 
STANDARD FOR REvIEWING THE EU’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
The protection of fundamental rights is not a novelty within the EU legal order. 
It has been established firstly via their recognition as general principles of EU 
law, and the Court developed a well-established case-law according to which 
international agreements, even prior to the entry into force of the Charter, have 
to be reviewed in light of fundamental rights, guaranteed as general principles 
of EU law.17 Their protection has obtained a new dimension first with the redac-
tion of the Charter and its proclamation in 2000, and then with its consecration 
as a binding instrument, with the same force as the Treaties (Art. 6 TEU), in 
2009. 
As a result of its consecration, it is somewhat unsurprising that the CJEU 
integrated the Charter among the standards it uses to review the compatibility 
of international agreements with EU treaties. Reflecting in a certain way the 
wide array of judicial avenues through which the EU’s external activities may 
be brought before it, the CJEU has mobilized various legal bases to assess and 
carry out in-depth reviews of the compatibility of international agreements with 
the Charter, thus formalizing the importance taken by the Charter, including the 
EU’s external activities. 
The next paragraphs will be devoted to the analysis of the CJEU’s case law 
in this field. It will start with an examination of the way CJEU relied on the clas-
sical scenario of Article 218(11) TFEU, in which the Court exercises a direct 
compatibility control of international agreements, and made it evolve to include 
the Charter in its control (a.). Will then follow more atypical scenarios, in which 
the CJEU has been led to carry out an indirect compatibility control, in which 
the CJEU relied on other means than Article 218(11) TFEU to examine the EU’s 
external actions (b.). Finally, we will address the ambiguous use of the principle 
of autonomy of the EU legal order, which has played a key role in the reasoning 
15 As examples of the reserves of the judges to refer to and rely on the Charter, see ECJ, 
Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 or ECJ, Case C-176/12, Associa-
tion de médiation sociale [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2. 
16 See S. Peers et. al. (eds.), The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary (Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing 2014), or F. Picod et. al. (eds.), Charte des droits fondamentaux d l’union 
européenne. Commentaire article par article (Brussels: Bruylant 2019).
17 See, among others, ECJ, Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paras 283-
285.
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of the Court in various advisory Opinions on the conclusion of envisaged inter-
national agreements (c.). 
a. The “classical scenario”: direct compatibility control under Article 
218 (11) TfEU
As previously stated, the Treaty of Lisbon did not alter the prerogative of the 
Court to be requested to review a priori the compatibility of an envisaged inter-
national agreement with EU law on the basis of Article 218 (11) TFEU. Like in 
the past, this procedure is not exercised lightly, and a few years of patience 
were required before the Court was given the opportunity to examine the sub-
stantial compatibility of an envisaged international agreement with EU primary 
law, as amended by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
One of the first occasions the Court had the possibility to clarify whether the 
Charter counted among the standards to be complied with by an envisaged 
international agreement arose in its Opinion 1/15 on the draft Passenger Name 
Record (‘PNR’) Agreement between the EU and Canada.18 This Opinion has 
received wide-spread attention, firstly due to the fact that it was the first time 
the European Parliament made use of its new capacity to request an advisory 
Opinion from the CJEU, and secondly due to the topic of the envisaged inter-
national agreement. It concerned the exchange of passenger name records, 
including sensitive personal data, a topic on which the European Parliament 
had already had the opportunity to voice its concerns regarding the compatibil-
ity of such transfer to external partners with fundamental rights.19 The Euro-
pean Parliament requested an Opinion from the Court referring precisely to the 
question of the compatibility of the envisaged agreement with the provisions of 
the Treaty and the Charter.20 After recalling its “traditional position” on the role 
and importance of such advisory procedure for the international relations of the 
EU,21 and when examining the admissibility of the request, the CJEU very 
openly stated that:
‘A judgment on the compatibility of an agreement with the Treaties may in that regard 
depend, inter alia, not only on provisions concerning the powers, procedure or or-
ganisation of the institutions of the European Union, but also on provisions of sub-
stantive law […]. The same is true of a question relating to the compatibility of an 
international agreement with the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEu and, conse-
18 ECJ, Opinion 1/15 (Eu-Canada PNR Agreement) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:592. 
19 See in particular the proceedings it brought against an adequacy decision of the Commis-
sion concerning the U.S.A.: ECJ, joined cases C-317 and 318/04, European Parliament v. Council 
and Commission [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:346.
20 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, para. 1: ‘Is the [envisaged agreement between Canada and 
the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data] compat-
ible with the provisions of the Treaties (Article 16 TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (Articles 7, 8 and Article 52(1)) as regards the right of individuals to the 
protection of personal data?’. 
21 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, para. 69. 
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quently, with the guarantees enshrined in the Charter, since the Charter has the 
same legal status as the Treaties.’22 [emphasis added]. 
With such reasoning, the Court rightly introduced the Charter among the stan-
dards through which it would examine the envisaged agreement, reflecting the 
new place this instrument received in the Treaties. As a consequence of such 
inclusion, the CJEU proceeded to a thorough examination of the compatibility 
of the envisaged agreement with the provisions of the Charter on the protection 
of personal data. 
The reasoning applied here is very similar to the reasoning it applies when 
reviewing the compatibility of internal instruments with the Charter, and also 
very ‘traditional’ as regards the control of human rights by supranational and 
national courts.23 The Court indeed firstly considered that the processing of 
personal data constitutes an interference with the fundamental right to the pro-
tection of personal data guaranteed in Article 8 of the Charter,24 which still 
continues to apply where personal data is transferred from the European Union 
to a non-member country.25 When examining the proportionality and adequacy 
of the processing of personal data in the PNR agreement between Canada and 
the EU, the Court insists on the importance that the agreement contains clear 
and precise rules limited to what is strictly necessary, defining the degree of 
seriousness of the offences concerned,26 the authorities responsible for receiv-
ing and processing data,27 the person concerned28 and the retention and use 
of data,29 as well as the rights of the data subjects and the oversight of data 
protection safeguards.30 The Court carried out a meticulous review of each of 
the relevant provisions, pronouncing itself on their compatibility with the Charter 
(i.e. not exceeding what is strictly necessary to attain the objective pursued by 
that agreement, or strengthening certain rights31), or their incompatibility with 
the Charter.32
The Court concluded that the draft agreement could not be concluded in its 
current form, and based its decision on two grounds: its adoption of the wrong 
22 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, para. 70. 
23 C. Brière, ‘Cooperation of Europol and Eurojust with External Partners in the Fight Against 
Crime: What are the Challenges Ahead?’, DCu Brexit Institute Working Paper 2018, at 26. 
24 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, para. 126.
25 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, para. 134.
26 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, paras 175-177.
27 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, paras 182 ff.
28 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, paras 186 ff.
29 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, paras 190 ff. 
30 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, paras 228 ff.
31 On the individual rights of air passengers and the compatibility of the provisions regarding 
their rights in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, protecting the right to an effective rem-
edy before a tribunal, see Opinion 1/15, para. 227: ‘The fact that Article 14(2) of the envisaged 
agreement provides that the ‘effective judicial redress’ may also take the form of an action for 
compensation does not, contrary to what the Parliament claims, have the effect of depriving air 
passengers of such an effective remedy, but rather strengthens, as the Advocate General has 
observed in point 324 of his Opinion, judicial protection for the persons concerned’.
32 See especially Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, para. 203, 211, 215.
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legal basis33 and the incompatibility of several of its provisions with the Charter.34 
Regarding the second point, the Court detailed a series of amendments to be 
made to correct the incompatibilities identified, which almost resemble new 
negotiations guidelines.35 As a follow-up, the Council amended in December 
2017 the authorisation36 it gave to the Commission to negotiate the agreement 
with Canada. New negotiations, launched in June 2018, were concluded in 
2019, and the finalisation of the agreement is now pending.37 
Beyond the specificities of the envisaged agreement, the Court reaffirmed 
the importance of fundamental rights in reviewing the compatibility of envisaged 
international agreements with the EU treaties, and especially rights enshrined 
in the Charter. According to M. Cremona, this Opinion provides an example of 
the way the Court has throughout the last decade detailed ‘what a commitment 
to constitutional and international fundamental rights legality entails’.38 With 
Opinion 1/15, the Court asserted the need for substantive compliance, as a 
failure to comply with constitutional fundamental rights as expressed in the 
Charter has resulted in a declaration of incompatibility of a projected interna-
tional agreement.39 The ruling thus also provided valuable support for Euro-
pean negotiators, and had a practical impact on the cooperation between the 
EU and third countries in the exchange of PNR data.40 As an example, the 
Opinion was notably referred to in the Commission’s recommendation for a 
Council Decision to authorise the opening of negotiations for a new PNR agree-
ment between the EU and Japan,41 in which the Commission stressed that the 
33 The European Parliament disagreed with the choice of the Council of point (d) of the sec-
ond subparagraph of Article 82(1) and Article 87(2)(a) TFEU (police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters) as legal bases for the Council decision on the conclusion of the envisaged 
agreement. For the Court, the decision should be based on both Article 16(2) (protection of per-
sonal data) and Article 87(2)(a) TFEU (Opinion 1/15, para. 104 and 118).
34 For a discussion of Opinion 1/15, see, e.g., C. Kuner, ‘International agreements, data pro-
tection, and EU fundamental rights on the international stage: Opinion 1/15, EU-Canada PNR’, 55 
Common Market law Review 2018, 857–882.
35 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18, conclusion, para. 3 (a) to (g). 
36 Council, Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for an Agreement be-
tween the European Union and Canada for the transfer and use of Passenger Name Record, 
approved on 7 December 2017, Council Doc. No. 13672/1/17 Rev 1 and Add. 1. 
37 At the recent EU-Canada summit in July, the parties finally presented a new agreement, 
which is to be adopted by the parliaments after a legal review. An adequacy decision was also 
taken on Canada. See press release, available at: <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=2051>, and for an analysis of the EU’s PNR agreements, see M. Monroy, ‘New agree-
ments: European Union wants to expand use of passenger data’, 22 November 2019, available 
at: <https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/22/new-agreements-european-union-wants-to-expand-use-
of-passenger-data/>. 
38 M. Cremona, ‘Extending the Reach of EU Law, The EU as an International Legal Actor’, in 
M. Cremona and J. Scott (eds), Eu law Beyond Eu Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of Eu 
law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019), p. 81. 
39 Ibid. 
40 C. Docksey, ‘Opinion 1/15: Privacy and security, finding the balance’ 24 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative law 2017, at 771. 
41 Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision to authorise the opening of negotia-
tions for an Agreement between the European Union and Japan for the transfer and use of Pas-
senger Name Record (PNR) data to prevent and combat terrorism and other serious transnational 
crime, COM(2019) 420 final. 
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text took into consideration the applicable EU legal framework on data protec-
tion and PNR, including the treaties and the Charter. As a consequence, the 
text includes references to the Charter’s provisions in both the draft Council 
Decision42 and the negotiating directives.43 It illustrates how Opinion 1/15 gave 
a clear place to the Charter in the development of the EU’s external activities, 
and how the CJEU could eventually be called upon to review its respect. Short-
ly after, the CJEU had further occasions to rely on it when reviewing envisaged 
international agreements. 
A next opportunity arose with the request for an Opinion made by the Kingdom 
of Belgium regarding the compatibility of the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada in September 2017.44 
This request is particularly notable for a series of reasons. The request was 
made by the Belgian federal government, after a political deal was sealed with 
the regional Walloon government, which had refused to ratify the CETA,45 and 
the request thus integrates itself in the multi-level structure of governance of 
the European Union. The request also attracted attention due to the substance 
of the question asked, referring to the compatibility with EU law of the Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Mechanism provided for in the agreement. 
This type of mechanism is increasingly present in new generation investment 
treaties,46 and the ISDS mechanism included in the CETA agreement was the 
key reform model the EU developed for dispute settlement in international bi-
lateral investment agreements.47 Such mechanism had also been subject of 
politically sensitive discussions, in Europe and beyond, with civil society or-
ganisations marking their strong opposition to it.48 Finally, the request for an 
Opinion on the ISDS foreseen in the agreement integrated itself in a context in 
which the Court had previously rejected the creation of dispute settlement 
mechanisms, relying inter alia on the concept of the autonomy of the EU legal 
order.49 This topic was furthermore particularly topical and sensitive in the af-
42 Ibid., p. 3. 
43 Commission, Annex to the Recommendation for a Council Decision to authorise the open-
ing of negotiations for an Agreement between the European Union and Japan for the transfer and 
use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to prevent and combat terrorism and other serious 
transnational crime, COM(2019) 420 final Annex, para. 6 and para. 8 e) and h). 
44 ECJ, Opinion 1/17 (Eu-Canada CET Agreement) [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:341. 
45 K. Lenaerts, Modernising trade whilst safeguarding the Eu constitutional framework: an 
insight into the balanced approach of opinion 1/17, 6 September 2019, Belgian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs - Brussels Seminar on Opinion 1/17 of the European Court of Justice and on the re-
form of investment protection, available at: <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/
downloads/presentation_lenaerts_opinion_1_17.pdf>. 
46 Similar dispute settlements mechanisms have notably be included in the agreements 
with vietnam and Singapore, see S.W. Schill, ‘The European Union’s Foreign Direct Investment 
Screening Paradox: Tightening Inward Investment Control to Further External Investment Liber-
alization’, 46 legal Issues of Economic Integration 2019, at 113.
47 S.W. Schill, supra note 46, at 127. 
48 See for instance, D. De Bièvre, S. Gstöhl and E. van Ommeren, overcoming ‘Franken-
foods’ and ‘secret courts’: the resilience of Eu trade policy, CEPOB #9.18, May 2018, available 
at: <https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/de_bievre_gstohl_vanommer-
encepob_final.pdf?download=1>. 
49 See, e.g., ECJ, Opinion 1/91 (European Economic Area I) [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:490; 
ECJ, Opinion1/09 (unified Patent litigation System) [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, quoted in S.W. 
Schill, supra note 46, at 126. 
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termath of Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement on the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR.50 For all these reasons, the Opinion of the Court was highly and ea-
gerly expected.51 
For the purpose of our analysis, its main interest lies in the reference made 
by the Court to its competence under Article 218 (11) TFEU and the scope of 
review it exercises. Referring to recent judgments,52 the Court stressed how the 
compatibility of an agreement envisaged with the Treaties ‘must be construed 
in the light of that general requirement of compatibility with the EU constitu-
tional framework.’53 For the Court, this implied that an examination of the com-
patibility of an agreement envisaged would include: 
“not only on provisions concerning the powers, procedure or organization of the 
institutions of the European Union, but also on provisions of substantive law. The 
same is true of a question relating to the compatibility of an envisaged international 
agreement with the guarantees enshrined in the Charter, since the Charter has the 
same legal status as the Treaties.”54 [emphasis added]
As a consequence, like in Opinion 1/15, the CJEU proceeded to an in-depth 
review of the compatibility of the ISDS with specific provisions of the Charter. 
The first element reviewed concerned a potential difference of treatment 
between Canadian and EU-based investors, the latter not being able for their 
investments within Europe to bring a dispute before the CETA Tribunal. The 
Belgian government inquired whether this could be contrary to Articles 20 and 
21 of the Charter protecting equality before the law and prohibiting discrimina-
tion, in this case on grounds of nationality. Opinion 1/17 is the first time that the 
Court addressed directly the issue of discrimination between foreign and EU-
based investors, even though the issue was raised but not answered by the 
Court55 in the case Achmea.56 The Court considered that Canadian investors 
that invest within the Union are not in a situation that is comparable to that of 
EU-based investors that invest in Canada, or within the Union.57 The Court 
stressed that Canadian investors, in their capacity as foreign investors, are to 
have a specific legal remedy against EU measures,58 something that is consid-
ered as a standard practice in investment and trade agreements.59 The Court 
50 See infra. 
51 For a discussion of the possible consequences of the Opinion of the Court on the EU’s 
capacity to shape international investment law, see S.W. Schill, supra note 46, 127-128. 
52 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 165: ‘see, inter alia, Opinion 1/15 (Eu-Canada PNR 
Agreement) of 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592, paragraph 67, and judgment of 27 February 
2018, Western Sahara Campaign uK, C-266/16, EU:C:2018:118, paragraph 46)’.
53 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 166. 
54 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 167.
55 See e.g. Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘It Is not Just About Investor-State Arbitration: A Look at 
Case C-284/16, Achmea Bv’, 3 European Papers 2018, 367-368. 
56 ECJ, Case C-284/16, Achmea [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, para. 23 & 61. The provision 
invoked was Article 18 TFEU. 
57 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 180. 
58 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 181. 
59 See in this regard, Chapter 21 in the Economic Partnership Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and Japan (oJ L 330, 27.12.2018, p. 3) or Chapter 15, in the Free Trade Agreement 
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thus rejected the doubts expressed by the Belgian government, and it also did 
so regarding the alleged discrimination in the access of redress for decisions 
sanctioning a violation of competition law.60 
The second element reviewed referred to the potential breach of the right of 
access to an independent tribunal, protected by Article 47 of the Charter. After 
recalling principles identified in previous case-law, in particular the case lM 
(deficiencies in the judicial system),61 the Court conducted an extensive review 
of the CETA Tribunal and the rules governing them. It firstly considered wheth-
er they were compatible with the requirement of accessibility, in particular for 
small and medium-sized enterprises and natural persons, which might find it 
difficult to bear the costs of the proceedings. Although the provisions of the 
CETA do not contain any legally binding commitments relating to financial ac-
cessibility, Statement No. 36 foresees the adoption of additional rules on the 
matter, and – for the Court – it makes the conclusion of the CETA by the Coun-
cil subject to the premise that financial accessibility will be ensured.62 The Court 
then examined the compatibility of the CETA Tribunal with the requirement of 
independence. The CETA Tribunal was an interesting test for reviewing their 
compatibility with requirements on independence. The Court itself stressed that 
if the rules on bringing cases before the CETA Tribunal are largely inspired by 
traditional ISDS mechanisms, it is not the case with respect to the rules on the 
composition of that Tribunal and on dealing with those cases.63 The CETA Tri-
bunal is indeed composed of relatively independent arbitrators, with high-level 
legal qualifications and who are allocated to a case on the basis of drawing from 
a rooster, ensuring a random and unpredictable composition of the divisions.64 
Nevertheless, a close scrutiny was required, considering that this Tribunal aims 
at offering an alternative mechanism of dispute settlement that is neither embed-
ded in the national constitution, nor subject to review by the ordinary judiciary.65 
The Belgian government had raised concerns about the appointment and re-
muneration of the members of the CETA Tribunal, and the possibility of the Joint 
Committee to adopt binding decisions on the interpretation of the agreement. 
However, the Court sets aside each of these elements.66 The Court also exam-
ined the internal aspect of the requirement of independence (i.e. maintenance 
of an equal distance from the parties in the proceedings and the absence of any 
personal interest), for which it did not identify any issues.67 As pinpointed by K. 
Lenaerts, the ethical rules contained in Article 8.30 CETA require the members 
of the envisaged tribunals to be independent and impartial both at the time where 
between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of viet Nam (signed)
60 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, paras 184-186. 
61 ECJ, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the judicial 
system) [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
62 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, paras 216, 217 and 221. 
63 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 194. 
64 C. Eckes, ‘Some Reflections on Achmea’s Broader Consequences for Investment Arbitra-
tion’, 4 European Papers 2019 at 83
65 Ibid., p. 84
66 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 223-237. 
67 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 238-243. 
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a claim is brought and throughout the proceedings, and preclude them from 
being affiliated to any government, and any failure to meet these requirements 
may result in their removal.68 
As a general conclusion, the Court had not identified incompatibilities with 
EU law and thus declared the CETA’s Chapter on dispute settlement compatible 
with EU primary law, and in particular with provisions of the Charter.69 
These two cases show, albeit with a varying outcome in terms of conciliating 
internationally negotiated agreements with the Charter, that this latter instrument 
has started to play a pivotal role in the direct compatibility control under Article 
218 (11) TFEU. The Court integrates provisions of the Charter among the stan-
dards against which it will test the compatibility of envisaged international agree-
ments with EU law, and Luxembourg judges have even pushed for the 
re-negotiations of certain provisions in order to mitigate their impact on the 
fundamental rights of individuals protected by the Charter. The Court turned the 
Charter into one of the parameters in the negotiations of international agree-
ments within the scope of EU law. This goes beyond the role the general prin-
ciples of EU law played before the entry into force of the Charter. 
b. Atypical scenarios 
Our analysis will now turn to alternative scenarios, in which the Court is called 
upon to review the compatibility of international agreements with the Charter, 
albeit in an indirect way. This indirect control has taken two distinct features: on 
the one hand, the Court has stressed the roles and powers of the European 
institutions when acting in such capacity, and on the other hand, the CJEU has 
conditioned the validity of international agreements, by analysing the compat-
ibility of the acts deriving from it with the Charter. Both scenarios will be exam-
ined in turn.
i. Through the roles and powers vested in the European institutions 
The first case presented itself in the wake of the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis that hit several EU Member States late 2008. In order to safeguard the 
financial stability of the Union, deficient Member States (Greece, Cyprus, Ireland 
and Portugal) needed to be bailed out. The Council and the European Council 
first adopted two temporary bail-out mechanisms70, which granted punctual aids 
based on strict conditionality71.
68 K. Lenaerts, supra note 45, p. 14 – 15. 
69 see e.g. the clear and explicit conclusion on the compatibility with Article 47 of the Charter, 
in Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 222. 
70 See, respectively, Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a 
European financial stabilisation mechanism, oJ [2010] L 118/1, 12.5.20101; and the framework 
agreement between the Member States of the Eurozone and the FESF: <http://www.efsf.europa.
eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf>.
71 Recital 7, Art. 1 and 2 of Regulation 407/2010. 
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However, due to the gravity of the situation, especially in Greece, a permanent 
solution had to be found. Due to the constraints of the Treaty, the Member States 
and the EU institutions had to demonstrate a certain ingenuity in this regard. 
Indeed, Articles 124 and 125 TFEU provide on the one hand for the prohibition 
of privileged access to financial institutions, and on the other hand for a “no 
bail-out clause”, which prohibits the Union or Member States to be liable for the 
decisions of the authorities of other Member States. A permanent bail-out mech-
anism instituted by the EU would therefore be a violation of the Treaties. The 
solution was found in a modification of the Treaties through the simplified pro-
cedure, adding a paragraph to Article 136 TFEU, that reads as follows:
‘3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mecha-
nism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a 
whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will 
be made subject to strict conditionality.’72
Given the fact that the simplified Treaty revision procedure under Article 48(6) 
TEU is certainly less time-consuming, but also less democratic than the ordinary 
revision procedure, due to the absence of a ratification procedure at the level 
of the Member States’ parliaments, the Treaties provide for a legal safeguard, 
which is that simplified revision procedures cannot affect the allocation of pow-
ers and the division of competences provided for in the Treaties. However, due 
to its impact on national budgetary policies, especially given the conditionality, 
any such stability mechanism as provided for in Article 136(6) would necessar-
ily impact the allocation of powers.73 The solution therefore found was that the 
Member States of the Eurozone, reunited in the European Council, created an 
intergovernmental structure under international law, outside the EU legal order. 
The European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM) was signed in Brussels on 2 
February 2012, and entered into force shortly after.74 Among other provisions, 
Article 13 of the ESM Treaty provides that the European Commission, and where 
necessary with the assistance of the European Central Bank, is entrusted with 
the task to negotiate, on behalf of the Board of Governors of the ESM, with the 
concerned Member State, a Memorandum of Understanding setting out the 
conditions of the financial assistance provided. 
The conformity of this Treaty with several EU primary law dispositions, includ-
ing with the Charter, has been challenged a first time in the case Pringle75. 
Advocate General Kokott had argued in her view that: 
‘the ESM Treaty would only infringe European Union law if that Treaty required the 
Commission to perform tasks which the Treaties prohibited. The Commission remains, 
72 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose 
currency is the euro, oJ [2011] L91/1, 6.4.2011.
73 F. Allemand and F. Martucci, ‘La nouvelle gouvernance économique européenne’, 47 Ca-
hiers de droit européen 2012, at 434.
74 Full text available at: <https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/20150203_-_esm_
treaty_-_en.pdf>.
75 ECJ, Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, para. 28.
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even when it acts within the framework of the ESM, an institution of the Union and 
as such is bound by the full extent of European Union law, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.’76
The Court did not raise this issue in its judgment when assessing the confor-
mity of the ESM Treaty with the Charter. It only took into account the role of the 
Member States in the framework of the ESM, which, under Article 51(1) of the 
Charter, are not bound by it when they are not implementing EU law. Since the 
Member States concluded the ESM Treaty outside the EU legal order, they did 
not implement EU law and the Court therefore concluded that the ESM Treaty 
did not fall within the scope of protection of the Charter.77
Naturally this strategic oversight has led to criticism78, and the Court eventu-
ally qualified its stance in the case ledra Advertising.79 This case concerned 
the financial assistance provided to Cyprus in the framework of the ESM. Con-
trary to most Memoranda of Understanding concluded with deficient Member 
States, the Cypriot one included what is commonly called a “hair-cut” or a “bail-
in” of bank funds and deposits exceeding a certain amount, resulting in sub-
stantial reduction in the value of the funds and deposits. The concerned 
companies and individuals brought actions for annulment and liability before 
the General Court against the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank, requiring compensation for the losses suffered. They argued the Euro-
pean Commission signed the Memorandum of Understanding despite its in-
fringement of Article 17 of the Charter, guaranteeing their right to property. The 
General Court dismissed the claims as it considered it had no jurisdiction to 
examine the Memorandum of Understanding, since neither the ESM nor the 
Republic of Cyprus are among the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of 
the European Union, pursuant Article 263 TFEU.80
On appeal, the Court set aside this part of the judgment, and added an im-
portant nuance to its Pringle case-law: 
‘whilst the Member States do not implement EU law in the context of the ESM 
Treaty, so that the Charter is not addressed to them in that context, on the other 
hand the Charter is addressed to the Eu institutions, including […] when they act 
outside the Eu legal framework. Moreover, in the context of the adoption of a 
memorandum of understanding […] the Commission is bound, under both Article 17(1) 
76 AG Kokott, Opinion to Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:675, para. 
176. 
77 Pringle, supra note 75, paras 178-182. 
78 It has been argued that at the height of the financial crisis, the Court has willingly made cer-
tain sacrifices, among which the protection of fundamental rights, to preserve the delicate solution 
that had been found for the deficient Member States. See R. Cisotta and D. Gallo, ‘The impact of 
the Troika’s austerity measures on the Portuguese labour law system: a general assessment of 
the scope of social sovereignty in the light of the Constitutional Tribunal Case Law’, 4 European 
Journal of Social law 2014, at 108; F. Fines, ‘L’atteinte aux droits fondamentaux était-elle le prix 
du sauvetage de la zone euro?’, , in R. Tinière and C. vial (dir.), Protection des droits fondamen-
taux dans l’union européenne, (Brussels: Bruylant 2015) 195-211. 
79 ECJ, Joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, ledra Advertising v. Commission and ECB e.a. 
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:701.
80 GC, Case T-289/13, ledra Advertising v European Commission and ECB [2014] T:2014:981. 
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TEU, which confers upon it the general task of overseeing the application of EU law, 
and Article 13(3) and (4) of the ESM Treaty, which requires it to ensure that the 
memoranda of understanding concluded by the ESM are consistent with EU law, to 
ensure that such a memorandum of understanding is consistent with the fundamen-
tal rights guaranteed by the Charter.’81 [emphasis added]
This situation – an international agreement between the Member States which 
falls outside the scope of the EU legal order – is evidently not the same as the 
Union concluding an international agreement which would fall within the scope 
of the EU legal order. The Court however derived from Article 17(1) TEU, which 
entrusts the Commission with the task to oversee the correct application of the 
Treaties, a duty of care, capable of engaging the liability of the EU, including in 
the conclusion of international agreements falling outside the EU legal order.82 
This reasoning is a fortiori applicable to international agreements falling within 
the scope of the EU legal order. 83 On the basis of the judgment in ledra Adver-
tising, Article 17(1) TEU thus constitutes in the eyes of the Court an additional 
legal basis, ratione personae, imposing the obligation on the Commission to 
ensure that international agreements concluded within the scope of EU law 
comply with EU primary law.
ii. Through the control of acts deriving from international agreements
A second scenario in which the Court exercised its jurisdiction to conduct an 
indirect review of the compatibility of an international agreement with the Char-
ter can be identified. This time, the CJEU assessed such compatibility through 
the control of acts of secondary law deriving from international agreements. 
The case presented itself in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Associa-
tion Agreement between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco, concluded on 
26 February 1996.84 In the framework of this Agreement, the Council adopted 
81 ledra Advertising e.a., supra note 79, para. 67. 
82 The Commission itself acknowledged in reply to a question asked at the hearing, that it re-
tains, within the framework of the ESM Treaty, its role of guardian of the Treaties as resulting from 
Article 17(1) TEU, so that it should refrain from signing a memorandum of understanding whose 
consistency with EU law it doubts.
83 R. Tinière, « L’influence croissante de la Charte des droits fondamentaux sur la politique 
extérieure de l’Union européenne », supra note 4. 
84 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Com-
munities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part 
- Protocol 1 on the arrangements applying to imports into the Community of agricultural products 
originating in Morocco - Protocol 2 on the arrangements applying to imports into the Community of 
fishery products originating in Morocco - Protocol 3 on the arrangements applying to imports into 
Morocco of agricultural products originating in the Community - Protocol 4 concerning the defini-
tion of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol 5 on mutual as-
sistance in customs matters between the administrative authorities - Final Act - Joint Declarations 
- Agreements in the form of an Exchange of Letters - Declaration by the Community - Declarations 
by Morocco, oJ [2000] L70/2, 18.3.2000. 
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a decision on free trade of agricultural and other products, replacing certain 
Protocols of the Agreement.85 
This Council decision has been challenged before the General Court through 
an action for annulment brought by the Front Polisario, a national liberation 
movement present in Western Sahara, a disputed territory of which it controls 
a small part, the biggest part being under Moroccan occupancy.86 The Front 
Polisario considered the decision approved the application of the Agreement to 
the Western Sahara as well, resulting in a number of violations of EU law and 
international law by the Council, since the European Union does not recognise 
the sovereignty of Morocco over the entire Western Sahara. Among other pleas, 
the Front Polisario considered the Council violated several dispositions of the 
Charter, since:
‘by deciding to implement an agreement which flouts the right to self-determination 
of the Sahrawi people and which has the immediate effect of encouraging the policy 
of annexation conducted by Morocco, the occupying power, the Council breaches 
the principle of freedom, security and justice, and turns its back on the respect for 
the fundamental rights and legal systems of the Member States.’87 
On a preliminary note, the General Court interpreted the Agreement as applying 
to Western Sahara, based on the provisions of the Agreement and based on 
the fact that the European authorities were aware that the Kingdom of Morocco 
applied itself the Agreement to the part of the Western Sahara it occupies.88 
Based on this finding, it considered that while EU institutions enjoy a wide dis-
cretion in concluding international agreements with third countries, and that the 
control is therefore limited to manifest errors of assessment, the protection of 
fundamental rights is of particular importance, especially in this case where an 
agreement applies to a disputed territory. The Council must therefore examine 
all relevant factors in order to ensure that such an agreement and the production 
of goods destined to export to the EU is not detrimental to the fundamental rights 
of the population of such territory.89 These fundamental rights include the rights 
to human dignity, to life and to the integrity of the person (Articles 1 to 3 of the 
Charter), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 5 of the Charter), 
the freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15 of 
the Charter), the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter), the 
right to property (Article 17 of the Charter), the right to fair and just working 
85 Council Decision 2012/497/EU of 8 March 2012 on the conclusion of an Agreement in 
the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco 
concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural 
products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 3 and their Annexes 
and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, 
of the other part, oJ L 241, 7.9.2012, p. 2-47. 
86 GC, Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council and Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:953.
87 Front Polisario, supra note 86, para. 143. 
88 Front Polisario, supra note 86, paras 89-103. 
89 Front Polisario, supra note 86, paras 227-228. 
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conditions and the prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at 
work (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter).90
The General Court argued that even if the EU is not directly liable for the 
infringement of fundamental rights in third countries, it may indirectly encourage 
such infringements or profit from them if it allows an export of goods produced 
or obtained in conditions which do not respect the fundamental rights of the 
population of the territory from which they originate.91 In this specific case, the 
General Court considered that the Agreement facilitates the export of products 
to the EU originating from Western Sahara,92 and that the Agreement does not 
guarantee an exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara beneficial 
to its inhabitants.93 According to the General Court, the Council committed a 
manifest error of assessment by failing to ensure that the exploitation of natural 
resources of Western Sahara would not be detrimental to the fundamental rights 
of its inhabitants, and that the argument that this is a matter that only concerns 
the Kingdom of Morocco cannot be accepted.94
On appeal brought by the Council, the judgement has been set aside by the 
Court on the preliminary finding that the General Court erred in considering that 
the Agreement would apply to the territory of Western Sahara.95 Therefore, there 
has been no examination of the possible fundamental rights implications. 
This does not as such invalidate the reasoning of the General Court which 
is interesting for a number of reasons: firstly, the General Court, established its 
competence to assess the compatibility of international agreements through 
acts derived from it, with fundamental rights. As described above, this possibil-
ity is especially meaningful as it allows the CJEU to exercise an a posteriori 
control of international agreements, contrary to the procedure in Article 218(11) 
TFEU, allowing thus compliance with EU law in the long term. A second interest-
ing question raised here is the territorial scope of the Charter. Going further than 
the European Court of Human Rights’ review of the actions of its States parties 
in territories of third countries that they effectively control (‘effective control test’), 
the General Court gives extraterritorial effect to the Charter by widening its scope 
to EU decisions that have an extraterritorial effect.96 This is in line with the pro-
visions of the Charter, as there is no territoriality clause akin to other interna-
tional human rights instruments,97 that would limit the application of the Charter 
to violations occurred on the “territory” of the EU (or of that of the Member 
States), and solely a material scope of application: the implementation of EU 
law. v. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello saw herein the emergence of an autonomous 
paradigm governing the applicability of the Charter, depending on the allocation 
90 Front Polisario, supra note 86, para. 228.
91 Front Polisario, supra note 86, paras 230-231.
92 Front Polisario, supra note 86, para. 238.
93 Front Polisario, supra note 86, para. 239.
94 Front Polisario, supra note 86, para. 247.
95 ECJ, Case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario [2016] EU:C:2016:973.
96 For more details, see C. Ryngaert, ‘EU Trade Agreements and Human Rights: From Extra-
territorial to Territorial Obligations’, 20 International Community law Review 2018, 383-385 and 
cited case-law. 
97 See, e.g., Article 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
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of powers organised by the Treaties, and irrespective of any geographical cri-
terion.98 S. Hummelbrunner proposed to qualify this position, making a distinc-
tion between negative and positive obligations stemming from the Charter, 
expanding the extraterritorial scope of the Charter only to the former,99 and 
relying on the effective control test of the ECtHR for the latter.100 The question 
of democratic legitimacy of expanding the scope of application of the Charter, 
an EU internal instrument, to a third country, can also be raised,101 but this judg-
ment of the General Court shows, as in the Opinions analysed above, that the 
CJEU is determined to mainstream the high level of protection provided for by 
the Charter throughout not only internal EU policy, but also external policy.
c. The ambiguous mobilization of the principle of autonomy of the 
EU legal order 
Finally, it is important to address the ambiguous use by the Court of another 
legal basis it appears to rely upon to justify that international trade agreements 
must respect fundamental rights, which is the general principle of autonomy of 
the EU legal order, taken in its external dimension. B. De Witte defined external 
autonomy as ‘the capacity and perceived necessity for the European Union 
legal system to give priority to its own internal rules over and above external 
international norms’, in order to protect the EU legal order against threats orig-
inating from international law.102 
The CJEU allows international agreements concluded by the EU to affect, in 
a certain way, the powers of the EU institutions, provided that they do not alter 
the essential character of those powers and, moreover, that there is no adverse 
effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order.103 This autonomy stems from, 
according to the Court, the essential characteristics of the EU and its law (name-
ly the principles of primacy and direct effect of EU law in the Member States) 
and is characterised by its unique constitutional framework, which encompass-
es the founding values, the general principles of EU law, the Treaty provisions 
and the Charter.104 In the Kadi judgment,105 as in Opinions 2/13 on the acces-
sion of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights,106 and 1/17 on 
98 v. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model’, in S. Peers et. al. (eds.), 
supra note 16, 1657-1683.
99 S. Hummelbrunner, ‘Beyond Extraterritoriality: Towards an EU Obligation to Ensure Human 
Rights Abroad?’, ClEER Papers 2019, 26-29.
100 Ibid., at 27.
101 C. Ryngaert, supra note 96 at 382. 
102 B. De Witte, ‘The Relative Autonomy of the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Re-
gime’, 88 Nordic Journal of International law 2019, 65-85; see also C. Eckes, ‘International Rul-
ings and the EU Legal Order: Autonomy as Legitimacy?’, ClEER Papers 2016, at 12.
103 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 107.
104 Ibid., paras 109-110. 
105 ECJ, Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foun-
dation v Council and Commission, [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 283. 
106 ECJ, Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras 169-
170.
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the CETA,107 the Court recalled, in the context of the autonomy of the EU legal 
order, that respect for fundamental rights is a condition of the lawfulness of EU 
acts, including in relation to international law.108
However, when looking closely at Opinions where the Court examined the 
compatibility of envisaged international agreements with the provisions of the 
Charter, the principle of autonomy plays an ambiguous role. In Opinion 1/17, 
this ambiguity is especially evident. In addition to the questions on equal treat-
ment and access to an independent tribunal analysed above, the Court was 
also called upon by the Belgian government to assess the compatibility of the 
ISDS mechanism with the principle that the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the definitive interpretation of EU law, of which the respect is necessary in order 
to ensure the autonomy of the EU legal order.109 
In its position, the Court followed this three-fold questioning, and answered 
each question subsequently,110 effectively disconnecting the question whether 
the ISDS mechanism is compatible with the autonomy of the legal order on the 
one hand, and with the Charter on the other hand. When assessing the question 
on the compatibility of the ISDS mechanism with the principle of autonomy of 
the EU legal order, the Court primarily relied on the fact that the preservation of 
this autonomy is ensured through the judicial system established by the Trea-
ties, which is intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation 
of EU law.111 The Court stressed that this means it must have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to interpret EU law.112 The Court thus solely verified whether the CETA 
Tribunal would have jurisdiction to apply and interpret EU law provisions other 
than the CETA,113 or whether the CETA Tribunal would be able to weigh on the 
EU constitutional framework, by calling into question the high levels of protection 
of public interest against the freedom to conduct business.114 The Court found 
that the CETA Tribunal had no such powers, and therefore declared that the 
ISDS mechanism has no adverse effect of the principle of autonomy of the EU 
legal order. 
This seems at odds with how the Court has defined the general principle of 
autonomy of the EU legal order, as explained above, which appears as the 
foundation of the comprehensive legal system that constitutes the EU and its 
specificities. Rather than proceeding to a comprehensive analysis of the effects 
of the ISDS on the EU legal order, the Court seems to primarily rely on this 
principle of autonomy to assess whether international agreements would affect 
its monopoly on the interpretation of EU law.115 This was also the case in the 
recent Achmea judgment, where the Court considered that arbitral tribunals 
established in Bilateral Investment Treaties between Member States could be 
107 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 110.
108 B. De Witte, supra note 102, p. 68.
109 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 46.
110 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, paras 105 ff.
111 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 111.
112 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, para. 111.
113 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, paras 120-136.
114 Opinion 1/17, supra note 44, paras 137-161. 
115 B. De Witte, supra note 102, p. 70.
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called upon to interpret EU law, without being subject to Article 267 TFEU, and 
are therefore contrary to the principle of autonomy.116 This was also the case in 
Opinion 1/09 on the draft agreement of the creation of a unified patent litigation 
system.117 In contrast, in cases where the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court was 
not at stake, the principle of autonomy has not been mobilised by the Court.118 
As Bruno De Witte put it: 
‘protecting the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction is presented in these rulings as a means 
of preserving the autonomy of the [EU] legal order. In reality, it seems the other way 
around: the autonomy of the [EU] legal system is put forward as a rhetorical device 
to help to protect the Court’s own exclusive jurisdiction in [EU] law matters.’119 
A more conciliatory approach is to consider that within the EU constitutional 
framework solely the CJEU and the national courts are vested in ensuring the 
respect of EU law in general, and of the Charter in particular. The reliance of 
the autonomy of the EU legal order is therefore needed to firstly verify that this 
competence is not threatened by international mechanisms, which are not en-
trusted with this task.
What is striking is that once the CJEU had determined that the autonomy of 
the EU legal order was not under threat, and turned to the assessment of the 
compatibility of international agreements with fundamental rights, it no longer 
referred to the autonomy of the EU legal order, but fell back on its traditional 
case-law. It referred more precisely to its well-established competence, identified 
since 1974120, and analysed above, according to which: 
‘the provisions of an international agreement entered into by the European Union 
under Articles 217 and 218 TFEU form an integral part of the EU legal system as 
from the coming into force of that agreement. The provisions of such an agreement 
must therefore be entirely compatible with the Treaties and with the constitutional 
principles stemming therefrom.’121 
These developments lead us to stress the ambiguous function the Court gives 
to the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order. While this general principle 
of autonomy constitutes in itself a legal basis derived from primary law for the 
obligation of international agreements to respect the fundamental rights ensured 
by the EU, this is not the way the Court construes this principle.
To conclude this overview of the tools used by the CJEU to review interna-
tional agreements, it is noticeable that the CJEU has developed an extensive 
case law regarding the compatibility of international agreements with EU pri-
mary law, including the Charter. Going beyond the possibility it received to 
116 ECJ, Case C-284/16, Achmea [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, paras 42-59.
117 ECJ, Opinion 1/09 (unified Patent litigation System) [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, para. 
78.
118 See, for instance, Opinion 1/15, supra note 18.
119 B. De Witte, supra note 102, p. 71.
120 see Haegemann, supra note 13, para. 5. 
121 Opinion 1/15, supra note 18. para. 67. 
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conduct a direct a priori compatibility control under Article 218 (11) TFEU, the 
CJEU has made full use of its extensive jurisdiction to ensure that in the inter-
pretation and application of the Treaties, the law is observed (Art. 19 (1) TEU). 
It has relied on various provisions of the Treaties to conduct an indirect compat-
ibility control of specific acts. One question remains whether these cases are 
merely topical or whether they indicate a more profound shift. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The CJEU has been increasingly including the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights among the standards in light of which it reviews the compatibility of in-
ternational agreements concluded by the EU (and/or its Member States) with 
the Treaties. A new extended standard of protection of fundamental rights has 
emerged in the case-law. In cases concerning the conclusion of international 
agreements by the EU, the Court simply extended the requirement of the com-
patibility of EU international agreements with EU primary law to their compatibil-
ity with the Charter. This was for instance the case in Opinions 1/15 and 1/17, 
which illustrated how this new standard applies in classical EU external relations. 
The Court also applied such control to acts adopted on the basis of existing 
international agreements, such as in the Front Polisario case. Finally, and may-
be more surprisingly, the Court also started increasingly referring to the Charter 
in cases which fall outside the scope of the EU legal order, but in which EU 
institutions receive competences to act. These cases illustrate the various av-
enues taken by the Court to ensure a direct or indirect compatibility control of 
EU external actions with the Charter. 
The CJEU has thus given flesh and legal substance to the principles and 
objectives of Article 21 TEU that guide the EU’s external relations, especially 
the advancement in the wider world of the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It is almost as if in the eyes of the CJEU, the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter equate the human rights protected 
in the international legal order. This certainly leaves room for new questions, 
such as the coherence between the use of this standard of protection in the 
different fields of EU external policy, or whether the CJEU will, in the future, set 
aside its stance on interpreting foreign law and practices to ensure the protec-
tion of fundamental rights.122
Such move appears to integrate itself in a larger shift in the EU’s external 
relations in favour of a higher level of protection of fundamental rights. Two 
examples of such shift can be highlighted. 
The first example can be found in the case law of the CJEU regarding the 
scope of the EU’s competence within the Common Commercial Policy (Art. 207 
TFEU), and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms within 
this policy area. This has been the case with the interpretation the Court offered 
in its Opinion 2/15.123 The Opinion was highly anticipated, since it concerned 
122 C. Kuner, supra note 34, p. 880. 
123 ECJ, Opinion 2/15 (Eu-Singapore Free Trade Agreement) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
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one of the very first “new generation” free trade and investment agreements 
with Singapore, for which the Council authorised the Commission to start ne-
gotiations just weeks after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Relying on 
Article 21 TEU and the objectives enshrined therein,124 as well as the renewed 
importance given to the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, the Court 
provided for an extensive definition of the scope of the Common Commercial 
Policy. The judges, in contrast with Advocate General Sharpston’s view,125 re-
defined the objectives of EU trade policy in light of the general objectives and 
principles governing all of the EU’s external action.126 This reasoning allowed 
the Court to include the objectives of sustainable development and high labour 
protection standards within the Common Commercial Policy.127 It considered 
that the EU and the Republic of Singapore did not intend to regulate with this 
envisaged trade agreement the levels of social and environmental protection in 
their respective territories, but rather want to ensure that the liberalisation of 
trade between themselves is conditional to their compliance with their interna-
tional obligations.128 As a consequence, the provisions in question were thus 
linked to the trade between the two parties, and fell within the scope of the EU’s 
common commercial policy, and its exclusive competence. This Opinion rein-
forced the capacity of the EU to include provisions on the protection of the 
environment and labour standards in its new agreements with external partners. 
This is particularly important since sustainable development and labour protec-
tion standards are considered as fundamental rights enshrined within the Char-
ter (Title Iv Solidarity) and they are a welcome addition to the human rights 
previously protected in EU’s international agreements.129 
The second example can be found in the discussion initiated by the Nether-
lands in late 2018, which led to an agreement on 9 December 2019 by the 
Foreign Affairs Council on the elaboration of an “EU-Magnitsky Act”.130 This Act 
– owing its name to a Russian accountant who investigated large-scale Russian 
money-laundering in the EU, and who died in a Russian prison after suffering 
from torture and being denied medical treatment despite visible conditions – 
would be an EU human rights sanctions regime that targets serious human 
124 Opinion 2/15, supra note 123, para. 143. 
125 AG Sharpston view on on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement [2016] EU:C:2016:992.
126 M. Cremona, ‘Shaping EU trade policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017’, 14 
European Constitutional law Review 2018, 242-243. 
127 Opinion 2/15, supra note 123, para. 147.
128 As listed by the CJEU, in Opinion 2/15, para. 150: the obligation on them to implement 
effectively the multilateral environmental agreements to which they are party (Article 13.6.2), to 
address trade in illegally harvested timber and timber products (Article 13.7(b)), to comply with 
sustainable exploitation of fish stocks as defined in the international instruments ratified by the 
Parties (Article 13.8(a)), to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Article 13.8(b)) 
and to adopt effective monitoring and control measures to ensure compliance with conservation 
measures (Article 13.8(c)).
129 See e.g. human rights clauses in association agreements.
130 Council, outcome of the Council Meeting, 3738th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, 9 De-
cember 2019, doc. 14949/19, p. 6: “The Council reflected on how to improve the EU toolbox on 
human rights, and the High Representative announced the launch of preparatory work on a pos-
sible horizontal sanctions regime to address serious human rights violations.” 
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rights violations by individual offenders.131 Even though the scope of this sanc-
tions regime is still unclear, it is intended to be global, meaning that the alleged 
violations and targeted individual(s) could be situated anywhere in the world.132 
Such sanctions regime would be a way for the EU to reaffirm its global lead on 
the protection of human rights. yet, when elaborating such mechanism, the EU 
must ensure respect for fundamental rights of potential offenders, including 
those guaranteed in the Charter. In that regard, special attention would have to 
be devoted to the standards of proof for the imposition of global sanctions that 
may be imposed in situations in which geographical distance and dependency 
on more indirect sources of information may go against the requirements of due 
process and respect for procedural rights of the individuals concerned.133 These 
rights, protected in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, have already been the 
object of scrutiny and control by the Court of Justice,134 and the Court may be 
called upon to control that the envisaged sanctions regime complies with them. 
As mentioned above, these two examples illustrate how EU external relations 
are increasingly governed by fundamental rights. Their protection expands be-
yond those considered as jus cogens under international law and the EU mo-
bilises modern tools, such as international sanction regimes to ensure their 
enforcement. The CJEU plays an important role in such promotion of funda-
mental rights, by relying on the variety of avenues and instruments, and espe-
cially the Charter, at its disposal to ensure the respect for fundamental rights in 
all aspects of EU external relations.
131 For an analysis of the possible mechanism, see N. van der Have, ‘The Proposed EU Hu-
man Rights Sanctions Regime A First Appreciation’, 30 Security and Human Rights 2019, p. 1-16. 
132 Ibid., p. 2. 
133 Ibid , p. 7. 
134 See for instance the saga “Kadi”, supra note 17, and the need to ensure respect for pro-
cedural rights.
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JUDiCiAL ExTRATERRiToRiAL AppLiCATion of THE EU 
CHARTER of fUnDAmEnTAL RigHTs AnD EU TRADE 
RELATions – WHERE Do WE sTAnD ToDAy?
Katarzyna Szepelak1
1. INTRODUCTION
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR or Charter) 
has the same legal value as the Treaties.2 However, its lack of an explicit refer-
ence to externality or extraterritoriality raises the question of whether EU acts 
with external effect that are potentially violating fundamental rights can be set 
aside by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the basis of the 
Charter. At the same time, the EU’s activities in the international arena are 
subject to a number of self-imposed human rights obligations. Articles 21 TEU 
and 3(5) TEU in particular commit the EU to protecting human rights globally. 
There is, however, no consistent judicial practice pertaining to the Charter’s 
extraterritoriality. The purpose of this contribution is to discuss the extraterrito-
rial scope of application of the CFR in the context of the EU’s trade policy – more 
specifically in the context of the EU’s trade agreements.3 The question of the 
extraterritorial applicability of the Charter will be specifically considered with 
regard to the possibilities for judicial review laid down in the Treaties.
Section 2 of this paper presents general issues regarding the judicial review 
of trade agreements. In that context the paper will explore the adequate judicial 
review with a focus on the review of the compatibility with fundamental rights.4 
Noting that the extraterritorial applicability of the Charter could be substantially 
limited if traditional International Human Rights Law5 concepts such as author-
1 Ph.D. candidate, Chair of European Law, Jagiellonian University, Kraków.
2 Article 6 TEU.
3 As EU trade agreements, I understand international agreements concluded by the EU with 
relevant trade components: (1) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Custom Unions (XXIv par. 8 
(a) and (b) GATT 1994); (2) Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), concluded prima-
rily under Articles 207 TFEU, 209 TFEU, 217 TFEU, and 325 TFEU; (3) agreement for partnership 
with countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), concluded under Article 217 
TFEU); (4) sectoral trade agreements liberalising trade in a specific area or in specific products 
(concluded under Article 207 TFEU). FTAs include: (1) first-generation trade agreements (includ-
ing association agreements concluded under Article 217 TFEU and agreements concluded under 
Article 207 TFEU); (2) new-generation trade agreements (concluded primarily under Article 207 
TFEU); (3) The Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Areas (DCFTA) concluded primarily under 
Article 217 TFEU, and additionally Economic and Partnership Agreements with ACP countries 
concluded primarily under Article 207 TFEU and Article 209 TFEU.
4 Whenever this paper mentions ‘fundamental rights’ it refers exclusively to the rights en-
shrined in the CFR. ‘Human rights’ for the purposes of this paper mean both human rights envis-
aged in IHRL and fundamental rights prescribed in the CFR.
5 Hereinafter: ‘IHRL’
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ity of effective control are applied, the paper presents and discusses the stand-
points of the CJEU and Advocate Generals on that matter. In particular, it 
discusses the adequacy of autonomous jurisdictional standards for the applica-
tion of the CFR. Further, Section 3 provides an analytical case-study of the Front 
Polisario case – which to this day constitutes the only example of extraterrito-
rial judicial application of the CFR in the ex post review of trade agreements 
conducted by the GC. Section 4 assesses the limits of judicial review of the 
compatibility of trade agreements with the CFR imposed by the standard of 
institutional discretion. To that end, the premise of the discretionary standard 
as applied to the legislative acts is dismissed, and alternative models for the 
reasonable judicial review of external action in the field of trade are proposed. 
1.1 setting the stage
At the outset, there is a need for clarification of the terminology adopted in this 
paper. Central concepts for this research include: external action, extraterrito-
riality, and territoriality in the context of human rights obligations. In general 
terms, for the purposes of this paper, the concept of external shall be used for 
the laws and policies of the EU related to third countries, whereas the concept 
of extraterritoriality in general refers to situations in which the abovementioned 
laws and policies apply or have a direct effect outside the EU territory.6 In the 
scenario when the judicial body applies the law, extraterritoriality for the pur-
poses of this paper refers to the effect prompted by determining the relevant 
rights of individuals abroad by a domestic judicial body. Finally, the concept of 
territory in Public International Law7 refers to the land within the national borders 
and territorial waters of a State,8 whereas territoriality refers to the exercise of 
authority by a certain entity over a given territory.9 
This paper deals predominately with the judicial extraterritorial application of 
fundamental rights enshrined in the CFR in the context of the judicial review of 
compatibility of trade agreements with this instrument.10 It is therefore useful to 
explain the concept of the application of the Charter as it is understood in this 
paper. As J. Wróblewski observed in his book ‘The Judicial Application of Law’ 
that: 
 6 v. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello, ‘The extraterritorial application of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights: from territoriality to facticity, the effectiveness model’, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), 
The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 
at 1658, in footnote 3 thereof.
 7 Hereafter: ‘PIL’
 8 J. Wouters et al., International law. A European Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing 
2018), at 426.
 9 A. Arcuri and F. violi, ‘Reconfiguring Territoriality in International Economic Law’, in M. Kui-
jer and W. Werner (eds.), 47 Netherlands Yearbook of International law 2016.
10 In literature limits of the application of the Charter have been extensively discussed pri-
marily in the context of the examination of national measures. Less focus has been given to the 
extraterritorial application of the Charter.
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“judicial application of law”, similarly to the term “application of law”, is one which 
lacks any precisely fixed meaning either in legal language, in which enacted rules 
are formulated, or in other languages associated with law. Legal practice and legal 
science use the terms with various meanings, this variability resulting from the pres-
sures to which the functioning of law and analytical studies of law are subject, as 
well as from the pressures of judicial ideology.11 
This finding is corroborated by relevant scholarship on the application or judicial 
application of the CFR (be it territorial or extraterritorial application). For the 
purposes of this paper, the application of the CFR shall mean that the CFR 
constituted a definite legal basis determining the content of the judicial decision.12 
The external judicial application of CFR is understood here as determining, in 
the context of judicial review, the rights of individuals located outside the EU’s 
territory,13 be it positively in the cases of alleged infringement, or in cases of ex 
ante control without any positive legal consequences.14 Therefore, a situation 
of extraterritorial application occurs whenever the CJEU reviews the compatibil-
ity of a trade agreement with the Charter to investigate whether an infringement 
of the fundamental rights of a person based abroad has occurred or not.15
1.2 Extraterritorial human rights obligations of the EU
The question of the extraterritorial application of the CFR fits into the larger 
scheme of the EU’s extraterritorial human rights obligations described in the 
treaty. To understand the architecture of the EU’s human rights obligations with 
relevance to its external action, it is helpful to investigate how these obligations 
interact with the more general scheme of international human rights law (IHRL) 
obligations of states and international organisations. According to the classical 
division of the IHRL obligations of states, these obligations can be divided into 
the following groups16: (1) the obligation to respect human rights, which encom-
passes abstention from actions that can negatively impact human rights in 
11 J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of law (Dordrecht: Springer 1992), at 1.
12 See J. Wróblewski, supra note 11, at 1.
13 For the simplification in this article I will refer to EU territory instead to the territory of all 
Member States.
14 See J. Wróblewski, supra note 11, at 1.
15 See C. Ryngaert, ‘EU Trade Agreements and Human Rights: From Extraterritorial to Ter-
ritorial Obligation’s’, 20 International Community law Review 2018, at 379. Similarly Advocate 
General Wathelet found that application of the Charter (as understood in Article 51) encom-
passes the examination of the EU act’s compatibility with the CFR’s provisions. However, at the 
same time Advocate General Wathelet dismissed the extraterritorial application of the Charter to 
the indigenous people of Western Sahara, whose rights have been threatened by the applica-
tion of the EU’s trade agreement. Against this particular finding I will further argue in Section 2 
of this paper. See AG Wathelet, Opinion to Case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:677, para 271.
16 O. De Schutter, International Human Rights law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2010), at 242, ACHPR, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the center for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, para. 45.
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another state;17 (2) the obligation to protect human rights, which in IHRL means 
taking adequate steps to deter third parties from violating human rights in an-
other state;18 (3) the obligation to fulfil human rights, which means undertaking 
positive legislative or administrative efforts to enable full realisation of human 
rights;19 (4) additionally, the obligation to promote human rights closely linked 
to the obligation to fulfil.20
In the literature, the obligation to respect human rights is described as nega-
tive (it creates obligations to refrain from action),21 whereas the obligations to 
protect, fulfil, and promote demand undertaking certain action and are therefore 
described as positive.22 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU became bound by a 
wide array of obligations concerning human rights in external settings. Treaty 
provisions, unfortunately, provide no guidance on the understanding of the 
delimitation between notions of extraterritoriality and territoriality of the human 
rights obligations prescribed therein. It is, however, useful at this point to pres-
ent how the obligations envisaged in the Treaties at least linguistically fit into 
the categories of the IHRL obligations listed above.
Firstly, Article 21 (3) TEU stipulates that the Union shall respect the principles 
encompassing universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.23 Article 21 (2) TEU states that the EU shall pursue common policies 
and actions, and work towards a high degree of cooperation in all fields of in-
ternational relations, in order to consolidate and support inter alia human rights 
in different areas of the Union’s external action. In this context, Bartels argues 
that Article 21 (3) TEU (read in conjunction with Articles 21 (1) and (2) TEU) 
sets out beyond doubt the duty of the EU to respect human rights; so it is safe 
to assume that under EU law, there is an obligation to ensure that the EU’s 
policies do not have negative effects on human rights in third countries.24
The duty to protect is enshrined in Article 3 (5) TEU, which provides that the 
EU shall contribute to the protection of human rights. Article 3 (5) TEU is also 
17 The Maastricht Guidelines on violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997), 
para. 6, available at: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html
18 The Maastricht Guidelines on violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra 
note 17.
19 The Maastricht Guidelines on violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra 
note 17.
20 ACHPR, supra note 16, para 47.
21 J. Czepek, Zobowiązania pozytywne państwa w sferze praw człowieka pierwszej generacji 
na tle Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka [Positive obligations of the state concerning first 
generation of human rights in context of the European Convention on Human Rights] (Olsz-
tyn: Wydawnictwo UWM 2014), at 13 see also L. Bartels, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations 
in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects’, 25(4) European Journal of International law 
2014, at 1090 and M. Bulterman, ‘The Contribution of the Agency to the External Policies of the 
European Union’, in P. Alston and O. De Schutter (eds.), Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the 
EuS. The Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005), at 254.
22 See A. Ganesh, ‘The European Union’s Human Rights Obligations towards Distant Stran-
gers’, 37 Michigan JIl 2015–2016, at 475. H. Breakey, ‘Positive Duties and Human Rights: Chal-
lenges, Opportunities and Conceptual Necessities’, 63(5) Political Studies 2015, at 1198.
23 Article 21 (1) TEU.
24 L. Bartels, supra note 21, at 1090.
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strengthened by the wording of Article 21 (1) TEU, which reads as follows: ‘in 
the international scene the EU shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development, and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world including human rights’. Article 21 (1) TEU and the 
principle of ‘guidance’ also incorporate the duty to fulfil human rights. Finally, 
Article 3 (5) TEU provides that the EU promotes its values (which include human 
rights25) in its relations with the wider world. 
Even though there seems to be some consensus on the notion that Article 3 
TEU is legally binding on the EU institutions26 and that Article 21 TEU forms a 
point of reference for EU institutions in the legislative process,27 the normative 
scope of these provisions is yet to be defined.28 The case law of the CJEU shows 
that the Court also attributes legal value to Article 21 TEU; however, it does not 
indicate clearly that this provision contains any hard obligations.29 Also, it is 
worth noting that the Article 2 TEU, which stipulates that EU is founded on 
values including respect for human rights, is now considered to be justiciable 
(although it has been suggested that it should be applied in combination with 
another treaty provisions).30
It is nevertheless safe to say that the EU sets the threshold very high when 
it comes to its international presence, and it self-imposed an array of obligations 
which, at least textually, reflect the typology of IHRL obligations. 
It is important also to recognise that the abovementioned provisions should 
be read in line with Article 6 (1) TEU, which provides that ‘The EU recognises 
the rights, freedoms, and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted in Strasbourg on 12 
December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. 
2. JUDICIAL REvIEW By THE CJEU AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER 
As already stated, the EU has obligations to respect, protect, and promote hu-
man rights in its external actions. It was also underlined that the Treaties do not 
limit these obligations to merely territorial or extraterritorial situations. The EU’s 
judicature over the years has dealt with situations in which the revision of EU 
25 Article 2 TEU
26 K.-P. Sommermann, ‘Commentary to Article 3 TEU’, in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli 
(eds.), The Treaty on European union (TEu) (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 2014), at 159.
27 S. Oeter, ‘Commentary to Article TEU’, in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli, supra note 26, 
at 840.
28 E. Cannizzaro, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extrater-
ritorial Effects: A Reply to Lorand Bartels’, 25(4) European Journal of International law 2014, at 
1097.
29 S. Hummelbrunner, ‘Beyond extraterritoriality: towards an EU obligation to ensure human 
rights abroad? Reflections in light of the Front Polisario saga’, 2 ClEER PAPERS 2019, at 39 
and at note 181.
30 A. von Bogdandy and L. Spieker, ‘Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU 
values. Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges’, 15(3) European Consti-
tutional law Review 2019, at 410.
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acts (including trade agreements) demanded employment of the notion of hu-
man rights or more recently fundamental rights envisaged in the Charter. In this 
light, this Section presents fundamental rights as a potential ground of review 
of trade agreements. Then the Section examines possible limitations of such a 
review (for example lack of the EU’s external jurisdiction). Finally, it is argued 
that the review of the trade agreement’s compliance with fundamental rights 
calls for the emergence of an independent judicial standard.
2.1 Judicial review and fundamental rights
It is important to underline, that trade agreements undergo the same level of 
scrutiny as other EU acts.31 Also, because the trade agreements are instruments 
of external action, it is important to remember that the EU is bound by an ad-
ditional, sophisticated array of specific human rights obligations envisaged in 
the Treaties. 
It is therefore remarkable that in cases like the Western Sahara Campaign 
uK,32 which concerned external trade relations of the EU, the Court of Justice 
decided to omit in its reasoning any reference to Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU. The 
Court referred instead to the Kadi I doctrine,33 which was established before the 
abovementioned provisions were even introduced to the Treaty in their present 
form (in Kadi I the Court of Justice stressed that the EU is based on the rule of 
law and therefore respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness of 
Community acts). At the same time, the Court of Justice failed to mention the 
relevance of the examination of the act’s compliance with fundamental rights. 
The relationship between the Kadi I doctrine and Articles 3(5) TEU and 21 TEU 
was, however, considered by Advocate General Wathelet in his Opinion in the 
Western Sahara Campaign uK and Advocate General Bot in his Opinion in 1/17 
CETA. Advocate General Wathelet stated that: 
[A]s the Court held in (…) Kadi (…), respect for human rights is a condition of the 
lawfulness of EU acts and measures incompatible with respect for human rights are 
not acceptable in the EU legal order. Thus, the obligations imposed by an interna-
tional agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles 
of the EU and FEU Treaties, such as Article 3(5) TEU and Article 21 TEU, which 
provide that the Union’s external action is to respect human rights (…).34 
31 For examples of judicial review of trade agreements see: ECJ, Opinion 1/17, Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada (hereafter: ‘CETA’) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:341 (review under Article 218 TFEU), ECJ, Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agree-
ment between the European union and the Republic of Singapore [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 
(review under Article 218 TFEU), ECJ, Case C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign uK [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:118 (review under Article 267 TFEU), GC, Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. 
Council [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:95 (review under Article 263 TFEU).
32 Western Sahara Campaign uK, supra note 31.
33 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v. Council (hereafter: ‘Kadi I’) [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.
34 Western Sahara Campaign uK, supra note 31, para 100.
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Similarly, Advocate General Bot underlined (referring inter alia to the Kadi I 
doctrine in conjunction with the Western Sahara Campaign uK judgement find-
ings): 
[I]t follows from the second sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU, read in conjunction with 
Article 21 TEU, that the European Union must, when exercising the competences 
conferred on it by the EU and FEU Treaties, including those relating to the common 
commercial policy, respect fundamental rights (..) I note, in this regard, that, in ac-
cordance with settled case-law, international agreements concluded by the Euro-
pean Union ‘are, from the date of their entry into force, an integral part of the EU 
legal order. The provisions of such agreements must therefore be entirely compat-
ible with the Treaties and with the constitutional principles stemming therefrom’. This 
of course includes the Charter, pursuant to Article 51 thereof, which has ‘the same 
legal value as the Treaties’ in accordance with Article 6(1) TEu [emphasis added].35 
Ultimately it is yet to be determined whether human rights obligations in the 
context of the EU’s external action add to the threshold of the judicial review of 
trade agreements. The existence of such obligations nonetheless certainly 
strengthens the view that judicial review shall in all cases include an examina-
tion of the compatibility of the agreement with the CFR. 
2.2 CfR and the notion of territoriality
Even if CFR can be applied as a threshold of validity for EU acts such as trade 
agreements, one can cast doubt on the limits of the instrument’s applicability in 
extraterritorial settings. It is important to recall that there is no clause in the CFR 
concerning its territorial scope of application.36 Article 51 (1) CFR, which gener-
ally delimits the Charter’s scope of application, reads as follows: 
[t]he provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices, and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore 
respect the rights, observe the principles, and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of 
the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.
Accordingly, as violeta Moreno-Lax and Cathryn Costello indicated in their study 
on the extraterritorial application of the CFR, in light of the provision of Article 
51 (1) ECFR, the ‘territoriality’ question is simply irrelevant.37 According to them, 
the only criterion that limits the application of the CFR results from the judicial 
doctrine established in Fransson.38 According to Fransson and in line with Ar-
ticle 51, the Charter applies whenever the institutions, bodies, offices, and agen-
35 AG Bot, Opinion, case 1/17, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
Canada (hereafter: ‘CETA’) [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:72, para. 195.
36 L. Bartels, supra note 21, at 1075, v. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello, supra note 6, at 1658.
37 v. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello, supra note 6, at 1658.
38 v. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello, supra note 6, p. 1658.
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cies of the Union apply EU law.39 yet it remains unclear if and when the Charter 
indeed applies in extraterritorial situations. The implementation of EU law by 
EU institutions can take many forms, and, as Wróbel suggests, in most cases 
it will encompass legislative initiatives. Nevertheless, ‘implementation’ within 
the meaning of Article 51 should not be limited only to legislative acts but should 
also include acts of the institutions, including, – as indicated by the cited author 
– international agreements concluded by the EU.40 What follows from the previ-
ous parts of this paper is that neither the Kadi I doctrine nor the wording of Ar-
ticle 51 should preclude the judicial review of the compliance of trade agreements 
with the CFR. However, because such scrutiny could directly impact the rights 
of individuals outside the EU’s territory, it is valid to consider whether there are 
other concepts that would justify the imposition of territorial limits to the scope 
of judicial application of the CFR.
2.3 Jurisdiction – introduction of the concept
Although the issue has not yet been discussed by the CJEU, there are a num-
ber of concepts known to international human rights monitoring bodies that 
limit the scope of application of the human rights instruments. For the sake of 
clarity, it should be highlighted that: (1) the CFR is not a human rights treaty 
open to signature to all countries; and (2) the CJEU is not a human rights court 
(at least not officially). However, the present author contends that the Charter 
in many ways reflects and serves the role of a conventional multilateral human 
rights instruments. Thus, considerations on extraterritorial applicability of human 
rights treaties – where relevant – can be useful in sourcing judicial paths for the 
extraterritorial application of the Charter. 
The current debate on the scope of the application of the human rights instru-
ments focuses on the criterion of jurisdiction.41 The determination of the scope 
of application of human rights instruments implies the determination of the ac-
tors that benefit from the rights stemming from said instruments. As De Schut-
ter demonstrates, the popular concepts of territory and jurisdiction, as criteria 
for application of human rights obligations, can differ in different multilateral 
human rights instruments.42 Similarly, there is no coherent approach in multilat-
eral human rights instruments to the issue of defining the groups of people to-
wards which states have certain obligations, and not all of these instruments 
adhere to the notion of jurisdiction.43 An important example for present pur-
39 ECJ, Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
40 A. Wróbel, ‘Artykuł 51’ [Article 51], in A. Wróbel (ed.) Karta Praw Podstawowych unii Eu-
ropejskiej. Komentarz [EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Commentary] (Warszawa: C. H. Beck 
2013), at 6.
41 M. Langford et al., ‘Extraterritorial Duties in International Law’, in M. Langford et al. (eds.), 
Global Justice, state Duties: the extraterritorial scope of economic, social, and cultural rights in 
international law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), at 51, J. Wouters et al., supra 
note 8, at 421.
42 O. De Schutter, supra note 16, at 123.
43 For example article 2 (1) ICCPR stipulates: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
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poses is the instrument that often serves as a point of reference for the EU 
courts, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which provides a 
clear jurisdiction clause. Article 1 of the ECHR states: ‘The High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention’. Therefore, the case-law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) focused extensively on questions of 
extraterritoriality and jurisdiction. It is also worth mentioning that the concept of 
jurisdiction in IHRL does not reflect the concept of the jurisdiction in PIL, which 
focuses instead on delimiting state competences.44 However, as Ryngaert states, 
the occurrences of transporting the concepts from one field of law to another 
happened before.45 Because this paper deals extensively with the judicial un-
derstanding of jurisdiction for the purposes of the CJEU’s judicial review, in 
which the concept of extraterritorial application of the Charter is not even cur-
rently under construction, I propose borrowing jurisdiction concepts from IHRL 
and PIL whenever it serves the purposes of the treaties most adequately.46
2.4 Evaluating the adequacy of external jurisdictional standards
As mentioned above, the relevant instrument that served in a few cases as a 
point of reference for the purpose of delimiting the territorial scope of application 
of the Charter was the ECHR. The application of the doctrines and concepts 
such as control or authority were twofold and could be ad hoc or backed by the 
argument based on the text of Article 52 of the Charter, which provides guidelines 
on the scope and interpretation of rights and principles.
In his opinion given in the Front Polisario case, Advocate General Wathelet 
did not hesitate to apply the jurisdiction criterion developed by the ECtHR, and 
following that logic he dismissed the extraterritorial application of the CFR to 
the situation of the indigenous population of Western Sahara (the case involved 
the trade agreement concluded by the EU and Morocco applicable in fact to the 
territory of Western Sahara). The Advocate General admitted that in some 
cases fundamental rights enshrined in the CFR may apply extraterritorially; in 
that respect, he mentioned cases in which an activity is governed by EU law 
and carried out under the effective control of the EU and/or its Member States 
but outside their territory. The concepts mentioned by the Advocate General 
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.’ See also M. den Heijer, and R. Lawson, ‘Extraterritorial Human Rights and the 
Concept of “Jurisdiction”’, in M. Langford, et al. (eds.), supra note 41, at 159.
44 C. Ryngaert, ‘Jurisdiction. Towards a Reasonableness Test’, in M. Langford, et al. (eds.), 
supra note 41, at 194. 
45 C. Ryngaert, supra note 44, at 194.
46 I agree with Martin Scheinin that jurisdiction can be in some ways be seen as a word rather 
than a concept considering how its capacity shifts and expands. I do believe however that the 
ways the term jurisdiction can be interpreted can be conceptualized and that the terminological 
clarity and expanded reasoning can shed a light on the paths of the understanding of this concept. 
And operationalizing this concept in one way or another can be beneficial for the study on the 
extraterritorial application of the human rights instruments. See: M. Scheinin, ‘Just Another Word? 
Jurisdiction in the Roadmaps if State Responsibility’, in M. Langford et al. (eds.), supra note 41.
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were borrowed directly and without any explanation from ECtHR case law.47 
Applying the abovementioned concepts to the facts in Front Polisario, he ob-
served that neither the EU nor its Member States exercised control over West-
ern Sahara, and that Western Sahara was not among the territories to which 
EU law is applicable, so the CFR should not be applicable in the context of 
reviewing the trade agreement with Morocco.48 Unfortunately, however, he did 
not explain the reasons why the case-law of the ECHR should be considered 
even by analogy in determining the extraterritorial applicability of the CFR (which 
itself contains a clause regarding its scope of application)49. Also, interestingly, 
to support his arguments the Advocate General cited the Soering case, in which 
the ECtHR precisely provided that the state can be responsible for violation of 
human rights extraterritorially, provided that: (i) the act undertaken within its 
territory produces later foreseeable consequences on human rights outside its 
territory; and (ii) the State does not exercise control over the territory affected 
by this measure/act ,50 which is precisely the case of trade agreements con-
cluded in the territory of the EU but producing effects outside this territory.51 
Without any clear justification, Advocate General Wathelet applied concepts 
known to ECHR case-law in order to answer the question of extraterritoriality 
of the Charter. However, more sophisticated argumentation explaining the need 
for the application of the concepts developed by the ECHR can be found in the 
literature. According to some, an jurisdiction rule analogous to the Article 1 of 
the ECHR should be applicable in the scheme of the Charter (at least in relation 
to the Charter rights that correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR).52 That 
is because Article 52 (3) of the Charter provides that: ‘In so far as this Charter 
contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Conven-
tion. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protec-
tion.’ According to the Belgian government’s stance in the case X.X. v. État 
belge,53 this provision should be interpreted as follows: ‘where the rights of that 
Charter correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope 
47 AG Wathelet referred by analogy to the following cases before the ECtHR: ECtHR, loiz-
idou v. Turkey (Preliminary objections), Appl. No. 15318/89, March 1995, which concerned acts 
committed by a State outside its own territory, judgement referred to the Turkey’s occupation of 
Cyprus; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and others v. The united Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011 
and ECtHR, Al-Jedda v. The united Kingdom, Appl. No. 27021/08, 7 July 2011, which concerned 
acts committed by a State in a territory outside its own territory (the case involved indefinite deten-
tion of a dual British/Iraqi citizen in a Basra facility run by British forces), and interestingly ECHR, 
Soering v. The united Kingdom, Appl. No. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, which concerned extradition 
of a German national to the USA, where he faced charges of capital murder, AG Wathelet, Front 
Polisario, v. Council, supra note 15, footnote 128 thereof.
48 AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para 227.
49 See A. Berkes, ‘The extraterritorial human rights obligations of the EU in its external trade 
and investment policies’, 2(1) Europe and the World: A law review (2018), at 6.
50 ECtHR, Soering v. uK, supra note 47, para. 86 in fine.
51 See generally on this analogy C. Ryngaert, supra note 15, at 385 and following pages.
52 C. Ryngaert, supra note 15, at 385 and following pages.
53 AG Mengozzi, Opinion to Case C-638/16 PPU, X.X. v. État belge, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:93, 
para 95.
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of those rights are to be the same as those laid down by that convention, includ-
ing the accepted limitations (…) such limitations include Article 1 of the ECHR 
– delimiting the territorial scope of the application of the Convention based on 
the criterion of the jurisdiction.’54 Therefore, according to this line of argumenta-
tion, if a person is not within the EU’s territory (as understood according to 
ECtHR case-law), the Charter cannot apply. 
The argument described above is, however, quite unconvincing and illogical. 
The wording of Article 52 (3) of the Charter does not support the importation of 
notions of territoriality within the scheme of the Charter. This article provides 
guidance on the understanding of the rights prescribed in the Charter and their 
content. The potential application of the Charter is a separate discussion, and 
Article 52 (3) of the Charter does not influence this because it merely deals with 
the scope of the rights contained in the Charter. As Advocate General Mengozzi 
stressed: 
[T]he reference, made in the explanations relating to Article 52 (3) of the Charter, to 
the ‘limitations’ of the rights provided for by the Charter, must be understood as 
meaning that EU law cannot apply to the rights of the Charter which correspond to 
those of the ECHR limitations which would not be accepted in the scheme of the 
ECHR. (…) In other words, that provision enshrines the rule that the law of the ECHR 
prevails where it guarantees protection of the fundamental rights at a higher level.55 
Consequently, Advocate General Mengozzi concluded that the level of protec-
tion under the ECHR shall only establish a minimum threshold related to the 
rights that correspond to those in the ECFR; therefore, it would not be reason-
able to assume that Article 52(3) of the Charter obliges the EU to adopt the 
same jurisdictional criteria of limitation envisaged in Article 1 ECHR of the CFR.56
2.5 CJEU case law and the question of the extraterritorial application 
of the Charter
It is worth noting that Bartels argued that it is highly doubtful that the CJEU will 
adopt rules regarding the extraterritorial application of ECHR in situations requir-
ing the application of the CFR.57 The author stated that it is more likely that in 
the process of the judicial review the CJEU will develop rules of extraterritorial 
application specific to the CFR.58 
The question of the potential extraterritorial application of fundamental rights 
was addressed in Parliament/Council (Al-Qaeda).59 In this case, the European 
Parliament asked the Court to annul Council Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2009 of 
22 December 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 imposing specific 
54 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, para 95.
55 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, para. 98.
56 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, para. 99.
57 L. Bartels, supra note 21, at 1078.
58 L. Bartels, supra note 21, at 1078.
59 ECJ, Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council (hereafter: ‘Al-Qaeda’) [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:
472.
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restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated 
with Osama bin Laden, the Al-qaeda network, and the Taliban.60 When discuss-
ing the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), the Court observed that: 
‘the duty to respect fundamental rights is imposed, in accordance with Article 
51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on all the 
institutions and bodies of the Union.’61 As Bartels noted, in light of the Al- Qa-
eda judgement, one can assume that the CJEU allows the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Charter, however, the scope of such application has not been 
established in that judgement in any manner.62 This conclusion follows espe-
cially from the fact that the CJEU seems to assume the applicability of the CFR 
to all actions under the CFSP, whereas for obvious reasons many of those ac-
tions have extraterritorial dimensions. That is quite a far-reaching interpretation 
because the CJEU on multiple occasions gave rulings or advisory opinions on 
acts that may produce extraterritorial effects, maintaining that such acts must 
be in accordance with fundamental rights, and it somehow always managed to 
omit the question of whether these rights should be understood universally or 
should encompass only the rights of those residing within the EU or demonstrat-
ing any link to EU territory. However, this silence does not necessarily mean 
that the CJEU assumes the extraterritorial application of the CFR.
An interesting contribution shedding some light on the relation between the 
person whose rights are on the line with the EU was the opinion of the Advocate 
General Mengozzi in X.X. v. État Belge.63� The case concerned a reference for 
a preliminary ruling made by the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council 
for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium). The request was made in 
the context of proceedings between two Syrian nationals and their three young 
children, who resided in Aleppo (Syria), and the État Belge concerning refusal 
to grant the Syrian family a visa with limited territorial validity, which they sought 
on humanitarian grounds.64 In the proceedings the applicants submitted that 
failure to grant them a visa created risk of infringement of inter alia Article 4 of 
the CFR, which provides that no one is to be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.65 The Syrian applicants did not reside 
in the EU and in fact had no connection to EU territory,66 and their situation 
would certainly escape the jurisdiction as envisaged in ECtHR case law. Advo-
cate General Mengozzi argued that the Member State, which in these conditions 
refuses to grant a visa with limited territorial validity, implements EU law, and 
thus such a decision should respect the rights guaranteed by the Charter.67 
Considering the territorial scope of the CFR, Advocate General Mengozzi ap-
plied the criterion to the effect that the Charter applies wherever EU law is imple-
60 oJ [2009] L 346, p. 42
61 Al- Qaeda, supra note 59, para. 83.
62 L. Bartels, supra note 21, at 1076.
63 Even though this case concerned a Member State’s conduct within its territory.
64 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, para. 2.
65 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, para. 34.
66 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, para. 90.
67 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État belge, supra note 53, paras. 80-88. 
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mented irrespective of where the relevant individual is residing.68 As Advocate 
General Mengozzi observed, there seems to be no reason to exclude parts of 
EU activity from the applicability of the CFR based only on territorial grounds.
[I]f it were to be considered that the Charter does not apply where an institution or 
a Member State implementing EU law acts extraterritorially, that would amount to 
claiming that situations covered by EU law would fall outside the scope of the fun-
damental rights of the Union, undermining that parallelism. It is clear that such an 
interpretation would have consequences that go beyond the field of visa policy 
alone.69 
The Advocate General’s findings in this respect are similar to those drawn by 
the ECtHR in the Soering case because he focused on the EU activity and 
dismissed the relevance of the territory in which this activity might produce a 
negative effect. In X.X./ État Belge, the Advocate General chose to analyse how 
EU law might have affected a person’s fundamental rights, regardless of wheth-
er the affected person resided within the EU at that time. 
Finally, it is necessary to compare two advisory opinions issued by the CJEU, 
which curiously exemplify the Court’s silent treatment on the question of the 
Charter’s extraterritorial application. In Opinion 1/15 PNR, the CJEU for the first 
time reviewed the compatibility of an international agreement with the provisions 
of the CFR.70 The agreement in question covered all passengers flying to or 
from a third country, Canada and the EU. In answer to the request for an Opin-
ion, the CJEU specifically enumerated the amendments that should be intro-
duced to ensure that the agreement was compatible with fundamental rights.71 
These amendments included, for example: limiting the retention of PNR data 
after the air passengers’ departure; making the disclosure of PNR data by the 
Canadian Competent Authority to the government authorities of a third country 
subject to the specific conditions; providing, in specific situations, for a right to 
individual notification for air passengers in the event of use of PNR data con-
cerning them. Notably, these preconditions would serve not only the purpose 
of protecting the rights of air passengers who were EU citizens but, in practice, 
could also serve the purpose of protecting non-EU citizens residing outside the 
EU. The Court of Justice therefore did not dismiss explicitly the application of 
the CFR to the situation of people with no link to the territory of a Member State. 
At the same time, nothing in the judgement indicated that the extraterritorial 
protection of fundamental rights could be more than the side effect of actions 
undertaken to protect EU citizens. Interestingly, in another case of the review 
of trade agreements under Article 218 (11) TFEU (Opinion 1/17 CETA) the Court 
of Justice excluded the possibility of applying some particular rights provided 
68 See v. Moreno-Lax and C. Costello, supra note 6, at 1658.
69 AG Mengozzi, X.X. v. État Belge, supra note 53, para. 92.
70 ECJ, Opinion 1/15, Transfer of Passenger Name Record data from the European Union 
to Canada (hereafter: ‘PNR’) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:592, A. Berkes, supra note 49, at 19, A. 
vedaschi, ‘The European Court of Justice on the EU-Canada Passenger Name Record Agree-
ment: ECJ, 26 July 2017, Opinion 1/15’, 14(2) European Constitutional law Review 2018, at 426.
71 Opinion 1/15 PNR, supra note 70, para. 232.
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in the Charter to the situation of nationals of non-Member States residing outside 
the EU. In particular, the Court of Justice dismissed the notion of the application 
of the principle of non-discrimination (Article 21 CFR) to the difference in treat-
ment between nationals of Member States and nationals of non-Member States 
(EU investors as compared with Canadian investors).72 In that respect, the Court 
referred to the doctrine of vatsouras and Koupatantze regarding, in general, 
Article 18 TFEU.73 However, even though the Court of Justice refused to apply 
the CFR extraterritorially (to the investors located outside the EU), it is worth 
noting that the Court did not dismiss in general the possibility of applying the 
Charter instrument extraterritorially. Further, the argumentation for refusal of 
application was not made on the basis of jurisdictional concerns. Indeed, rath-
er than adhere to this concept – and state that the CFR would not apply simply 
because the EU had no jurisdiction over the situation of Canadian investors – 
the Court felt a need to justify the application of the Charter by referring to its 
previous case law.74 The assessment of the relevance of these two opinions 
(1/17 CETA, 1/15 PNR) issued under Article 218 (11) TFEU is not an easy task 
because the territorial and extraterritorial aspects in these two cases are close-
ly intertwined. Both the Court and the Advocates General did not provide instru-
ments to resolve that problem. It should also be noted that both cases were 
brought to the Court with the clear intent of protecting the rights of EU citizens. 
Notably, however, in both cases the Court of Justice did not clearly dismiss the 
application of the CFR to extraterritorial situations (even though the standard 
of jurisdiction would not have been met in relation to third-state nationals outside 
the EU in either case). It is also worth observing that the Court of Justice seems 
to distinguish between rights that should and should not be protected in the 
case of distant non-EU actors. This finding is potentially highly important. It will 
be further discussed in the next part of this paper.
2.6 The territorial scope of the CfR 
As stated previously, the CFR, unlike the ECHR and many other multilateral 
human rights instruments, does not contain a jurisdiction clause delimiting the 
scope of its territorial application. For comparison, some commentators under-
stand the absence of a similar clause in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) as leading to the conclusion that this instrument applies 
globally and without limitation.75 However, as Scheinin correctly underlined, the 
absence of the notions of territory or jurisdiction in the text of the instrument 
72 Opinion 1/17 CETA, supra note 31, paras. 169-170.
73 ECJ, Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:344, para. 52.
74 Arguably not very convincingly because deliberations in vatsouras and Koupatantze re-
garded the specific intent behind adopting Article 18 TFEU, and there is no clear analogy between 
this explanation and the scope of application of Article 21 TFEU.
75 M. Langford et al., supra note 41, at 58, see also for the example of universal application of 
human rights instrument: ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), I.C.J. Reports 
2007, at 43.
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does not imply that this instrument creates obligations to secure human rights 
for everyone anywhere in the world, irrespective of the factual link between the 
person and the State.76 One must also bear in mind that the ICCPR is in its 
nature a universal instrument whereas the CFR is specific in that it is a re-
gional instrument and thus, not open for signature universally. The CFR exists 
within the framework of EU law, and its application – whether territorial or ex-
traterritorial – should be designed to fit the human rights obligations and aspira-
tions of the EU. On the other hand, as Hummelbrunner rightfully suggested, the 
absence of the notion of jurisdiction or of a rule on territorial application of the 
Charter does not automatically imply that the Charter applies only territorially.77 
I believe that the constraints for the territorial application of the Charter in the 
case of the EU’s trade agreements can be mutatis mutandis transported from 
some doctrines on jurisdiction as far as these doctrines suit the facticity of the 
EU’s trade relations. 
It should be underlined that concepts and judicial practices regarding jurisdic-
tion were established in ECtHR case law primarily in the context of occupation 
or military actions, and they do not necessarily have to suit the specifics of the 
EU trade agreements with third countries. On the one hand, it is not difficult to 
imagine how trade agreements can have a negative impact on human rights in 
third countries (for example, the extensive export of some agricultural products 
to the EU can endanger the right to food). On the other hand, concluding a trade 
agreement, which is undoubtedly an action with an external dimension,78 escapes 
the traditional concepts of control and authority. In general, by concluding a 
trade agreement the EU does not gain control over the foreign territory; neither 
do the inhabitants of the third state automatically fall under the control of the 
EU institutions. The described approach might lead to the conclusion that a 
restrictive standard of jurisdiction regarding effective control (over territory or 
people) developed in ECtHR case law, which generally fits cases of military 
operations, will not be suitable in the case of trade agreements.79 At the same 
time, the ECtHR jurisprudence should bear relevance in shaping the CJEU’s 
understanding of jurisdiction. As the Soering case shows, there are cases of 
extraterritorial application of the Convention which can serve as adequate com-
parative examples in the case of trade agreements. 
Thus, there is not an easy answer to the question regarding the jurisdic-
tional scope of the CFR. The simple transposition from ECtHR case law seems 
insufficient. If the concepts developed by the ECtHR are inadequate, as I argued 
above, there is no general reason to use them in the potential application of the 
Charter to trade agreements (in particular, there is no such requirement arising 
from Article 52(3) of the Charter). After all, using the concept of jurisdiction (in 
any of its formulations) without a particular reason impedes the prospect of 
fulfilling the EU’s human rights obligations prescribed in treaties. There are, 
76 M. Scheinin, supra note 46, at 226.
77 S. Hummelbrunner, supra note 29, at 18.
78 Title v TFEU
79 C. Ryngaert, supra note 15, 379-380. Contra: AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, 
supra note 15, para. 227.
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however, doctrines that suit the ambitious aspirations of the EU prescribed in 
Article 21 TEU and Article 3(5) TEU better. Ryngaert, in his chapter on jurisdic-
tion and the reasonableness test, deliberated on the conduct doctrine known in 
PIL, which bases jurisdiction on the territorial conduct that can produce adverse 
effects on human rights abroad80. He maintained that although the doctrine was 
developed in anti-trust law, it can be utilised outside that particular field.81 Con-
duct doctrine limited by some diligently crafted reasonableness test82 seems 
suitable to the issue of trade agreements that are concluded by a domestic act 
and are themselves an act of the EU with potential adverse effects abroad. This 
concept shifts the focus from the territorial link to the person potentially harmed 
by an act of state regardless of his/her residence, and it seems to reflect better 
the human rights obligations that the EU has imposed upon itself. The question 
that should be central to the CJEU’s deliberations should be the proximity be-
tween the person affected by the trade agreement and the EU, which would 
mean examining whether there was a sufficiently close connection between the 
EU’s act and the individual.83 The next section will discuss more extensively the 
question of the adequate jurisdictional scope of the CFR since it deals specifi-
cally with the study of the possible adverse effects of one of the EU’s trade 
agreements. 
3. THE FRoNT PolISARIo CASE – ASSUMED JUDICIAL 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE CFR 
Arguably one of the most interesting cases regarding the possible application 
of the Charter’s extraterritorially is the legal saga concerning trade agreements 
concluded between the EU and Morocco and their impact on Western Sahara.
‘Africa’s Last Colony’ - Western Sahara, formerly colonised by Spain, is situ-
ated between Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania in northern Africa.84 In 1963, in 
accordance with Article 73(E) of the Charter of United Nations, it was listed as 
a Non-Self-Governing Territory (on this list it figures up to this day).85 Relations 
between Western Sahara and Morocco are defined by the ongoing conflict that 
originated in Western Sahara’s war of independence between 1975 and 1991. 
The indigenous people of Western Sahara’s struggle for independence is led 
by the Front Polisario - a liberation movement aimed at ending Morocco’s pres-
80 C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), at 
195.
81 C. Ryngaert, supra note 80, at 195.
82 C. Ryngaert, supra note 80, at 197
83 C. Ryngaert, supra note 80, at 200. It goes , however, beyond the scope of this paper to 
deliberate in detail how the proximity should be investigated in the case of the possible violations 
caused by trade agreements.
84 More on the history of Western Sahara, see A. Kosidło, Sahara Zachodnia. Fiasko dekolo-
nizacji czy sukces podboju? 1975-2011 [Western Sahara. Failure of decolonisation or the suc-
cess of the conquest? 1975-2011] (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego 2012), A. 
Kosidło, ‘Saharyjska Arabska Republika Demokratyczna – państwo na wygnaniu’ [Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic – state on exile], 5 Studia Historica Gedanenia 2014, 175-195.
85 https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt. 
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ence in Western Sahara.86 Currently the parties have agreed to a ceasefire, and 
the UN Security Council established the peacekeeping mission MINRUSO87, 
which should help to hold a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara 
will choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, a 
referendum has not been held to this day. The literature, distinguishes between 
two approaches regarding the status of Morocco in relation to Western Sahara: 
(1) Morocco is perceived to be de facto administering power in relation to West-
ern Sahara,88 (2) more often and with consideration of international law it is 
perceived that Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara constitutes occupation.89 
Morocco and the EU have cultivated mutual trade relations for years. On 26 
February 1996 they signed the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
association between Morocco and the EU (then the European Community) and 
its Member States. The agreement was aimed at liberalising the trade flow 
between the parties, especially in agricultural products and in fisheries, and at 
developing a common economic relationship. In 2012 an agreement in the form 
of an exchange of letters was signed between the European Union and the 
Kingdom of Morocco concerning inter alia the reciprocal liberalisation measures 
on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, and fish and fishery 
products. The agreement was approved by the 2012/497/EU Council Decision.90
In response, Front Polisario filed an action for annulment of Council Decision 
2012/497/EU under Article 263 TFEU before the General Court. It put forward 
11 pleas in law, which included: ‘infringement of fundamental rights’, ‘breach of 
the principle of consistency of the policy of the European Union, by failing to 
observe the principle of … sovereignty’, ‘breach of the fundamental values of 
the European Union … and the principles governing its external action’.91 Front 
Polisario argued against the trade agreement approved by the disputed decision 
insofar as it concerned the territory of Western Sahara, inter alia because it 
furthered export of products from Western Sahara (without the indication of their 
origins) which led to exploitation of this region to the detriment of its indigenous 
inhabitants. Further, Front Polisario maintained that the application of the trade 
agreement to the territory of Western Sahara flouts the right to self-determina-
tion of the Sahrawi people and has the immediate effect of encouraging the 
policy of annexation conducted by Morocco, the occupying power.92 The Gen-
eral Court annulled the act insofar as it approved the application of the trade 
agreement to Western Sahara, the invalidation of the decision concluding trade 
86 The partially recognized state that raises claims to the territory of Western Sahara is the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). 
87 UNSC, Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991, (1991), available at: http://www.securitycoun-
cilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/MINURSO%20
SRES690.pdf. 
88 See S. Hummelbrunner and A-C. Prickartz, ‘It’s not the Fish that Stinks! EU Trade Re-
lations with Morocco under the Scrutiny of the General Court of the European Union’, 32(83) 
utrecht Journal of International and European law 2016, at 23.
89 Eva Kassoti, ‘The ECJ and the art of treaty interpretation: Western Sahara Campaign UK’, 
1 Common Market law Review 2019, at 212.
90 oJ L 241 [2012] 7.9.2012, p. 2–3.
91 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para 115.
92 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para 143.
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agreements was justified on the grounds that the Council failed to fulfil its obli-
gation to examine all the elements of the case before the adoption of the con-
tested decision.93 
Arguably, however, the most noteworthy part of the General Court’s consid-
erations was the indication that: 
(…) [A]s regards an agreement to facilitate, inter alia, the export to the European 
Union of various products originating in the territory concerned, the Council must 
examine, carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the 
production of goods for export is not conducted to the detriment of the population of 
the territory concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights, including, in 
particular, the rights to human dignity, to life and to the integrity of the person (Articles 
1 to 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour (Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), the freedom to choose an 
occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights), the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights), the right to property (Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights), 
the right to fair and just working conditions and the prohibition of child labour and 
protection of young people at work (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights).94 
The General Court seemed to therefore assume the application of the CFR to 
the extraterritorial situation of indigenous people of Western Sahara who did 
not show evidence of any link to the territory of the EU’s Member States.95 
Notably, no theory of effective control developed in ECtHR case law would have 
been applicable to this situation because the Court did not accept that Morocco 
was exercising control over Western Sahara. Nonetheless, the question of ju-
risdiction (whether intentionally or not) did not appear in the Court’s reasoning, 
leaving open the question of the limits of the Charter’s extraterritorial application. 
The value of the judgement can only be undermined by two factors. Firstly, it 
was later overruled by the Court of Justice; secondly, the judicial review of the 
merits of the case was substantially limited by the General Court due to the wide 
margin of institutional discretion enjoyed by the Council.
The ruling given by the GC in the Front Polisario case provides one very 
important finding: trade agreements (international agreements in general) form 
part of EU law, apply to non-EU territories,96 and might affect the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights of the inhabitants of said territories. Therefore, in line with 
the decision given by the GC, there seems to be no reason to dismiss the judi-
cial review of the compatibility of said agreements with the Charter provisions 
even in cases where the CJEU would have to investigate whether these agree-
ments conflict with third-country nationals’ rights. The extension of the territo-
rial scope of application of the CFR in this case could very well be explained 
under the conduct doctrine described in the previous part of this paper. One 
93 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para 247.
94 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para 228.
95 S. Hummelbrunner, supra note 29, at 10.
96 Contra: AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para. 270.
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might also say that the scheme of extraterritorial obligations imposed on the EU 
by the Treaties (Articles 3 (5) TEU and 21 TEU) creates sufficient normative 
underpinnings for the judicial extraterritorial application of the Charter to such 
cases.97 However the question of the limits and the depth of the review remains 
open and will be discussed in the next part of this paper. 
4. CONSTRAINTS FOR THE JUDICIAL REvIEW 
The General Court’s reasoning in Front Polisario might still come to many as a 
disappointment. On one hand, the Court employed, without limitation, the CFR 
to the situation of people outside the EU (Sahrawi people) who were not linked 
directly to the EU’s territory. On the other hand, the General Court managed to 
escape essential analysis of evidence of breaches of fundamental rights en-
shrined in CFR in Western Sahara, limiting its judgment to finding formal errors 
in the Council’s action. It is argued that this happened because the General 
Court relied heavily on the concept of institutional discretion. In this part the 
constraints for the review of the compatibility of the trade agreements with the 
CFR will be discussed with focus on the critique of the concept of institutional 
discretion. However mindful of the problems that a too far-reaching external 
application of the CFR could cause, the present author will propose certain 
solutions outside the institutional discretion that could suit better the objectives 
prescribed in the treaties. 
4.1 institutional discretion – external commercial relations
Discretion, as held by Fritzsche, can be defined as the power and competence 
of a decision-maker to decide, with the highest authority, about the application 
of the law to a specific fact pattern or certain elements thereof.98 Fritzsche also 
notes that European courts do not make a distinction between discretion and 
margin of appreciation.99 It is worth noting that the CJEU in its case law recog-
nises the doctrine of institutional discretion with regard to external relations. In 
the Swiss International Air lines case, the CJEU stated in general terms that in 
the context of the EU’s external relations: ‘[t]he institutions and agencies of the 
Union have available to them, in the conduct of external relations, a broad dis-
cretion in policy decisions (…)’.100 Consequently, also in the case of external 
commercial relations (including Common Commercial Policy) according to CJEU 
 97 See v. Kube, The Polisario case: Do Eu fundamental rights matter for Eu trade policies? 
(2017) available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-polisario-case-do-eu-fundamental-rights-matter-
for-eu-trade-polices/
 98 A. Fritzsche, ‘Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in European 
Law’ 47(2) Common Market law Review 2010, at 364.
 99 A. Fritzsche, supra note 98, at 364.
100 ECJ, Case C-272/15, Swiss International Air lines v. The Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, Environment Agency [2016] ECLI EU:C:2016:993, para. 24.
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case law following the judgement given in odigitria case,101 EU institutions are 
attributed a wide margin of discretion due to the complexity of the economic, 
political, and legal assessments they must undertake.102
The judgement of the General Court in Front Polisario exemplifies how dis-
cretion can preclude judicial review of the merits of a case. The General Court 
also recalled the odigitria doctrine and emphasised that EU institutions enjoy 
wide discretion as regards the appropriateness of concluding a trade agreement 
(in that case an agreement concluded under Article 207 TFEU) with a non-
Member State which will be applied on a disputed territory.103 Consequently, the 
General Court emphasised that, in cases when EU institutions enjoy a wide 
margin of discretion, judicial review is limited to verifying: ‘whether it has com-
mitted a manifest error of assessment, the Courts of the European Union must 
verify whether it has examined carefully and impartially all the relevant facts of 
the individual case, facts which support the conclusions reached.’104 In Front 
Polisario the GC considered fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter to be 
relevant facts.105 It thus held that the Council should have ensured that there 
were no indications of the exploitation of resources of Western Sahara against 
the will of the Sahrawi people before adopting the decision approving the liber-
alisation agreement.106 Accordingly, it upheld the action because the Council 
failed to fulfil its obligation to examine all the elements of the case before the 
adoption of the contested decision.107 Even with that outcome, the judicial ap-
plication of the CFR was, however, substantially limited as the GC was not able 
to investigate the merits of the case and review the alleged infringements of 
fundamental rights. 
It is unclear from the previous case-law of the CJEU whether the self-imposed 
limitation of the judicial review was even a standard suitable for the review in 
the case of trade agreements. Interestingly, the General Court cited Technische 
universität München and Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços108 in sup-
101 GC, Case T 572/93, odigitria AAE v. Council, Commission [1995] ECLI EU:T:1995:131, 
para 38.
102 ECJ, Case C-398/05, AGST Draht - und Biegetechnik GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Aachen 
[2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:126, para. 33, The case law so far regarded particularly the realm of 
measures to protect trade. Against this backdrop, Advocate General Wathelet, in his opinion given 
in Front Polisario, observed that trade agreements such as the association agreement with Mo-
rocco (under Article 217 TFEU) or the liberalisation agreement (under Article 207 TFEU) are part 
of external commercial relations, being thus protected by a higher standard of institutional discre-
tion (as stems from CJEU case law). AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para 
221. To support that argument AG Wathelet cited the judgement in case Germany v. Council, 
which concerned action for annulment of Decision 94/800 concerning the conclusion on behalf 
of the Community of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations, to 
the extent to which the Council approved therein conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Ba-
nanas. Judgement concerned, therefore, the decision approving multilateral trade agreements. 
ECJ, Case C -122/95, Germany v. Council [1998] ECLI: EU:C:1998:94, paras. 77 and 79.
103 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para. 223.
104 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para. 225.
105 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para. 227.
106 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, paras. 241-246.
107 Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 31, para. 247.
108 ECJ, Case C-77/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços [2010] ECLI: 
EU:C:2010:803, para. 57.
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port of these findings. These cases did not, however, concern legislative acts 
(whatever the legislative procedure) but administrative acts of EU institutions.109 
The General Court never explained why case law regarding legislative acts 
should matter in the case of an act adopted under a legislative procedure (deci-
sion on approval of the conclusion of the international agreement). In that respect, 
Advocate General Wathelet explained how this finding did not constitute an 
error in the Court’s logic. Firstly, the principles applicable in administrative pro-
cedures are applicable mutatis mutandis to legislative procedures110. Secondly, 
the principle established in Technische universität München and Gowan Co-
mércio Internacional e Serviços111 cited by the General Court in Front Polisario 
was then reproduced almost verbatim in Spain and Italy v. Council – a case 
concerning a decision authorising enhanced cooperation under Article 329(1) 
TFEU.112 If the principle applied to the ordinary legislative procedure, then, as 
Advocate General Wathelet pointed out, there was no reason not to apply it to 
the special legislative procedure for the conclusion of an international agree-
ment.113 In my view, however, the argumentation of the Advocate General is 
rather unconvincing. The standard of discretion is a doctrine established and 
developed to provide for flexibility in administrative choices; however, it cannot 
be transposed automatically to legislative acts. As far as the Spain and Italy v. 
Council case is concerned, it should be treated more as an exception than as 
a general rule.114 The GC’s use of the standard of discretion received mixed 
reviews. Whilst some praised the judgement given in Front Polisario to the 
extent of describing it as an example of judicial activism because it reversed 
the decision of the EU’s executive,115 others remain sceptical. For example, 
Hilpold noted that the examination of whether an institution has committed a 
manifest error of assessment will in practice amount to reviewing whether there 
was an impact assessment of the draft trade agreement prepared beforehand.116 
This is because it might not be clear which fundamental rights should be in-
cluded in such assessments and, if so, to what extent.117
It should be noted that the standard of discretion raises further questions. 
Sometimes the impact assessment can be diligently prepared, but in a later 
stage a trade agreement can still infringe the rights of the third parties in an 
extraterritorial manner that was not foreseeable (or extremely hard to foresee) 
at the moment of concluding the agreement. In that context, the reflection made 
109 AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para. 223.
110 AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para. 223.
111 ECJ, Case C-269/90, Technische universität München [1991] ECLI: EU:C:1991:438, 
para. 14.
112 Joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v. Council [2013] ECLI: EU:C:2013:
240.
113 AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para. 227.
114 J. Öberg, ‘The Rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial Review of EU Legislation in verti-
cal Competence Disputes’, 13 European Constitutional law Review 2017, at 267. 
115 A. Rasi, ‘Front Polisario: A Step Forward in Judicial Review of International Agreements by 
the Court of Justice?’, 2(3) European Papers 2017, at 970.
116 P. Hilpold, ‘Self-determination at the European Courts: The Front Polisario Case’ or ‘The 
Unintended Awakening of a Giant’, 2(3) European Papers 2017, at 915.
117 P. Hilpold, supra note 116, at 915.
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by Advocate General Wathelet in his opinion given in Western Sahara UK seems 
especially relevant. Advocate General Wathelet observed that the CJEU is: ‘by 
default, the only court with jurisdiction to review the external action of the 
Union’.118 It is therefore highly troublesome to rely on standards that might allow 
the actual extraterritorial infringement of human rights contrary to the clear 
obligations established in the Treaties in that respect. In my view, the discretion 
standard impairs also the rule of law paradigm so densely emphasised in the 
Kadi I case because it allows certain legislative acts to escape thorough control 
of their consistency with fundamental rights enshrined in CFR. 
Interestingly enough, arguments on institutional discretion did not appear 
even once when the CJEU conducted ex ante reviews of the trade agreement 
under Article 218 (11) TFEU, e.g. in Opinion 1/17 CETA and 1/15 PNR. It is 
therefore curious that the CJEU chose to rely so strongly on the standard in the 
ex post control pursuant to Article 263 (4) TFEU, because the contested deci-
sion concerned precisely the conclusion of an international agreement that might 
endanger the rights of individuals (who therefore were found to have a concern 
in invalidating the act)The finding that the CJEU should not be bound strictly by 
the discretionary standard in reviewing the fundamental rights situation in a third 
country possibly affected by a trade agreement does not imply that the due 
diligence standard should not bear any relevance in the review of trade agree-
ments.119
4.2 outside of discretion – possible patterns 
Some maintain that eliminating the discretionary standard could open a gate 
for arguably overly rigorous assessments of trade agreements.120 This could 
perhaps block the negotiations or possibly impact negatively upon the political 
relations with third states. In that respect, it is worth mentioning that the EU is 
committed to encouraging the integration of all countries into the world econo-
my, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
trade (Article 21(2)(e) TEU). Even if international trade in itself is not an end but 
rather a means to an end, it can impact the socioeconomics of EU trade partners 
in many ways on different fields. Furthermore, it goes without saying that delay-
ing or breaching negotiations with a third country can impact its nationals in 
ways that could not even be foreseeable at the time of the negotiations. That 
being said, trade as a means rather than an end cannot impede the exercise of 
the human rights obligations that bind the EU. The drafting of the treaties and 
the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are of such special nature and 
gravity that one cannot doubt the honest normative devotion of the EU to the 
goals prescribed in Article 21 and 3(5) TEU. 
118 AG Wathelet, Front Polisario v. Council, supra note 15, para. 85.
119 The scope of this paper precludes me from going into detail in describing normative issues 
raised in regard of legal basis for the duty of due diligence imposed on the EU institutions. For that 
matter, see for example S. Hummelbrunner, supra note 29. 
120 C. Ryngaert, supra note 15, 389-390.
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In an attempt to strike a balance between trade and fundamental rights pro-
tection, other propositions were made in the literature – for example advocating 
in favour of limiting judicial review to only the most striking human rights infringe-
ments or to examining the possibility of infringing core human rights.121 Also, 
perhaps the catalogue of rights protected in extraterritorial situations need not 
reflect ideally the catalogue prescribed in the CFR that might land close to the 
Court’s observations in Opinion 1/17 CETA (however, in that case there would 
be a need for a substantial and convincing case law defining the catalogue of 
the fundamental rights that can never be waived).
As was stated before, the reasonable conduct-based jurisdiction assists in 
determining when the proximity between the fundamental rights’ infringement 
and the EU’s action is sufficient to deliver a judicial decision. At the same time, 
I contend, agreeing with Milanovic, that a reasonable interpretation of the juris-
dictional scope of human rights instruments (in the case of absence of a jurisdic-
tion clause in such instruments) should be read into relevant instruments – so 
that the negative obligation to respect human rights would be territorially unlim-
ited while positive obligations would generally require territorial jurisdiction to 
be exercised.122 The negative duty to respect – which means abstaining from 
the policies that create a negative effect – should certainly serve as a point of 
reference for the EU’s credibility in its external action. That is why in the litera-
ture this obligation was previously found to be binding on the EU with more 
certainty than the obligations to protect or fulfil.123 In that way, the CJEU would 
be able to apply the Charter extraterritorially in cases of alleged violation of the 
right to life or to water by the EU trade agreement, but the EU would not be 
bound to ensure all citizens of the world are provided with access to water. 
Because the EU links the value of human rights protection so strongly with its 
international presence, it would be only logical to strengthen the role of the Court 
in the examination of the external misconduct of the Union itself.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Today, the EU presents itself as a diligent global player, which pays great respect 
to human rights. In many respects this is true, and the inclusion of a human 
rights perspective in the EU’s external actions is indeed worthy of praise. At the 
same time, however, the CJEU challenges the EU’s credibility when it conducts 
insufficiently in-depth judicial reviews of trade agreements, without analysing 
the implications of extraterritorial human rights violations. The question of how 
and to what extent the review of the CJEU could be deepened should not be 
dismissed easily under the pretext of maintaining political balance. This contri-
bution argued that the CFR can and should serve as ground for review of trade 
agreements. The external standards limiting the CJEU’s jurisdiction borrowed 
121 P. Hilpold, supra note 116, at 916.
122 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: law, Principles, and 
Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), at 228.
123 L. Bartels, supra note 21, at 1090.
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from the ECtHR case-law do not suit the specificity of the review of EU trade 
agreements. It is possible however to search for more suitable paths for an 
application of the CFR. In that respect the conduct doctrine known in PIL, con-
cerning the territorial conduct that can produce adverse effects abroad, seems 
an appropriate path for delimiting the territorial scope of CFR’s judicial applica-
tion. Established reviews should also not be constrained by foggy standards of 
discretion to the point where judicial review can no longer reveal extraterritorial 
violations of human rights produced by the EU’s conduct. Instead, the jurisdic-
tion of the CJEU established under the conduct doctrine could be limited to the 
cases of breaches of negative obligations imposed on the EU.
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fUnDAmEnTAL RigHTs in THE EU’s ExTERnAL TRADE 
RELATions: fRom pRomoTion ‘through’ TRADE 
AgREEmEnTs To pRoTECTion ‘in’ TRADE AgREEmEnTs
Isabella Mancini*
 INTRODUCTION 
At an international level, the linkage of international trade law and human rights 
law has always been an extremely contested one,1 and ‘one of the central is-
sues confronting international lawyers at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.’2 In the context of a trade regime that has long been accused of being 
embedded in, not least designed by, neoliberal thought, and whose legitimacy 
is highly disputed, questions have been raised as to the normative foundations 
and purpose of such a system today.3 At present, the two legal frameworks 
remain largely separate and hardly speak to each other.4 The main develop-
ments have instead occurred in the context of regional and preferential trade 
agreements.5 In this case, the linkage with human rights has mainly manifested 
in the inclusion of provisions on labour standards, which yet have only recently 
* Isabella Mancini is a PhD candidate at the City Law School (City, University of London) and 
an Early Stage Researcher within the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Network on 
EU Trade and Investment Policy (EUTIP). Isabella is working on a thesis on “The Place of Fun-
damental Rights in the New Generation of EU ‘Deep’ Trade Agreements with other Developed 
Economies”.
1 See inter alia E. U. Petersmann, ‘Human rights and international economic law in the 21st 
century. The need to clarify their interrelationships’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic 
law 3, 3-39; T. Cottier et al. (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (New york: Oxford 
University Press 2005).
2 P. Alston, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to 
Petersmann’ 13 European Journal of International law 2002, at 181.
3 A. Lang, World Trade law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic order 
(New york: Oxford University Press 2014); q. Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the 
Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2018); P. O’Connell, ‘Brave New 
World? Human Rights in the Era of Globalisation’ in M. A. Baderin and M. Ssenyonjo (eds.), In-
ternational Human Rights law: Six Decades after the uDHR and Beyond (Abingdon: Routledge 
2010); N. Lamp, ‘How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? 
Three Narratives and their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements’ 
(queen’s University Legal Research Paper No 2018-102, 2018); F. J. Garcia and T. Meyer, ‘Re-
storing Trade’s Social Contract’ 116 Michigan law Review online 2017, 78-100; F. Bourguignon 
et al., The Globalization of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015); B. Milanovic, 
Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 2005).
4 H. Gott, ‘Labour Standards in International Economic Law: An Introduction’ in H. Gott (ed.), 
labour Standards in International Economic law (Cham: Springer International Publishing 2018), 
at 4.
5 H. Gott, supra note 4, at 3. 
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gained wider acceptance as forming part of an international system of human 
rights.6 
When it comes to trade and human rights linkages, the European Union (EU) 
emerges as a leading actor. Depending on the partner at stake, the EU has 
operationalised the linkage between trade and human rights in different ways: 
by means of human rights conditionality clauses, by making market access 
concessions dependent on, e.g., ratification of a number of human rights instru-
ments and/or ILO Conventions, and most recently via provisions binding the 
Parties to respect certain core labour standards.7 The aim of this paper is none-
theless not to review the history of the EU’s approach to human rights in trade. 
Rather, it focuses on the latest, so-called ‘new generation’ of EU free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with other developed economies, and provides a critique of 
the EU’s understanding and approach to fundamental rights therein. 
The focus is on developed, as opposed to developing or least developed 
countries, for they reflect the main EU’s trade partners of the Post-Lisbon era, 
but most importantly as a way to enable an alternative to the traditional under-
standing of the linkage of trade and fundamental rights. EU trade agreements 
have been used as tools to promote human rights in third countries,8 mainly as 
part of overarching development objectives for developing or least developed 
countries.9 In the past, human rights requirements were a sort of EU political 
messianism or ‘offensive’ interest.10 Conversely, it has been argued that today 
fundamental rights emerge as a ‘defensive’ tool for the EU and the rights of its 
citizens, as a result of deep trade relations with other developed countries.11 
The selection of developed economies as trade partners thus enables fresh 
thinking about fundamental rights in trade, beyond a development issue or as 
a problem for the trade partner alone.12
 6 See v. Mantovalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ 3 European labour law Journal 
2012, 151-172. 
 7 See Section 2.1. below for specific variations of this: whether ratification of fundamental 
ILO Conventions, whether provisions committing the Parties not to lower levels of protection and 
so on.
 8 See F. Martines, ‘Human Rights Clauses in EU agreements’ in S. Poli (ed.), Protecting Hu-
man Rights in the European union’s External Relations (CLEER PAPERS 2016/5) (The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Institute 2015).
 9 L. Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in M. Cremona 
(ed.), Developments in Eu External Relations law (New york: Oxford University Press 2008).
10 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘In the face of crisis: Input legitimacy, output legitimacy and the political Mes-
sianism of European integration’ 34 Journal of European Integration 2012, 825-841.
11 v. Depaigne, ‘Protecting fundamental rights in trade agreements between the EU and third 
countries’ 42 European law Review 2017, at 563.
12 The paper will speak of ‘fundamental rights’ as opposed to ‘human rights’ for two main 
reasons: the willingness to take an EU law and governance perspective, which in turn should 
allow going beyond the minimum floor and understanding provided by internationally recognised 
human rights. By referring to fundamental rights, the aim is to appreciate a broader set of rights 
which additionally form part of and are recognised under EU law. The paper thus wants to out-
distance understandings of human rights according to which protection of rights would be satis-
fied with the protection of basic rights or would be limited to civil and political rights. There is an 
important revived debate in the literature on international human rights, particularly on what they 
encompass and their role within the global economy. The most recent contribution in this respect 
is Samuel Moyn’s controversial book ‘Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World.’ Samuel 
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From this perspective, the paper does not embark upon an examination of 
all possible fundamental rights. The focus is on two sets of rights: labour and 
data privacy rights. The former represents the most common set of rights being 
incorporated into trade agreements, while the latter have typically not been 
included in trade agreements and have only recently emerged as an increas-
ingly significant set of rights in the context of digital trade. Regarding labour 
rights, the paper wants to embrace a broad understanding beyond core labour 
standards, which is warranted in a context of ever evolving employment condi-
tions in the digital era, even witnessing labour and data privacy issues coming 
together.13 Labour rights are understood as forming part of broader frames of 
social justice, encompassing i.a. matters of health and safety at the workplace, 
decent work, social protection and promotion of social dialogue. In this respect, 
together with the EU Social Charter, the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for 
a Fair Globalization14 and the objectives of the ILO Decent Work Agenda, rep-
resent key frameworks of reference. By employing the terminology of ‘data 
privacy rights’ the aim is to avoid discussions that dispute the difference between 
‘data protection’ and ‘privacy’ rights, and to focus instead on the protection of 
‘personal’ data, as opposed to any other kind of data.15 The relevance of labour 
and data privacy rights is provided later. Suffice to say that the contrasting way 
they are addressed in EU trade agreements is telling of many inconsistencies 
and deficiencies in the EU’s approach towards the linkage of fundamental rights 
and trade. 
The paper proceeds as follows: it starts with a discussion of how the Treaty 
of Lisbon provides for ‘new normative impetus’ which outdoes the limited per-
ception of trade agreements promoting human rights as a development issue16 
(Section 1). In the light of this, it gives an overview of the EU’s current approach 
to fundamental rights in the new generation trade agreements (Section 2) and 
offers reasons why it is problematic from a fundamental rights perspective (Sec-
Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an unequal World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
2018). The paper is informed by a broad reading of the sources of fundamental rights under EU 
law and international human rights agreements, not least the ILO Conventions. From an EU 
law perspective, fundamental rights are understood as encompassing the rights flowing from the 
sources specified in Article 6 TEU, as well as from the member states’ obligations under interna-
tional human rights treaties to which they are party. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR) has introduced some socio-economic rights which were not included in the ECHR. The 
EUCFR constitutes an important yardstick as it incorporates internationally recognised human 
rights while also developing them further and amplifying their catalogue. As such, it goes beyond 
both minimum standards and understandings of rights limited to civil and political.
13 See F. Hendrickx, ‘video surveillance at work: European Human Rights Court approves 
hidden cameras’, Regulating for Globalization: Trade, labour and Eu law perspectives (18 Oc-
tober 2019), available at <http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2019/10/18/video-surveillance-at-
work-european-human-rights-court-approves-hidden-cameras/>.
14 International Labour Organisation, Ilo Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globaliza-
tion (2008), available at <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/docu-
ments/genericdocument/wcms_371208.pdf>.
15 Recognised under Art.8 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] 
OJ C326/391.
16 v. Kube, ‘The European Union’s external human rights commitment: what is the legal value 
of Article 21 TEU?’ EuI Working Paper lAW 2016/10 (2010).
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tion 3). It concludes by suggesting a change in perspective and an exploration 
of fundamental ‘in’ trade as opposed to ‘through’ trade (Section 4).
1. THE NEW NORMATIvE IMPETUS OF THE TREATy OF LISBON 
FOR THE EU’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has been 
brought under the umbrella of the EU’s external action, including its principles 
and objectives. As per Article 207(1) TFEU, the CCP of the Union ‘shall be 
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action.’ Such principles and objectives are to be found in Articles 21 and 3(5) 
TEU, which include human rights and the Union’s values, more broadly. Because 
of Article 207(1), these principles and objectives can now be read as applying 
to the EU CCP, leading some to speak of a ‘Union’s human rights obligation in 
its external relations.’17 Such an alleged obligation has been extensively de-
bated in its scope and effect, raising questions of whether it should be understood 
as giving rise to a duty for the EU to protect the rights of third country citizens.18 
This paper does not embark upon this discussion, its aim being much narrower 
in scope: it wants to rely on the innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon in this regard 
to suggest a change in perspective on the relationship between EU external 
trade and fundamental rights, and address the question of what the combined 
reading of these articles would imply: is it about respecting, protecting and/or 
promoting fundamental rights?
The relevance of this question lies in recent arguments maintaining that the 
Treaty of Lisbon provides a ‘new normative impetus’ that allows going beyond 
the typical understanding that sees human rights in trade agreements as a 
development issue in third countries.19 The EU has traditionally found in pref-
erential trade agreements, and a series of mechanisms attached to them, use-
ful convectors to promote the respect of human rights externally, in the rest of 
the world.20 Meunier and Nicolaïdis have coined the concept of governing 
‘through trade’ to refer to how the EU uses its trade policy ‘to ‘export’ its laws, 
standards, values and norms.’21 Most of the literature on EU external trade and 
17 I. vianello, ‘Guaranteeing Respect for Human Rights in the EU’s External Relations: What 
Role for administrative Law?’ in S. Poli, supra note 8, at 35.
18 See L. Bartels, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extrater-
ritorial Effects’ 25 European Journal of International law 2014, 1071-1091; E. Cannizzaro, ‘The 
EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects: A Reply to Lo-
rand Bartels’ 25 European Journal of International law 2014, 1093-1099; C. Ryngaert, ‘EU Trade 
Agreements and Human Rights: From Extraterritorial to Territorial Obligations’ 20 International 
Community of law Review 2018, 374-393.
19 v. Kube, supra note 16.
20 A. Dashwood, ‘Article 47 TEU and the relationship between first and second pillar compe-
tences’ in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.) law and practice of Eu external relations (New 
york: Cambridge University Press 2008), p.85 and footnote 44; Piet Eeckhout, External relations 
of the European union (New york: Oxford University Press 2004), at 473. 
21 S. Meunier and K. Nicolaïdis, ‘The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power’ 13 Jour-
nal of European Public Policy 2006, 906-925; A. Marx et al., ‘Protecting labour rights in a globaliz-
ing world: an introduction’ in A. Marx et al. (eds.), Global Governance of labour Rights Assess-
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its relationship with human rights has accordingly focused on the effectiveness 
of EU’s instruments in bringing a change or securing compliance with human 
rights in third countries.22
This section wants to provide a different angle: it argues that a combined 
reading of Articles 207 TFEU and 21(1) and 3(5) TEU allows liberation from the 
traditional understandings of the EU as a global trade actor that is expected to 
promote fundamental rights globally ‘through’ its trade agreement, and to prompt 
an exploration of the protection of fundamental rights ‘in’ trade; in the sense of 
making sure that trade agreements do not become, as of themselves, sources 
or intensifiers of downward pressures on fundamental rights. 
The table below is an attempt to unpack what the combined reading of Articles 
207(1) TFEU, 21 TEU and 3(5) TEU can imply in terms of: (a) what the EU is 
expected to pursue (object) in relation to its external relations, and the extent 
to which these objects encompass fundamental rights; (b) what the EU is ex-
pected to do (action) in its external dimension in relation to fundamental rights; 
and then (c) it explores and questions the meaning of ‘EU’s external action’ and 
similar phrasings such as ‘in its relations with the wider world’; given the ab-
stractness of these phrasings, it tries to highlight specific instances where EU’s 
action is required and/or possible, for instance ‘when defining’, ‘developing’, 
and also ‘implementing’ areas of the Union’s external action.23 In this respect, 
EU trade agreements are regarded as specific instances ‘developing’ and ‘imple-
menting’ the EU’s external relations in trade, and essentially the Union’s Com-
mon Commercial Policy as an area of the Union’s external action.24
ing the Effectiveness of Transnational Public and Private Policy Initiatives (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2015) at 4-5. 
22 See inter alia L. Campling et al. ‘Can labour provisions work beyond the border? Evaluat-
ing the effects of EU free trade agreements’ 155 International labour Review 2016, 357-382; J. 
Orbie et al., ‘The Impact of Labour Rights Commitments in EU Trade Agreements: The Case of 
Peru’ 5 Labour Standards in a Global Environment 2017, 6-18; A. Marx et al. (eds.) supra note 21; 
S. Poli (ed.) supra note 8.
23 Art.21(3) Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 (here-
after, TEU).
24 Art.21(1) TEU: 1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidar-
ity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
Table 1: The Union’s mandate to respect and promote fundamental rights in its external relations.
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25262728
The table should help to visualise that principles and objectives of the Union’s 
external action, which include human rights and the Union’s values, not only 
have to be ‘pursued’ and ‘promoted’,29 but also have to be ‘respected’, ‘upheld’ 
and ‘safeguarded’30 – the timing of this being ‘in the development and imple-
mentation of the different areas of the Union’s external action.’31 This suggests 
that the EU’s external action itself should i.a. ‘respect’, ‘safeguard’, ‘consolidate 
and support’ principles and values of fundamental rights. To the extent that trade 
agreements can be considered concrete manifestations of the ‘EU’s external 
action’, it could be argued that as of themselves they should be consistent with 
such principles and objectives, and therefore ‘respect’, ‘safeguard’ and ‘uphold’ 
fundamental rights. 
25 Art.21(2)(a) TEU: 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and 
shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safe guard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
26 Art.21(2)(b) TEU: (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the principles of international law;
27 Art.21(3) TEU: The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s 
external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.
28 Art.3(5) TEU: 5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote 
its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the 
rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
29 Art.21(3), Art.3(5) TEU.
30 Art.21(3), Art.3(5) TEU, Art.21(2)(a) TEU.
31 Art.21(3) TEU.
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Understanding the articles this way enables a different perspective on how 
fundamental rights are addressed in the context of trade agreements, and how 
their protection should be pursued in practice. Fundamental rights would not 
represent external objectives alone, but would become inherent objectives to 
EU external trade. Such reading suggests two views: not only that trade can 
and has to work as an instrument for the pursuit of fundamental rights objectives 
externally; but that also the Union’s external action, and in fact the trade agree-
ments themselves, should be consistent with such principles and objectives, 
including fundamental rights. This can imply that trade agreements should not 
undermine the protection of fundamental rights as a minimum (‘respect’), and 
can be understood as having to ensure their protection (‘safeguard’).
Such a different understanding is also allowed by Article 207(1) TFEU,32 
wherein the second sentence states that the CCP of the Union ‘shall be con-
ducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action.’ [emphasis added] This sentence was not present in previous versions 
of the treaties,33 and in fact represents a novelty of the Treaty of Lisbon. How-
ever, it is not clear, generally speaking, what ‘conducting’ a policy ‘in the context 
of principles’ could mean. Arguably, a less vague wording could have been used, 
such as ‘shall respect and promote’ the principles of the Union’s external action. 
For instance, as regards the EU’s foreign and security policy, the EU treaties 
have typically specified that the Union and its Member States shall ‘define and 
implement’ a common foreign and security policy, ‘the objectives of which shall 
be’, i.a. to safeguard ‘common values.’34 yet in this case, the focus on the ‘ob-
jectives’ clearly alludes to an outward perspective. The legacy of this provision 
is now Article 21(1) TEU,35 which deploys a vague phrasing in its first paragraph, 
namely ‘shall be guided by’, similar to Article 207(1) TFEU. Arguably, it is pre-
cisely the vagueness of the wording of Article 207(1) TFEU that allows embrac-
ing a broader, normative understanding of the relationship between the EU’s 
external action in trade and fundamental rights.
2. THE EU’S APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN POST-
LISBON FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
2.1 Labour and Data privacy Rights in EU fTAs with other Developed 
Economies
The post-Lisbon EU trade agreements with Canada, Singapore and Japan, as 
well as what would have been the TTIP, do not include a chapter on fundamen-
32 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/47 (hereafter, TFEU).
33 See Art.113 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1 (Treaty of Maastricht) (hereafter, 
EC Treaty), Art.113 Treaty establishing the European Community [1997] OJ C340/1 (Amsterdam 
consolidated version (hereafter, EEC Treaty) and Art.133 Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity [2001] OJ C80/1 (Nice consolidated version).
34 Art.J.1 EC Treaty and EEC Treaty.
35 Art.21(1),(2)(a) and (2)(b) TEU.
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tal rights, yet can be understood as still providing a series of mechanisms aimed 
at their protection.36 Starting with labour rights, relevant provisions are to be 
found in the so-called Trade and Sustainable Development chapters.37 With 
slight variations and different configurations, a taxonomy of the provisions in-
cluded across trade agreements can be largely classified as displayed in the 
table below. 
In addition to these, CETA is the only trade agreement that includes commit-
ments in relation to labour rights beyond core labour standards, and which refers 
to the ILO Decent Work Agenda and the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for 
a Fair Globalization, and ‘other international commitments’, which are listed: 
health and safety at work, including the prevention of occupational injury or ill-
ness and compensation in cases of such injury or illness; establishment of 
acceptable minimum employment standards for wage earners, including those 
not covered by a collective agreement; and non-discrimination in respect of 
working conditions, including for migrant workers.38 
With respect to data privacy rights, a very small number of provisions can be 
found, limitedly the chapters on financial services, telecommunications (or elec-
tronic communications) and e-commerce. They usually require the Parties to 
‘adopt or maintain appropriate safeguards to protect privacy and personal data’;39 
and make data privacy rights part of general exceptions, allowing derogation 
36 See v. Depaigne, supra note 11.
37 The Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, 
and recently the EU-Singapore FTA, include a specific subsection on Trade and Labour, but in 
practice the commitments remain the same.
38 Art.23.3(2) and (3) CETA.
39 See e.g. Art.8.54 EU-Singapore FTA.
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from a more general commitment to liberalise trade in services.40 Unlike the 
provisions on labour rights, provisions on data privacy rights do not require the 
Parties to promote or realise certain standards via their laws, nor to cooperate 
on the matter. The underlying idea, as it will be explained below, is to avoid 
including substantive standards related to data privacy rights in the trade agree-
ments. Even though not envisaged prior to the negotiations, the EU-Japan trade 
talks led to parallel negotiations on an adequacy decision on their level of pro-
tection of personal data.41 On this path, the EU has initiated similar negotiations 
with trade partners with which it had concluded trade agreements, such as South 
Korea, and is contemplating doing the same with Singapore. At present, the EU 
maintains the Privacy Shield with the US, a partial adequacy decision with 
Canada.
Beyond these provisions specifically on labour and data privacy rights, three 
additional mechanisms can be considered as providing room for protection. 
First, clauses on the right to regulate have been included to reaffirm the right of 
the Parties to pursue their public policy objectives. Overall, these can be found 
in the chapters on trade and sustainable development and in the chapters 
regulating services and investment. Safeguards under these formulations have 
been introduced to address concerns that regulatory cooperation and investment 
chapters would have restrained the regulatory space or even prevented each 
Party to adopt new regulatory measures, particularly in the public interest. It has 
been argued that such provisions could be invoked or relied upon by the Parties 
to justify the adoption of measures that are necessary to protect and ensure 
respect of certain rights, while preventing regulatory chill effects.42 However, 
they do not imply a proactive stance, representing a rather defensive, and not 
absolute, guarantee. Similarly, general exceptions are a second means by which 
the Parties retain their possibility to derogate from the agreement to introduce 
measures in favour of, e.g., protection of public morals and public order, public 
40 CETA also specifically provides that, in cases of transfers of financial information that in-
volves personal information, ‘such transfers should be in accordance with the legislation govern-
ing the protection of personal information of the territory of the Party where the transfer has origi-
nated.’ (Art.13.15(2) CETA). In practice, any transfer originating from the EU will have to fall within 
the restrictive EU standards of protection, and that as such, there is no indication that standards 
for data protection would be lowered. See W. Berka, ‘CETA, TTIP, TiSA, and Data Protection’ in S. 
Griller et al. (eds.), Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA; New orientations 
for Eu External Economic Relations (New york: Oxford University Press 2017) 178-179; K. Irion 
et al., ‘Trade and Privacy: Complicated Bedfellows? How to achieve data protection-proof free 
trade agreements’ (2016) independent study commissioned by BEUC et al., Amsterdam, Institute 
for Information Law (IviR), p.43. On the other hand, it has been also argued that the use of the 
language ‘should’ does not lead to a binding obligation and that has been weakened if compared 
to the version preceding the legal scrubbing. See A. Wessels, ‘CETA will harm our privacy’ (15 
April 2016), available at <https://blog.ffii.org/ceta-will-harm-our-privacy/>.
41 See E. Fahey and I. Mancini, ‘The EU as an Intentional or Accidental Convergence Actor? 
Learning from the EU-Japan Data Adequacy Negotiations’ International Trade law and Regula-
tion 2020 (forthcoming).
42 v. Depaigne, supra note 11; L. Bartels, ‘Human Rights, Labour Standards and Environ-
mental Standards in CETA’, university of Cambridge Faculty of law Research Paper No.13/2017, 
12-16.
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life and health, the environment, privacy and national security.43 yet again, they 
do not provide for a positive relationship between trade reform and fundamen-
tal rights issues related to it.44
Finally, human rights conditionality clauses could also be understood as 
providing a mechanism for fundamental rights protection. Some have seen in 
the human rights conditionality clauses an additional venue via which labour 
rights could be protected.45 However, these clauses have seldom been invoked 
by the EU to suspend trade benefits,46 and their scope is usually one that envis-
ages an outrageous violation of human rights of the magnitude of coups d’état. 
Furthermore, the EU’s practice has recently been to include these clauses in 
political agreements (called Strategic Partnership Agreements or Framework 
Agreements) which are negotiated parallel to the trade agreements: they are 
not binding and their relationship to the trade agreement remains often very 
vague. 
Having briefly outlined what can be found in relation to fundamental rights in 
the new generation of EU’s trade agreements, the next section turns to the 
arguments that back such an approach, and explains essentially why so little is 
there. The way fundamental rights are dealt with in EU trade agreements reflects 
underlying assumptions and open standpoints in relation to their linkage, which 
are used to justify such an approach. However, as it will be shown, they raise 
a series of concerns from a fundamental rights perspective.
2.2 Arguments backing the Current Approach to fundamental Rights 
in EU fTAs
a. Fundamental Rights are ‘non-negotiable’
One of the main arguments is that fundamental rights are ‘non-negotiable’, and 
as such, should fall outside trade negotiations and trade agreements altogeth-
er. This has been mostly manifested and voiced in relation to data protection, 
and particularly during the trade negotiations with the US and Japan. In a speech 
in the US, amid TTIP negotiations, vice-President of the Commission, viviane 
Reding warned ‘against bringing data protection to the trade talks’, for data 
protection ‘is a fundamental right and as such it is not negotiable.’47 Similarly, 
when faced with Japanese demands to discuss data protection-related issues, 
the Commission said that data protection ‘is a fundamental right in the Euro-
43 S.M. Walker, The Future of Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements (In-
tersentia 2009), p.57.
44 S.M. Walker, supra note 43. 
45 L. Bartels, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade 
Agreements’ 40 legal Issues of Economic Integration 2013, 297-313.
46 T. Novitz, ‘Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between ‘Human Rights’ and 
‘Sustainable Development’?’ in H. Gott, supra note 4, p.129.
47 v. Reding, ‘Towards a more dynamic transatlantic area of growth and investment’ (29 October 
2013), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/SPEECH_13_867>.
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pean Union and is therefore not up for negotiation.’48 The Commission’s open 
position in respect to trade and fundamental rights is clearly that fundamental 
rights are non-negotiable and should therefore not be dealt with in trade agree-
ments. 
It is totally logical and understandable that the EU does not want to compro-
mise the level of protection of fundamental rights by making them objects of 
trade negotiations. The trade realm is a particularly sensitive setting where this 
could occur, as the rhetoric is usually one of ‘cutting the red tape.’49 On the 
other hand, what does it mean that fundamental rights are not negotiable in the 
context of trade negotiations? What would ‘negotiation of fundamental rights’ 
imply in practice? Such an approach arguably raises a series of concerns. The 
first is the implication of excluding altogether any discussion relating to funda-
mental rights in the context of trade. Even though the Commission’s stance aims 
at ensuring that levels of protection are not compromised, it simultaneously 
removes any positive action or consideration for ensuring that fundamental 
rights are not compromised by the trade agreement itself once in place. 
Second, one could argue that negotiations on data protection have indeed 
taken place, in the context of data adequacy negotiations with Japan. Here, the 
benchmark, or starting point of reference, for the assessment of adequacy was 
the EU legal framework on data protection (GDPR).50 yet the outcome of such 
negotiations has been criticised for not providing a true equivalent level of pro-
tection; while others have also noticed how the alleged convergence of the 
Japanese and EU legal framework on data protection has been reached in a 
way that only personal data of EU citizens have been granted additional safe-
guards, leaving much unchanged for Japanese citizens’ personal data. One 
could argue that, in this case, data protection emerges as a clear defensive 
interest of the EU when deepening trade relations with third countries. At the 
same time, the EU-Japan adequacy talks can inform a different understanding 
of ‘negotiations’: not as something that only leads to downwards pressures on 
the levels of protection, but one that can aim at achieving upwards convergence 
of standards. 
Third, the argument that fundamental rights are not for negotiation raises the 
question of why trade agreements include provisions on the protection of labour 
standards: are labour standards not fundamental rights? These provisions only 
concern ‘core’ internationally agreed labour standards: they are understood as 
guaranteeing a ‘level playing field’, and thus represent a minimum floor of labour 
rights for which there would be no lower levels, hence in fact nothing to be 
‘negotiated.’ Asking more would certainly prove very controversial and raise 
much opposition. yet while trade agreements include provisions on minimum 
48 European Commission, ‘Key elements of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement’, 
Press release (18 April 2018), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/MEMO_18_3326>.
49 v. Reding, supra note 47.
50 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
OJ L 119 (hereafter, GDPR).
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levels of labour protection, no corresponding provisions exist for data protection, 
for instance referring to the OECD Privacy Guidelines or the APEC Privacy 
Framework (the latter having been included, for instance, by Canada and the 
US in their newly concluded trade agreement with Mexico).51 Instead, data 
protection occupies a complex place in trade agreements,52 and the reference 
benchmark for (albeit parallel) adequacy decisions is the strictest legal framework 
in the world, namely the GDPR. Most importantly, an explanation for the minimum 
labour standards lies in the Union’s limited competences in labour matters53 and 
the scope of Common Commercial Policy, which result in the impossibility for 
the EU alone to include new substantive obligations in relation to i.a. labour in 
its trade agreements.54 yet there remains an underlying contradiction, or inco-
herence, in the argument that fundamental rights are non-negotiable. This is 
reflected in the differential treatment of the two sets of rights: while for labour 
standards it is generally accepted to have the lowest common denominator, for 
data protection it is the highest standard that is maintained. 
b. ‘Trade agreements are for trade’ 
Recently, the EU Commission has also been outspoken about the fact that trade 
agreements are essentially for trade, done to liberalise trade and make it less 
costly.55 This position contends that trade agreements cannot become the ve-
hicles for everything and anything. Whilst one should concede that EU trade 
agreements now go far beyond anything that had ever been included for fun-
damental rights, this logic remains highly problematic from a fundamental rights 
perspective, inasmuch as fundamental rights are considered to form part of a 
broader category of ‘non-trade objectives.’ There is similar scepticism among 
EU policy officials, economists and academics about the usefulness of provi-
sions on, for instance, environment and/or labour rights in trade agreements.56 
The argument is either that trade agreements should be primarily for trade,57 or 
51 Article 19.8 Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, 
and Canada.
52 See Section 2.1.
53 More precisely, it is a shared competence, see Articles 3 and 4 TFEU.
54 See Opinion 2/15 (Singapore FTA), ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, paras. 164 and 471 (hereafter 
Opinion 2/15).
55 See DG Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström at Civil Society Dialogue, available at <ht-
tps://webcast.ec.europa.eu/civil-society-dialogue-with-cecilia-malmstrom>.
56 See i.a. R.J. Flanagan, Globalization and labor Conditions (New york: Oxford University 
Press 2006).
57 L. Campling et al., ‘Can labour provisions work beyond the border? Evaluating the effects 
of EU free trade agreements’ 155 International labour law Review 2016, 357-382; F. C. Ebert, 
‘Labour provisions in EU trade agreements: What potential for channelling labour standards-
related capacity building?’ 155 International labour law Review 2015, 407-433; E. Postnikov and 
I. Bastiaens, ‘Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU preferential trade 
agreements’ 21 Journal of European Public Policy 2014, 923-940; J. M. Siroen, ‘Labour provi-
sions in preferential trade agreements: Current practice and outlook’ 152 International labour 
Review 2013, 85-106; L. van Den Putte and J. Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the 
Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions’ 31 International Journal of Comparative labour law and 
Industrial Relations 2015, 263-283; A. Marx and J. Soares, ‘Does integrating labour provisions in 
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that such provisions are not effective in achieving compliance to certain stan-
dards by the third country: whereas some would advocate for a change in the 
approach, others would still be sceptical about their usefulness altogether.58 
With respect to the first argument, a series of developments clearly show that 
trade agreements have already for a long time expanded beyond purely trade-
related matters. And this is so even if one were to exclude the newly-introduced 
‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters. The new generation of EU FTAs 
is marked by a high degree of ambition in terms of the liberalisation pursued 
and matters to be regulated under trade agreements. For instance, CETA and 
EUJEPA now include chapters on Regulatory Cooperation, which is something 
that has traditionally been undertaken outside the negotiations of trade agree-
ments, often in much looser forms. In general, the new generation of EU FTAs 
includes a series of so-called ‘WTO-X’ issues, such as anti-corruption and trans-
parency, which are not part of the WTO legal framework, and whose link to 
trade, strictly-speaking, could be questioned. The widening of the scope of FTAs 
is at once inevitable in the context of an increasingly interconnected and digi-
talised world, with structural changes having altered the way goods are produced 
and exchanged. A parallel can be drawn with the gradual expansion of the scope 
of the EU Common Commercial Policy, which has been interpreted as a reflec-
tion and adjustment ‘to the constantly evolving international trade environment.’59 
Hence the scope of trade agreements has been enlarged to such an extent that 
FTAs are not strictly-speaking about trade anymore; or they might be, but be-
cause the nature of trade itself has changed, in a way that it has raised the 
relevance of more matters in relation to it.
This backdrop has two related implications: first, that arguing trade agree-
ments cannot become the hub for everything and anything misses the empirics 
of the current situation, and can thus hardly hold when used to reply to demands 
regarding fundamental rights; and second, that as the scope of trade agreements 
expands and touches upon a wider array of issues, its reach is also more liable 
to have an impact on fundamental rights, which thereby warrants scrutiny of 
potential collisions with fundamental rights. It is noticeable how current discus-
sions on the inclusion of a chapter on gender in trade agreements has been put 
forward as an additional issue to be tackled via trade agreements. And it is even 
more remarkable how much more emphasis has been placed on explaining how 
trade negatively affects women more than men: no such discourses have 
emerged with respect to labour, explaining and recognising how trade agree-
ments might have an impact of labour rights. Hence if one is to counter conten-
free trade agreements make a difference? An exploratory analysis of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights in 13 EU trade partners’ in J. Wouters et al. (eds.), Global Governance 
through Trade: Eu Policies and Approaches (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2015); K. 
Banks, ‘Trade, Labor and International Governance: An Inquiry into the Potential Effectiveness 
of the New International Labour Law’ 32 Berkeley Journal of labor and Employment law 2011, 
45-142.
58 A. G. Brown and R. M. Stern, ‘What are the issues in using trade agreements to improve 
international labor standards?’ 7 World Trade Review 2008, 331-357.
59 P. Koutrakos, Eu International Relations law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd edition 2015) 
p.71.
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tions that FTAs are about trade and cannot be loaded with too many issues, it 
is important for any argument in favour of fundamental rights to spell out their 
relevance and linkage with trade. 
With respect to the second argument, namely that provisions on labour rights 
are not effective in prompting positive change in the third country, it is clear that 
the assumption is one that sees ensuring fundamental rights protection as an 
issue to be tackled only by the third country alone. yet it is argued that this 
misses the point of having labour provisions in trade agreements, and a more 
thorough understanding of their relationship with trade. Alternatively, they be-
come an internal EU’s cause for concern when contemplated from an eco-
nomic perspective: the concern is that the third country will lower its labour 
standards, hence altering the relative terms of trade and affecting workers at 
home – a rationale that, as discussed further below, remains very narrow-sight-
ed from a fundamental rights perspective, as it only contemplates the rights of 
EU citizens. Related to this, and in addition to the outspoken arguments for the 
current approach to fundamental rights in trade agreements, it is worth consid-
ering an underlying assumption that rows against more compelling contemporary 
understandings of linkages between trade and fundamental rights.
c. Fundamental Rights protection as ‘a problem of third countries’
Specifically with respect to the linkage of trade agreements and fundamental 
rights, an underlying assumption is that the protection of fundamental rights, 
yet more often in this case ‘human rights’, is an ‘external problem.’ This has 
been traditionally the case with conditionality clauses60 and the Generalised 
System of Preferences.61 The recent EU Commission’s Communication on 
Trade, Growth and World Affairs of 2010 similarly states that through trade, the 
EU should aim to encourage partners ‘to promote the respect of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment, and good governance.’62 Again, the target 
partners in this case are developing countries, while nothing is mentioned about 
the understanding and role of human rights with more economically advanced 
countries, which were the main trade partners targeted by the Global Europe 
Strategy at the basis of the new generation of EU trade agreements.
yet also in the context of the Post-Lisbon trade agreements with developed 
economies, potential breaches of fundamental rights seem to remain a problem 
of third countries: the inclusion of provisions that commit the Parties to core 
labour standards and fundamental ILO Conventions which all EU Member States 
have already ratified leads one to wonder about its added-value. Conversely, 
one could see some added value to the EU’s partners of the latest trade nego-
tiations: at the time of the negotiations, Canada, the US, Singapore and Japan 
60 Had the trade partner committed an outrageous violation of human rights, the EU could 
have suspended the trade agreement.
61 Preferential access can be withdrawn where the trade partner fails to ratify or implement a 
series of human rights instruments.
62 European Commission, ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy as a core compo-
nent of the EU’s 2020 strategy’, COM(2010) 612 final (2010).
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were all missing ratification of some of the Fundamental ILO Conventions. While 
the trade negotiations with Canada, for what would have become CETA, have 
triggered Canada’s ratification of the ILO Convention on the right to organise 
and collective bargaining, discussions on the inclusion of ILO commitments 
have proven very controversial in the negotiations with the US and Japan, both 
which are presently missing ratification of some important ILO Conventions. 
While the EU-US talks for TTIP have failed, it has to be seen whether commit-
ments under EUJEPA will bring about changes on the Japanese side in terms 
of ILO Conventions ratification. yet again, this perspective leads to an outward-
look on the issue.
Additionally, Labour standards are reportedly included in trade agreements 
between developed countries to counter claims of protectionism by developing 
countries. Therefore, it has been suggested that the EU, to counter such ac-
cusation, has to include the same provisions in agreements with developed 
countries. However, what this entire argument reveals is the assumption that 
fundamental rights are only an issue for concern outside EU borders.63 Develop-
ing countries have traditionally opposed the inclusion of provisions on labour 
standards and similar terms within the WTO framework, relying on the argument 
that these clauses are disguised protectionist measures. On a related note, 
while the EU maintains that its demands in relation to labour do not go beyond 
core labour standards, and should therefore meet no opposition by developing 
countries, discussions at the WTO on e-commerce, supported by the EU, are 
being accused of ‘digital colonialism.’64 In any case, justifying the inclusion of 
labour provisions in FTAs with developed countries because of possible accusa-
tions by developing countries is a window dressing that misses the purpose, 
and emerges in fact as a very narrow and dry understanding of the relationship 
between labour protection and trade agreements. 
Finally, the discussion on sanctions for breaches of labour rights reveals 
similar assumptions. The whole debate around labour rights in trade agreements 
typically ends up being narrowed down to the discussion on having binding 
mechanisms for their enforcement and the possibility of imposing sanctions on 
the trade partner. While not irrelevant, it reveals that concerns are about viola-
tions of labour rights abroad, rather than at home. In this sense, the idea pur-
ported is the same that has dominated trade agreements with developing 
countries: namely using trade agreements as tools, or ‘sticks and carrots’, to 
trigger compliance with human rights in third countries. Interestingly enough, in 
the trade negotiations with Canada, it was the EU that rejected the Canadian 
proposal to include the possibility of having sanctions in relation to the trade 
and sustainable development chapter, revealing concerns about its own labour 
protection.65 Furthermore, the discussion on sanctions reflects an understand-
ing of labour rights which considers them as exogenous and independent from 
63 Informal interview with policy official from the European Commission.
64 D. James, ‘Big tech seeks to cement digital colonialism through the WTO’, ALAI’s maga-
zine No 542: Social justice in a digitalized world, 24 June 2019.
65 B. M. Araujo, ‘Labour Provisions in EU and US Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Rhetoric 
and Reality’ 67 International and Comparative law Quarterly 2018, at 242.
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the trade agreement, i.e. which focuses on the (possibly precarious) situation 
of labour protection in the third country, regardless of the trade agreement. Such 
a perspective fails to question inherent challenges and pressures posed by the 
trade agreement upon the enjoyment of fundamental rights also within EU bor-
ders.66
3. WHy PROBLEMATIC FROM A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIvE: OvERLOOKING INTRINSIC LINKAGES BETWEEN 
TRADE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
From a fundamental rights perspective, three main flaws are highlighted here 
in the EU’s current approach to fundamental rights in trade agreements: first, it 
overlooks the economically developed nature of the trade partner, for which 
fundamental rights would not be a development issue (3.1); second, it omits 
contextualisation in an era of globalisation and digitalisation, which increases 
the relevance of labour and data flows to trade; and which puts additional pres-
sure on potential adverse effects of trade agreements on fundamental rights 
(3.2); and third, it overlooks new features of the ‘new generation’ of trade agree-
ments that warrant exploration in their linkage with and impact upon fundamen-
tal rights (3.3).
3.1 fundamental Rights in the context of fTAs with Economically 
Developed Trade partners
What has taken the name of ‘new generation’ of EU trade agreements is the 
result of the EU Global Strategy. Under the latter, the EU targeted ‘economi-
cally significant trading partners’ and ‘industrialised states that [could] offer the 
greatest potential for economic growth’67 in North America as much as Asia. 
Negotiations were then initiated with South Korea, Canada, the US, Singapore 
and Japan. It is argued here that the way fundamental rights have been dealt 
66 See Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The (down)side of this latter argument, however, is the risk of 
embroiling in arguments that would require the establishment of a link to trade before trigger-
ing any action, which is extremely difficult to prove. This argument yet goes beyond the scope 
and main thesis of this paper: the aim is not to identify how enforcement could be triggered, but 
rather provide a critique of the EU’s current approach in understanding the relationship between 
fundamental rights and trade agreement. Suffice to say that while the link between an instance 
of lowering, e.g., labour standards and facilitation of trade is indeed usually required for the ac-
tion to be brought, the relevant provisions of the FTAs dealing with labour rights do not elaborate 
on the features of this link: there is no description, nor examples are provided, as to how trade 
agreements could have such a link, for which action could be triggered. This again shows a lack of 
appreciation, or underestimation, of trade and fundamental rights linkages. As shown below, the 
idea of the paper is to trigger a change in perspective and advocate for the inclusion of provisions 
in the trade agreements that would address these linkages, and prevent, or at least minimise, and 
not intensify, potential adverse effects on fundamental rights in the first place. Issues of dispute 
settlement remain outside the scope of this paper.
67 L. McKenzie and K. L. Meissner, ‘Human Rights Conditionality in European Union Trade 
Negotiations: the Case of the EU-Singapore FTA’ 55 Journal of Common Market Studies 2017, 
832-849.
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with in the resulting trade agreements68 (including TTIP had it been successful) 
ignores the fact that the trade partner is not a developing country. Instead, the 
EU Commission should have taken into consideration that those trade agree-
ments were being negotiated with developed countries, for which fundamental 
rights concerns arising from a trade agreement would probably differ from those 
of a developing country. 
Developing countries usually argue that they do not have the economic ca-
pacity or tools to achieve the degree of fundamental rights protection demand-
ed by developed countries, and essentially look at social clauses as disguised 
protectionism. It is typically in these cases, where the trade partner is one where 
breaches of basic human rights are more likely, that the EU has adopted an 
approach ‘through trade’, aimed at changing the situation in the third country, 
by supporting mechanisms which promote human rights compliance. This crit-
icism is not intended to suggest that the current provisions would be redundant 
in trade agreements with developed countries. This is particularly so since, as 
mentioned before, third countries might not have ratified some of the fundamen-
tal ILO conventions; and even when these were ratified, it might in fact not be 
enough.69 Rather, some have suggested that the EU’s trade instruments ‘to 
promote and uphold human rights be tailored to the specificities of the countries 
that are parties to a given agreement’, including at the implementation, monitor-
ing and enforcement levels.70 While EU policy officials recognise that conclud-
ing trade agreements with developed countries is a totally different matter from 
FTAs with developing ones, this is not reflected in the way fundamental rights 
are dealt with in trade agreements. 
From a fundamental rights perspective, one would wish that, particularly with 
countries such as Canada and the US, the EU recognised the economically 
developed nature of the trade partner and were more ambitious in thinking about 
fundamental rights in trade, beyond basic human rights. More creativity and 
thorough exploration is needed when considering the relationship between 
fundamental rights and trade agreements in the context of present challenges 
to labour and data privacy rights. The economically developed nature of the 
trade partners enables thinking of fundamental rights as a matter of intrinsic 
relevance to trade agreements in an era of globalisation and increasing inequal-
ity. This would permit not condemning trade agreements in their entirety, but 
finding ways to avoid making them intensifiers of downward pressures on fun-
damental rights by globalisation and digitalisation. 
For instance, this could imply that safeguards are either embedded ‘in’ trade 
agreements to prevent or cushion such adverse effects; or in mechanisms 
parallel to trade agreements, and having similar purpose, but whose implemen-
tation would become an obligation in the trade agreement, in light of their op-
eration and implications for fundamental rights. A second way of conceiving of 
fundamental and trade agreements between developed countries could in fact 
68 See Section 2.1
69 World Bank, World Development Report 2013 on Jobs (World Bank 2012), pp.32-33.
70 S. velluti, ‘The promotion and integration of human rights in EU external trade relations’ 32 
utrecht Journal of International and European law 2016, pp.41-68.
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turn to the rights of ‘distant others’, namely citizens in fourth countries: not so 
much as a matter of worldwide mission for human rights promotion, as it seems 
the case in the current discussions between the EU and Canada;71 but rather, 
as a matter of European and trade partner’s companies’ conduct abroad, in a 
context of global value chains.72 While trade agreements include a few provi-
sions on corporate social responsibility, these are usually hortatory, besides 
being very vague, as much as overlooking controversies and ambiguities sur-
rounding the concept of CSR itself. Arguably, there needs to be more consid-
eration of the present context of globalisation and digitalisation, and how trade 
agreements might become companions for further downward pressures on the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights.
3.2 A Context of globalisation and Digitalisation putting pressures on 
fundamental Rights
The EU’s current approach to fundamental rights in trade agreements omits 
contextualisation in an era of globalisation and digitalisation, which increase the 
relevance of labour and data flows to trade, making them inevitable issues to 
be tackled. For practical reasons, it is not possible to assess or appreciate the 
relevance of all fundamental rights to trade, and the potential impact of trade 
agreements to all fundamental rights. As mentioned, priority is given to labour 
and data privacy rights. However, it is posited that in fact research would be 
needed to conduct such assessment for a broader range of rights.73 The need 
to tackle labour and data privacy rights stems above all from the appreciation 
of the fact that international trade economically depends on, and intertwines 
with, labour and data flows. In a context of global value chains and the data-
driven economy, labour and data underlie dynamics of international trade. 
Global trade has experienced significant structural changes – from unbundling 
of production and the emergence of global value chains; to the intensification 
of trade in services and foreign direct investment, alongside with technological 
developments – which make the economic relevance of labour and data flows 
to trade today both undeniable and pivotal.
71 European Commission, Meeting of Committee on Trade And Sustainable Development 
(13 November 2019), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/november/tra-
doc_158424.11.19%20(for%20publication).pdf>.
72 E. Lee and M. Jansen, Trade and Employment Challenges for Policy Research (Joint Study 
by the Secretariat of the ILO and the Secretariat of the WTO, 2007) (hereafter, Joint ILO-WTO 
study), available at <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/
documents/publication/wcms_091038.pdf>, p.29.
73 The sustainability impact assessments are such example but a very criticised tool: it is not 
clear always what definitions of human rights are taken into consideration, and are often criticised 
for obscure methodologies. See e.g. discussion in J. Harrison and A. Goller, ‘Trade and Human 
Rights: What Does ‘Impact Assessment’ Have to Offer?’ 8 Human Rights law Review 2008, 587-
615; and C. Kirkpatrick and C. George, ‘Methodological issues in the impact assessment of trade 
policy: experience from the European Commission’s Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) pro-
gramme’ 46 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 2006, 325-334.
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 labour and labour rights
Unlike data flows, labour has always underlay the dynamics of international 
trade. The way labour has an impact on trade is not only because, perhaps 
obviously, services and products come to life as a result of some kind of human 
activity, which inevitably becomes a factor of production in the trade of these 
goods and services; but particularly because such activity takes place within a 
legal system setting parameters to it; this will have a bearing upon the costs of 
labour, in turn affecting the competitive advantage of the country providing those 
goods and services.74 Differences in labour standards have been found to explain 
differences in international trade patterns, fostering concerns about ‘races-to-
the-bottom.’75 The intrinsic economic relevance of labour to trade has tradition-
ally justified the inclusion of international labour standards in trade agreements: 
since the 1970s, developed countries voiced concerns about cheaper labour in 
developing countries, and called for provisions on core labour standards to be 
included in the framework of the WTO.76 ‘Social dumping’ arguments are also 
usually advanced, also to refer to cases where labour standards are intention-
ally lowered for the purpose of altering the terms of trade and enhancing one 
country’s competitive advantage.77 
The EU has also embraced similar considerations in the context of its trade 
agreements. The motivation behind the inclusion of labour provisions seems to 
be only partially driven by normative considerations: while it might reflect con-
cerns about the negative consequences of social dumping on workers at home, 
it seems to overlook potential negative consequences on third or fourth countries’ 
citizens’ labour rights. Such interpretation is in line with recent arguments by 
the Commission that ‘labour protection between States can have direct and 
immediate effects on international trade and investment’ and that ‘lower stan-
dards of protection in one of the Parties can enhance trade and investment in 
its territory.’78 The justification for the inclusion of those clauses reflects the 
1970s discourses and at once reveals defensive interests of the EU. yet, argu-
ably, the EU could understand its defensive interests as going beyond concerns 
over lower labour standards in developing countries. Particularly in the context 
of trade agreements with other developed economies, the EU could think of 
ensuring that its trade partner’s and its own companies do not violate labour 
rights of workers abroad. This should be even more so in the context of increased 
economic interconnectedness and unbundling of production. In an era where 
74 A. Marx et al., ‘Protecting labour rights in a globalizing world: an introduction’ in A. Marx 
et al. (eds.), Global Governance of labour Rights Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational 
Public and Private Policy Initiatives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2015).
75 M. Artuso and C. McLarney, ‘A Race to the Top: Should Labour Standards be Included in 
Trade Agreements?’ 40 vIKAlPA The Journal for Decision Makers 2015, 1-14.
76 A. verma and G. Elman, ‘Labour Standards for a Fair Globalization for Workers of the 
World’ 16 The Good Society 2007, 57-64.
77 See e.g. in the context of future EU-UK relations, European Parliament resolution of 14 
March 2018 on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship (2018/2573(RSP)).
78 Opinion 2/15 para. 470.
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trade liberalisation is increasingly being blamed for,79 or at least recognised to 
have a bearing upon,80 increasing job insecurity and economic inequality,81 the 
aim here is to provide an overview of ways in which trade agreements are liable 
to put downward pressures on labour protection. 82 The focus is on the potential 
downward pressure on the workers at home, on the one hand, and on the work-
ers abroad, on the other. 
 Pressures on workers abroad
Liberalisation of trade has meant that trade in intermediate goods has grown in 
prominence.83 Trade liberalisation opens up market space for firms to contract 
with foreign suppliers,84 which allows production to be organised along global 
value chains whereby products are manufactured by supplier companies 
abroad.85 For instance, in the apparel industry, it has been argued that ‘trade 
79 See i.a. G. Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’ Illinois law Review 
2019 (forthcoming) at 18; q. Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliber-
alism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2018); N. Lamp, ‘How Should We Think about the 
Winners and Losers from Globalization? Three Narratives and their Implications for the Redesign 
of International Economic Agreements’, Queen’s university legal Research Paper No. 2018-102 
(2018); F. Bourguignon, The Globalization of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2015); B. Milanović, Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press 2005).
80 International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation, Making Trade 
an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment (2017), 
available at <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/wto_imf_report_07042017.pdf>.
81 B. Milanović, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 2016).
82 For reasons of space, the paper cannot go into depth about the economic theories explain-
ing the relationship between trade liberalisation and labour rights: the empirical picture varies 
greatly across countries (see i.a. Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 73, at 2), which complicates 
taking a hard line on whether trade agreements have a positive or negative impact on labour 
rights, which would additionally require addressing a number of empirical economic research and 
findings. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that while trade liberalisation in the long run is 
expected to produce positive effects on the ‘quantity’ of jobs, employment and the wages earned, 
economic studies still lack the appropriate data to assess broader standards of labour rights, 
such as the ‘quality’ or ‘conditions’ of employment, i.a. health and safety in the workplace, or job 
stability (see Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 20). Similarly, Milberg and Winkler (2011), 
who find global production networks to lead to ‘social upgrading’, by using ‘employment growth’ 
as the relevant standard, concede that their approach would not be sufficient to fully capture that 
relationship, if one were to broaden the meaning of ‘social upgrading’ to ‘decent work’, hence 
beyond employment and wages (W. Milberg and D. Winkler, ‘Economic and social upgrading 
in global production networks: Problems of theory and measurement’ 150 International labour 
Review 2011, 341-365).
83 See e.g. P. Antràs and R.W. Staiger, ‘Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements’ 102 
American Economic Review 2012, at 3140. 
84 A. Smith et al., ‘Labor Regimes, Global Production Networks, and European Union Trade 
Policy: Labor Standards and Export Production in the Moldovan Clothing Industry’ 94 Economic 
Geography 2018, 550-574.
85 A. Salmivaara, ‘New governance of labour rights: the perspective of Cambodian garment 
workers’ struggles’ 15 Globalizations 2018, 329-346; F. Mayer and G. Gereffi, ‘Regulation and 
economic globalization: Prospects and limits of private governance’ 12 Business and Politics 
2010, 1-25; K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Strengthening international regulation through transna-
tional new governance’ 42 vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 2009, 501-578; R. M. Locke, 
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liberalization’, and particularly the WTO-mandated phasing out of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement controlling trade in textile products, has enabled ‘buyers to play 
suppliers in more countries off against each other without concern for quotas 
or other barriers that had earlier restricted their sourcing options.’86 In addition, 
it has been observed that because of the falling costs of communication and 
transport, lead companies would be able to exercise a great amount of control 
on the production process, including on the ‘throughput time, costing structures, 
delivery systems, workplace organization and labour’, even when not directly 
hiring workers abroad, and not directly owning the supplier.87 What this implies 
for workers abroad has been studied extensively in the literature, and can be 
divided into studies that have found either positive outcomes in terms of higher 
employment and higher wages,88 or deepening of exploiting conditions,89 i.e. 
‘social downgrading.’90 While the facts might lie in between, it is striking that 
German firms operating in China have recently planned to leave (or relocate) 
their production, the main reason being rising labour costs.91 Two main aspects 
are worthy of attention here. 
First, regardless of better or worsening conditions, the fact remains that frag-
mented production makes it extremely difficult to identify employment relation-
ships, were one to think about how to improve them and support workers’ rights 
effectively.92 On this, the inclusion of core labour standards in trade agreements 
is largely regarded as lagging behind, whereas empowering local institutions to 
monitor what happens on the ground would be a means to address potential 
The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global economy (New 
york: Cambridge University Press 2013).
86 M. Anner et al., ‘Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Caus-
es of Labor violations in International Subcontracting Networks’ 35 Comparative labour law & 
Policy Journal 2013, at 8.
87 S. Barrientos et al., ‘Decent work in global production networks: Framing the policy debate’ 
150 International labour Review 2011, p.302.
88 See i.a. N. M. Coe et al., ‘Global production networks: realizing the potential’ 8 Journal 
of Economic Geography 2008, 271-295; Cumbers et al., ‘The entangled geographies of global 
justice networks’ 32 Progress in Human Geography 2008, 183-201; N. Coe and M. Hess, ‘Global 
production networks, labour and development’ 44 Geoforum 2013, 4-9; A. Rossi, ‘Does economic 
upgrading lead to social upgrading in global production networks? Evidence from Morocco’ 46 
World Development 2013, 223-33; N. Coe, ‘Labour and global production networks’ in K. New-
some et al. (eds.), Putting labour in its place (London: Palgrave 2015).
89 G. Starosta, ‘Revisiting the new international division of labour thesis’ in G. Charnock and 
G. Starosta (eds.), The new international division of labour (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2016); 
A. Smith, ‘Economic (in)security and global value chains’ 8 Cambridge Journal of Regions Econo-
my and Society 2015, 439-58; K. Newsome, et al. (eds.), Putting labour in its place (London: Pal-
grave 2015); E. Baglioni, ‘Labour control and the labour question in global production networks’ 
18 Journal of Economic Geography 2018, 111–137.
90 I.e. the worsening of ‘conditions and remuneration of employment and respect for workers’ 
rights, as embodied in the concept of decent work.’ See S. Barrientos et al., supra note 87, at 301.
91 See ‘quarter of German firms in China plan to leave’, Asia Times, 12 November 2019, 
available at <https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/11/article/quarter-of-german-firms-in-china-plan-
to-leave/>.
92 See Gereffi (1999) in S. Barrientos et al., supra note 87, at 301. See also J. Kenner, ‘The 
Enterprise, Labour and the Court of Justice’ in A. Perulli and T. Treu (eds.), Enterprise and Social 
Rights (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2017).
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labour rights violations.93 Second, the outsourcing of production creates a ‘trans-
national’ dimension that gives rise to ‘governance gaps’ or ‘deficits’ in global 
labour protection,94 making national standards falling short of being the only 
means for addressing labour.95 For instance, while some companies might have 
bilateral arrangements with local governments that would commit them to fair 
practices in relation to labour protection,96 some labour unions warn that when 
this is not the case, workers might be left without an interlocutor that could 
provide support; for instance, in situations where companies do not pay the 
wages or decide to lower them without prior consultations. Similarly, many ob-
serve how ‘it is now widely recognised that business operations affect the pub-
lic interest and can impact on a range of human rights.’97
 Pressures on workers at home
Turning to the domestic workers perspective, and in the light of what has been 
discussed in terms of trade agreements facilitating GNPs, liberalisation of trade 
has the potential to increase the price elasticity of labour demand, as substitut-
ing domestic workers with foreign workers becomes easier.98 It has been found 
that, as employers become subject to stiffer price competition, they are ‘more 
likely to threaten to lay off workers when they demand higher wages.’99 Rules 
of origin in this respect become important as they determine the amount of 
domestic labour that a product needs to ‘contain’ for it to qualify for a preferen-
tial tariff: more lenient rules of origin, in the sense of less domestic content re-
quired for it to fall under the preferential tariff, means that it will be easier for 
companies to source inputs from ‘lower cost countries.’100 Similarly, Foreign 
Direct Investment also plays a role in raising labour demand elasticities, as it 
allows ‘globalising’ production, via direct foreign affiliates or by means of inter-
 93 A. Smith et al., ‘Labor Regimes, Global Production Networks, and European Union Trade 
Policy: Labor Standards and Export Production in the Moldovan Clothing Industry’ 94 Economic 
Geography 2018, 550-574.
 94 G. Gereffi and F. W. Mayer, ‘Globalization and the Demand for Governance’ in G. Gereffi 
(ed.), The New offshoring of Jobs and Global Development (ILO 2006) p.39; K. van Wezel Stone, 
‘Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation’ 16 Michi-
gan Journal of International law 1995, 987-1028.
 95 E. de Wet, ‘Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause 
in the General Agreement On Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organization’ 17 Human Rights Quar-
terly 1995, 443-462.
 96 F. Hendrikx et al., ‘The architecture of global labour governance’ 155 International labour 
Review 2015, 339-355.
 97 See i.a. J. Wouters and N. Hachez, ‘When Rules and values Collide: How Can a Balanced 
Application of Investor Protection Provisions and Human Rights Be Ensured?’ 3 Human Rights & 
International legal Discourse 2009, at 316; S. velluti, supra note 70, at 42; T. Novitz, supra note 
46, at 124.
 98 Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 42.
 99 This could happen not only in the context of trade between developed and developing 
countries, but also in trade between developed countries. See Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 
72, at 4.
100 A. Santos, ‘The Lessons of TPP and the Future of Labor Chapters in Trade Agreements’, 
IIlJ Working Paper 2018/3 MegaReg Series (2018).
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mediate inputs.101 It has been found that even the mere possibility of threat of 
turning to source inputs from another country, or to delocalise, can affect the 
price elasticity of demand, and thus for instance weaken the possibility for work-
ers to resist wage reductions.102 One of the consequences of higher price elas-
ticity of labour demand is that workers may have to accept lower wages.103 This 
also links to another impact that has been pointed out, namely the reduction of 
governments’ ability to carry out redistributive policies, including the manipula-
tion of wages.104 Finally, higher price elasticity of labour demand may lead to a 
reduction of domestic workers’ power to bargain, as it becomes easier for em-
ployers to replace them with foreign workers.105 
A final element considered here relates to practices of offshoring tasks, which 
has become far easier today because of technology that facilitates ‘tradability 
of services.’106 Expectedly, tasks that can be performed at a distance will be 
also more likely the ones to be offshored. And this is a case where not only 
“low-skilled” jobs are likely to be affected, but also more “high-skilled” jobs that 
can be high IT intensive or transmittable, as in the case of security analysts.107 
Baldwin has also recently coined the term ‘globotics’ to refer to a mix of ‘glo-
balisation’ and ‘robotics’ that will make it easier to outsource services jobs.108 
While his suggestion for worried workers is to move to jobs that cannot be done 
by ‘globots’, it has been found that policy-makers will find it extremely difficult 
to predict next directions and new forms of employment in the digital era.109 As 
trade in services has recently witnessed a dynamic growth,110 trade agreements 
should take into consideration potential effects on labour and changes in the 
nature of employment, which might be facilitated not only by digitalisation, but 
also by further liberalisation of trade in services.111 
101 Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 43, on the basis of Scheve and Slaughter (2004).
102 Ibid, at 4.
103 In a context of higher elasticity for labour demand, it will be harder for workers to have the 
employers bearing the costs of benefits and standards, and might find themselves to accept lower 
wages to maintain these standards/benefits. Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 44.
104 Ibid, at 45.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid, at 29.
107 Ibid, at 30.
108 J. Crabtree, ‘The Globotics Upheaval by Richard Baldwin — white-collar disruption’, Fi-
nancial Times, 23 January 2019.
109 Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 73, at 30.
110 Eurostat, International trade in services - an overview, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_services_-_an_overview>.
111 Rules on cross-border provision of services have already been found to have competitive 
and divisive effects within the EU, see K. Debeuf, ‘The labour market is not ready for the future’, 
Euobserver, 20 November 2019, available at <https://euobserver.com/who-is-who/146470?utm_
source=euobs&utm_medium=email>.
84
CLEER PAPERS 2020/1 Mancini
 Data flows and data privacy rights
Unlike labour, free flow and mobility of data have only lately become the back-
bone of trade, and particularly of what is now called ‘digital trade.’112 Different 
from e-commerce, digital trade goes beyond online purchases or sales, and 
covers more broadly those trade activities that make use of digital technologies 
for business purposes.113 The emergence of new technologies has meant that 
now ‘data’ increasingly underlie global flows of goods, services, capital as well 
as people crossing borders. It must be noted, however, that not every transfer 
of data will necessarily occur in the context of trade, and can instead be simply 
transferred or collected via a number of mechanisms unrelated to it. Cross-
border data flows become a prominent component of digital trade for instance 
when data flows are used as a tradeable commodity on its own, or when it is 
attached to goods and services crossing borders, as in the case of e-commerce 
or financial services. Businesses increasingly demand the regulation of cross-
border data flows in trade agreements via provisions that would forbid measures 
restricting their free flow.114 The discussions in the context of Brexit, and the 
demands for an adequacy decision, as opposed to more costly arrangements 
such as standard contractual clauses and non-binding codes of practices, further 
confirm the economic relevance of data to trade.115
However, concerns have arisen as to when data contains ‘personal’ data, 
prompting a debate between those advocating free flow of data and those con-
cerned with the protection of personal data. Trade has moved towards a digital 
and information space, which increases the amount of data crossing borders, 
making the protection of personal data ever more crucial. Data transfers in the 
context of cross-border services, such as financial, e-commerce and telecom-
munications, increasingly challenge the protection of personal data.116 Globally, 
countries have understood that international trade necessitates coming to terms 
with data, yet divergent approaches mean that data protection will not always 
be the priority: this raises concerns as to the protection of personal data in an 
emerging global economic order where data flows are an important component. 
Whilst trade agreements have now become important vehicles to govern trans-
border data flows,117 the regulation of data flows in the context of trade agree-
ments still seems to be a compelling challenge for the years to come. 
112 W. Berka, ‘CETA, TTIP, TiSA, and Data Protection’ in S. Griller et al. (eds.), Mega-Regional 
Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New orientations for Eu External Economic Relations 
(New york: Oxford University Press 2017).
113 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Asia-Pacific 
Trade and Investment Report 2016: Recent Trends and Developments (2016), see Chapter 7 on 
‘Digital Trade.’
114 McKinsey Global Institute, Global Flows in a Digital Age: How Trade, Finance, People, and 
Data Connect the World Economy (Brussels: McKinsey and Company 2014).
115 O. Patel and N. Lea, ‘EU-UK Data Flows, Brexit and No-Deal: Adequacy or Disarray?’ uCl 
European Institute Brexit Insights paper (2019), available at <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-
institute/news/2019/aug/eu-uk-data-flows-brexit-and-no-deal-adequacy-or-disarray>.
116 K. Irion et al., supra note 40.
117 UNCTAD, Data protection regulations and international data flows: Implications for trade 
and development (United Nations 2016) p.36.
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On the one hand, attempts to restrict cross-border data have been qualified 
as protectionist measures, a red tape or non-tariff barriers to trade.118 Those 
who see restrictions of cross-border data as new non-tariff barriers to trade 
denounce measures that require data to be retained onshore (such as data 
localisation and local storage) and those that require businesses to have their 
physical presence on territory. Typical arguments against such measures are 
that they do not serve data security, while constituting an impediment to com-
panies’ competitive advantage. On the other hand, data protection is a funda-
mental right that should be guaranteed in the context of trade in data. Some 
have pointed at the risk of ‘data havens’, whereby data processing operations 
could end up being made in countries with less strict requirements for privacy.119 
The challenge is thus to allow data to flow across countries and reap the ben-
efits this would bring, while ensuring that personal data is protected. 
There is a need to define clear benchmarks drawing a line between, on the 
one hand, measures that amount to digital protectionism and unnecessary 
regulation impeding such flows of data; and on the other hand, measures that 
are addressed at the protection of personal data and privacy, and would there-
fore be legitimate. Whilst trade agreements might not necessarily be the place 
that most would advocate for including provisions on the protection of personal 
data, it is important to acknowledge that data today underpins global trade. Once 
it is recognised how data privacy rights are salient to data flows, and data flows 
to trade, trade agreements would need to ensure mechanisms to address these 
linkages. Inasmuch as trade agreements become more complex and far-reach-
ing, giving rise to new possible linkages with fundamental rights, the next section 
maps some of the new features of the latest EU trade negotiations that should 
be examined in relation to their impact and potential for fundamental rights 
protection.
3.3 new Linkages Emerging from new features of the post-Lisbon 
EU Trade Agreements
Moving increasingly towards deeper legal and institutional integration, the new 
generation EU trade agreements have stretched the stakes and implications for 
rights over a wider segment of people.120 Their complexity and ambition, not 
only in liberalising trade, but also in going beyond tariffs and seeking mechanisms 
for regulatory convergence and institutional arrangements, are at the basis for 
warranting exploration of new emerging linkages with fundamental rights: plac-
es and dimensions where fundamental rights could become subject to downward 
pressures, but where their protection could be arguably enhanced. What follows 
118 See e.g. J. Eger, ‘Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection 
or Non-Tariff Trade Barriers?’ 10 law and Policy in International Business 1978, 1055-1104.
119 See L. A. Bygrave, Data Protection law: Approaching Its Rationale, logic and limits (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2002); S. zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and 
the Prospects of an Information Civilization’ 30 Journal of Information Technology 2015, 75-89.
120 E. Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of 
Global Public Law’ 23 Constellations 2016, 58-70.
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aims to provide an exploratory agenda of the following dimensions in their in-
tersection with fundamental rights: wider scope, new actors, regulatory coop-
eration and institution-building. 
a. Wider Scope
The new generation of EU trade agreements has widened the scope far beyond 
strictly-related trade issues. The impact on fundamental rights of new objects 
of trade agreements, such as new actors, regulatory cooperation and institu-
tions, are discussed further below. However, if one is to consider how the scope 
of trade agreements has widened in relation to fundamental rights, what emerg-
es is that the new generation EU trade agreements for the first time include the 
trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters, where provisions on labour 
rights can be found. By contrast, data privacy rights remain mostly outside, 
under formulations which yet include them as part of exceptions or by means 
of provisions requiring the Parties to ‘maintain safeguards.’ 
Regarding labour rights, while most scholars point at the hortatory nature of 
these commitments and the fact that they are not truly binding nor enforceable, 
another perspective is warranted scrutiny here, which took into consideration 
the context of downward pressures on social protection and increasing inequal-
ities. It has been observed that labour provisions mandating respect of core 
labour standards are very limited in addressing possible adverse impacts of 
trade on labour protection,121 and do not go to the core of problems related to 
job insecurity, social dumping and income inequality.122 Their inclusion in the 
TSD chapters has additionally the effect of ‘compartmentalising’ their relevance 
to those chapters, and thus of separating their protection as a self-standing 
issue. Instead, it is necessary to understand their relevance across issue areas 
within the trade agreement.123 Increasingly, other disciplines and provisions in 
trade agreements are coming under the target of labour rights advocates, such 
as rules of origin, investment, currency manipulation and public procurement.124 
125 Labour rights thus necessitate innovations and integrated approaches to not 
121 D. Rodrik, ‘What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?’ 32 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
2018, 73-90; G. Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’ Illinois law Review 
2019 (forthcoming); A. Santos, ‘The Lessons of TPP and the Future of Labor Chapters in Trade 
Agreements’, IIlJ Working Paper 2018/3 MegaReg Series (2018).
122 A. Santos, supra note 121.
123 See T. Novitz supra note 46, at 125.
124 G. Shaffer, supra note 121; A. Santos, supra note 121.
125 Furthermore, the Sustainability Impact Assessments of the new generation of EU trade 
agreements, whilst pointing at harming effects of some specific categories of jobs, do not provide 
tailored solutions to the problem, nor are follow-ups present in the trade agreements themselves. 
For instance, the SIA for CETA finds that ‘While high degrees of liberalisation would produce the 
greatest overall economic gains, it could negatively impact dairy in Canada and beef/pork in the 
EU. Workers in these sectors would, subsequently, be expected to be negatively impacted with 
a number of workers likely forced to shift into alternative sectors over the long-term. Maintaining 
sensitivities on these sectors would likely limit any negative social impact on these workers. It is 
unclear how expansion in agricultural employment would impact quality and decency of work. 
(…) Further, as agriculture and food processing tend to have some of the highest rates of work 
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marginalise them, but to acknowledge their interaction with all aspects of a trade 
agreement, whose features have now become more complex and far-reaching.126 
Regarding data privacy rights, the approach is one that avoids references to 
specific standards and makes them grounds for exceptions, limiting a more 
proactive stance towards their protection. As yakovleva has argued, it only 
reflects ‘the economic nature of personal data and not its dignitary nature pro-
tected as a fundamental right’, with normative concerns not being truly elevated 
to the level of economic interests.127 The lack of an international standard on 
the matter complicates what can and/or should be included in trade agreements 
about data privacy: data privacy frameworks provided by the OECD and APEC 
clearly rely on an economic, as opposed to a more normative, approach, and 
their inclusion might provide suboptimal standards for data privacy rights.128 
The EU’s approach in this respect in fact allows concluding parallel adequacy 
decisions where the main benchmark is the GDPR. However, when adequacy 
is not granted, data can still flow under other specific, and usually administra-
tively more costly, arrangements; but particularly in the light of the EU-US saga 
on the Umbrella Agreement, some may wonder as to whether requiring the trade 
partner to ‘maintain or adopt safeguards’ would be enough to ensure that data 
privacy rights are not breached. The recent EU Commission’s proposal for 
horizontal provisions on data flows seems to perpetuate such an approach, as 
it provides that ‘each Party may adopt and maintain the safeguards it deems 
appropriate to ensure the protection of personal data and privacy.’129 On the 
other hand, their horizontal nature can be contrasted with the approach to labour 
rights, and be understood as acknowledging the relevance of data to different 
aspects of trade, from telecommunications to e-commerce, financial services 
and so on. 
Arguably, the complexity of the linkage of trade respectively with labour and 
data privacy rights implies that the latter could be protected not necessarily via 
stricter commitments on a wider range of standards. Rather, it is argued here 
that more research and exploration is needed on more indirect (and possibly 
less controversial) means, as could be the incorporation of provisions on side-
issues that would indirectly bolster their protection in relation to other trade 
related injuries and fatalities, expansion of employment in Canada and the EU’s agriculture and 
food processing sectors could expose a greater number of workers to working conditions that are 
more unsafe than average. This could, in turn, produce negative consequences for the level of 
work-related stress of employees in both Canada and the EU.’ C. Kirkpatrick et al., Eu-Canada 
SIA Final Report (2011), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/september/tra-
doc_148201.pdf>, at 49. For a critique, see F.C. Ebert, ‘The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA): Are Existing Arrangements Sufficient to Prevent Adverse Effects on Labour 
Standards?’ 33 International Journal of Comparative labour law and Industrial Relations 2017, 
295-329.
126 T. Novitz, supra note 46.
127 S. yakovleva, ‘Should Fundamental Rights to Privacy and Data Protection be a Part of the 
EU’s International Trade ‘Deals’?’ 17 World Trade Review 2018, 477-508.
128 Ibid.
129 European Commission, Horizontal provisions for cross-border data flows and for personal 
data protection (in EU trade and investment agreements), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2018/may/tradoc_156884.pdf>.
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disciplines and in the context of global production networks and further liber-
alisation of services in the context of digitalisation.
b. Non-Traditional Actors
Actors that have not traditionally engaged or been interested in EU external 
trade law and policy, have mobilised in the context of the new generation of EU 
trade agreements at an unprecedented degree. Crucially, not only have they 
mobilised, but they have been enabled to do so, as the Commission and the 
Council have introduced initiatives and changed their practices to allow for a 
wider engagement by non-traditional actors of EU external trade. A series of 
consultations, civil society dialogues and transparency initiatives, including pub-
lication of documents, reflect clear attempts to trump traditional criticisms of 
‘behind closed doors’ trade negotiations. While the latter have been criticised 
until recently for excluding representation of broader constituencies with an 
interest in, not least liable to be affected by, the outcome,130 the latest EU trade 
negotiations have been praised for changing this trend, with the EU Commis-
sion’s ‘Trade for All’ strategy now being the most manifest example.131 
However, while it is easy to call for, or exhibit, more inclusiveness broadly 
speaking, it is more difficult to grasp who the actors that are given a say are, 
how different inputs are weighed, and the extent to which they embrace funda-
mental rights issues; or put differently, the extent to which such actors understand 
the relevance of fundamental rights to trade. Research, as much as policy mak-
ers, should pay special attention to whom is entitled; to provide what kind of 
input; and at what stage of the life cycle of the FTA (from the negotiation stage, 
to the implementation and new regulatory mechanisms beyond the state). Im-
portantly, actors demanding a say in trade negotiations become important 
voices underlying how trade agreements come about and what they are about. 
From a fundamental rights perspective, an exploration of linkages between 
non-traditional actors of the new generation of EU trade agreements thus could 
look at the extent to which these newly empowered actors have embraced ac-
tors advocating for the protection of fundamental rights. 
Where this was the case, the next question would be whether they are given 
meaningful venues to express their views and influence the law-making process. 
A second issue to be addressed indeed relates to cases where these actors 
could meaningfully influence the outcome of the law or not. From a fundamen-
tal rights perspective, actors speaking in favour of rights should be able to shape 
the trade agreement accordingly, and in this sense, contribute to more thorough 
understandings of the relationship between trade and fundamental rights. A vast 
amount of literature has for instance pointed at civil society actors as among 
the key candidates for achieving democratisation of global governance, and 
130 Bull et al., ‘New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of 
TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements’ 78 law and Contemporary Problems 2015, 
pp.13-14.
131 EU Commission, ‘Trade for All: a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’ (2015), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf>.
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explored ways in which they could fill legitimacy deficits of law-making beyond 
the state.132 yet others have also addressed their limitations.133 Hence, this 
would mean conceiving of mechanisms that understood and addressed typical 
shortcomings of participation of civil society. These mechanisms should be 
designed with the objective of representativeness and prioritisation of funda-
mental rights in mind. They should additionally create legal venues for ‘norma-
tive’ actors to provide meaningful input at different stages of trade law-making 
and ensure that their input is taken into consideration.
c. Regulatory Cooperation 
Another typical new feature of the latest EU trade negotiations is ‘regulatory 
cooperation.’ Whilst regulatory cooperation is a concept that comprises a pan-
oply of mechanisms, it can be defined as encompassing those institutional and 
procedural mechanisms whereby actors at sub- and trans- national levels of 
law-making cooperate to bridge their regulatory divergences. It is typically un-
derstood as a means to create a level regulatory field against a context of 
regulatory divergence. In trade, divergent regulatory requirements are ‘non-
tariff’ barriers and essentially a source of costs. As trade is increasingly more 
about non-tariff barriers, regulatory cooperation provides a space for addressing 
them. In the new generation of EU FTAs, regulatory cooperation clauses provide 
a range of possibilities and activities that the Parties can undertake, leaving 
much room for both low and high ambition in terms of the degree of alignment 
to be sought. As some have observed, institutionalised forms of regulatory 
cooperation can become veritable ‘vehicles for regulatory rapprochement’, as 
the Parties commit to ‘regulatory reform and changes to the regulatory culture.’134 
Regulatory cooperation can channel deeper forms of legal and institutional in-
tegration.
Regulatory cooperation started receiving public attention, and in fact great 
opposition, in the context of the trade negotiations with the US: the way it was 
envisaged would have made the TTIP a ‘living agreement’ whereby changes to 
the agreed texts could have taken place via the activity of regulators with the 
power to advance legally binding commitments in identified areas of conver-
gence.135 Academic research has also voiced concerns as to potential demo-
132 J. Tallberg and A. Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy: an assessment’, in D. 
Archibugi et al. (eds.), Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (New york: 
Cambridge University Press 2011); F. Bignami, ‘Theories of civil society and global Administrative 
Law: the case of the World Bank and international development’ in S. Cassese (ed.), Research 
Handbook on Global Administrative law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016).
133 M. Bexell et al., ‘Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transna-
tional Actors’ 16 Global Governance 2010, 81-101; S. Kalm et al., ‘Civil Society Democratising 
Global Governance? Potentials and Limitations of ‘Counter-Democracy’’ Global Society 2019, 
499-519.
134 S. S. Krstic, ‘Regulatory Cooperation to Remove Non-tariff Barriers to Trade in Products: 
Key Challenges and Opportunities for the Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade Agreement’ 39 le-
gal Issues of Economic Integration 2012, at 10.
135 A. Alemanno, ‘The democratic implications of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership’, FEPS policy brief (July 2016), at 3, available at <https://www.feps-europe.eu/attach-
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cratic deficits of regulatory cooperation activities.136 Some have warned that 
regulatory cooperation mechanisms would fall outside the scrutiny of domestic 
institutions, hence undermining ‘traditional checks and balances characteristic 
of vibrant democracies.’137 From a fundamental rights perspective, regulatory 
cooperation becomes problematic for there are no provisions reflecting concerns 
inherently related to the protection of fundamental rights: this is so, even though 
the subject matter falling under the scope of regulatory cooperation chapters is 
either very broad;138 or specifically includes labour or e-commerce,139 for which 
labour and data privacy would become a relevant issue.140 Furthermore, regu-
latory cooperation is usually understood as a tool to facilitate trade and ‘cut the 
red tape’, less often in terms of ‘enhanced protection.’ This is reflected in the 
objectives of the relevant chapters, which is argued here to have an impact on 
how regulators will understand their role. Adding to this the potential legitimacy 
deficits that have been voiced, regulatory cooperation emerges as a new feature 
that warrants investigation on its impact on fundamental rights.
In fact, regulatory cooperation could be understood as having potential to 
contribute to the protection of fundamental rights, by providing a platform for 
mutual learning and cooperation, where challenges to fundamental rights could 
be discussed and jointly-addressed. This would require, for instance, making 
sure that the objectives of regulatory cooperation chapters are not confined to 
aims of trade and investment liberalisation, which is pivotal for the bodies in-
volved to embrace fundamental rights considerations with a view to enhance 
their protection. For a research agenda, it would be important to focus on sub-
stantive and procedural safeguards that would enable protection of fundamen-
tal rights: be it via a mandate including human rights impact assessments of 
regulatory initiatives; mandatory participatory mechanisms, and the possibility 
for the European Parliament to scrutinise the activities, as already explored by 
some scholars.141 
ments/publications/alemanno-finalpdf.pdf>; M. Cremona, ‘Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ (Guest Editorial) 52 Common Market law Review 2015, 
pp.352-353.
136 A. Alemanno, supra note 135; W. Weiß, ‘Delegation to Treaty Bodies in EU Agreements: 
Constitutional Constraints and Proposals for Strengthening the European Parliament’ 14 Euro-
pean Constitutional law Review 2018, 532-566; F. De ville and G. Siles-Brügge, TTIP: The Truth 
about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Cambridge: Polity Press 2016).
137 E. Benvenisti, supra note 120.
138 See Art.18.3(1) EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement; Art.x3.(1) TTIP - EU pro-
posal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation.
139 See Art.21.1 CETA.
140 See I. Mancini, ‘Deepening Trade and Fundamental Rights? Harnessing Data Protection 
Rights in the Regulatory Cooperation Chapters of EU Trade Agreements’, in W. Weiß and C. 
Furculita (eds.), Global Politics and Eu Trade Policy: Facing the challenges to a Multilateral Ap-
proach (European yearbook of International Economic Law, Springer 2020).
141 W. Weiß, ‘The implementation of CETA within the EU: Challenges for democracy and in-
stitutional balance’, presentation at CETA Implications Conference (Dalhousie University, Halifax, 
27-28 September 2019).
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d. New Institutions Beyond the State
A common feature of the new generation of EU FTAs is the presence of claus-
es that create a plethora of new entities forming a capacious institutional archi-
tecture for the operation of the trade agreement: from joint committees, to 
specialised (sub)committees, working groups, advisory groups and fora. For 
instance, the treaty bodies created via CETA encompass a Joint Committee, a 
Regulatory Cooperation Forum, a Civil Society Forum and a series of specialised 
committees, among which a Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development. 
To varying degrees, also the FTAs with Singapore and Japan and the envisaged 
TTIP all contain institutional provisions for the creation of bodies with different 
powers and mandates. The proliferation of treaty bodies in trade agreements, 
and the powers that these bodies are granted, warrant exploration in their rela-
tion to rights. 
In studying these new institutional arrangements, some have warned against 
democracy and legitimacy problems that such bodies could entail.142 Similarly, 
others have discussed global checks and balances, transparency, parliamen-
tary control and accountability in the operation of the institutional structures that 
the latest trade initiatives create.143 It has been observed that not only would 
these bodies operate for the monitoring and implementation of the trade agree-
ments; in some cases they would also be vested with significant decision-mak-
ing powers and to create new bodies in turn.144 In these instances, they would 
emerge as autonomous institutions operating beyond the State, with uncer-
tainty as to whether they would be subject to any control and by whom. On the 
other hand, many of these new mechanisms envisage exchanges with, or even 
encompass, civil society actors. yet inasmuch as the involvement of civil society 
is envisaged under different configurations and overlapping mechanisms, some 
have argued that in the resulting framework, ‘the purpose of civil society engage-
ment is lost and genuine participation and voice is likely to fade.’145
Against this backdrop, it could be explored how fundamental rights are guar-
anteed or could be undermined under these new institutional sets-up in the 
context of trade agreements. Similarly to the emerging structures in the opera-
tion of regulatory cooperation chapters, consideration of fundamental rights 
should be given in the different elements of these new institutions, from the 
mandate to oversight and participatory mechanisms allowing and enabling dis-
courses of protection of fundamental rights. Regarding the newly-established 
committees, some suggest a more prominent role being given to the European 
Parliament, which should be given the possibility to participate in the work of 
these committees and scrutinise relevant documents.146 Regarding institution-
al arrangements for civil society participation, similar considerations as to the 
involvement of non-traditional actors could apply. A further argument that could 
142 W. Weiß, supra note 136.
143 E. Benvenisti, supra note 120.
144 W. Weiß, supra note 136.
145 T. Novitz, supra note 46, at 128.
146 W. Weiß, supra note 141.
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be made is that instead of creating new institutions beyond the state, trade 
agreements could envisage the creation of institutions domestically, as they 
would be closer to local concerns regarding potential impacts upon the enjoy-
ment of i.a. labour rights.147 Relationships and interactions between new institu-
tions and local institutions could also be spelled out, with a view to enable 
exchanges that would benefit the protection of fundamental rights. 
4. CONCLUSION: FROM FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ‘THRouGH TRADE’ 
TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ‘IN TRADE’
In the context of trade, the EU emerges as a singular global actor from a fun-
damental rights perspective: unlike other international actors, the EU’s external 
action is to be guided by interests as much as values. The Treaty of Lisbon does 
not erase the tension between market goals and respect of fundamental rights, 
it opens up the possibility for the EU to pursue fundamental rights both in and 
through trade. yet for a very long time, the EU has been a global actor through 
trade: it has taken for granted an understanding of human rights in trade that 
sees them as a development issue for third countries. No more sophisticated 
conceptualisations have been explored, making the EU’s current approach 
heavily reliant on this legacy. 
The way fundamental rights are provided protection in the Post-Lisbon new 
generation EU trade agreements emerges as outdated and not fit for purpose: 
not fit for trade relations with developed economies where fundamental rights 
concerns may differ from core labour standards, and where the economic ca-
pacity would be present to be more ambitious; not apt in a context of globalisa-
tion and new pressures for enjoyment of fundamental rights; and very 
narrow-sighted insofar as new features of such ambitious trade agreements 
that account for deeper integration would require a more thorough appreciation 
of potential linkages with fundamental rights. On this, a parallel can be drawn 
with the development of the EU Single Market and the emergence of a funda-
mental rights dimension: not only does the EU now have a Charter of Funda-
mental Rights that is part of primary law, but some scholars have also started 
addressing questions as to whether the EU could be considered a ‘human rights 
organisation.’148 The history of what started as a purely (albeit ambitious) eco-
nomic project shows how further economic integration is liable to collide with 
fundamental rights149 and evolve into something more. While fundamental rights 
have pervaded the EU internally, a lot still needs to be done externally.
The aim of this paper is to urge new conceptualisations of the relationship 
between trade agreements and fundamental rights. There is a compelling need 
to understand underlying linkages, and how trade agreements could intensify 
147 G. Shaffer, supra note 121. See also M. Barenberg, ‘Sustaining Workers’ Bargaining Pow-
er in an age of GlobalIzatIon: Institutions for the meaningful enforcement of international labor 
rights’, EPI Briefing Paper (9 October 2009).
148 A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights 
and the Core of the European Union’ 37 Common Market law Review 2000, 1307-1338.
149 See T. Novitz, supra note 46.
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negative effects upon fundamental rights in the context of new technologies and 
business practices that underlie the dynamics of production and trade in goods 
and services. The implication of thinking of trade agreements in relation to their 
potential for fundamental rights would not necessarily imply an expansion of the 
range of fundamental rights to be dealt with in a trade agreement – which would 
additionally ‘load the boat.’ Rather, it is necessary to engage in a systematic 
research and open discussion about how to ensure that more complex and 
far-reaching trade agreements do not provide additional fuel to downward pres-
sures on fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, when new features and 
mechanisms are envisaged (eg. further liberalisation, inclusion of non-state 
actors, regulatory cooperation, institution-building), the fundamental rights com-
ponent to them should be appreciated, potential harming effects be taken into 
consideration, and mechanisms provided to counter them. If not for the sake of 
social justice,150 protecting fundamental rights ‘in’ trade agreements becomes 
vital for their legitimacy and social acceptance, not least their ultimate success.
150 G. Shaffer, supra note 121.
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DiRECT CHALLEngEs To EU mEAsUREs ADopTing TRADE 
AgREEmEnTs: Locus standi AnD THE fRonT poLisARio’s 
WEsTERn sAHARA CLAims in THE EU CoURTs
Stephen Allen* 
1. INTRODUCTION
The Joint Conference on EU Trade Agreements and the Duty to Respect Human 
Rights Abroad was convened to consider the extent to which the EU owes legal 
obligations to individuals, situated extraterritorially, who claim their human rights 
have been violated as a result of trade agreements concluded with third States.1 
In this context, it is worth recalling the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) proclaimed, in Kadi I, that: (i) respect for human rights is a prerequisite 
for the lawfulness of EU acts; and (ii) international agreements cannot generate 
obligations which have a prejudicial effect on the constitutional principles con-
tained in the EU’s foundational treaties.2 Such profound commitments presup-
pose that aggrieved individuals will have sufficient access to the courts for the 
purpose of contesting specific measures on human rights grounds. Against this 
background, this paper contends that the question posed at the outset cannot 
be fully addressed without considering the impact that the admissibility require-
ments governing direct challenges to EU acts have on the EU’s ability to honour 
these obligations.3 Specifically, it assesses the way in which the EU courts have 
interpreted the standing requirements, set out in Article 263(4) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in order to restrict severely the 
affected individuals’ ability to contest the legality of EU measures and the im-
plications of this approach for prospective Applicants located beyond the com-
bined territory of its Member States. 
For this purpose, it examines the operation of these rules by reference to the 
Polisario’s ongoing dispute with the EU Council arising out of the extension of 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, queen Mary University of London. Barrister, 5 Essex Court Cham-
bers, London: s.r.allen@qmul.ac.uk.
1 This conference was jointly convened by the ESIL’s Interest Group on the EU as a Global 
Actor and CLEER. Hosted by the T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, 11 December 2019. Conven-
ors: Professor Ramses Wessel and Dr Eva Kassoti.
2 ECJ, Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission [2008], paras. 284-285.
3 The importance of this question of admissibility has been amply demonstrated, elsewhere, 
by the way that the European Court of Human Rights has used the threshold requirement of 
State jurisdiction as one of the principal means by which to regulate the extra-territorial applica-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights. See S. Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What 
Jurisdiction Amounts to’, 25 leiden Journal of International law 2012, 857-884, at 862–64; and 
S. Allen, et al, (eds.), The oxford Handbook of Jurisdiction in International law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2019). 
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EU/Morocco trade agreements to Western Sahara. Polisario v. Council involved 
a direct challenge to Council Decision 2012/497,4 which approved the 2010 EU/
Morocco Liberalization Agreement, which made amendments to the 1996 EU/
Morocco Association Agreement in respect of tariff preferences relating to ag-
ricultural and fisheries products originating in Morocco.5 The Polisario argued 
that these trade preferences were also being applied to products originating in 
Western Sahara and, during the proceedings, this de facto practice was con-
ceded by the Council and Commission. The General Court found that the Polisa-
rio had standing to institute such proceedings and it held, on the merits, that the 
Council’s Decision should be partially annulled.6 However, on appeal, the CJEU 
overturned this decision because, in its view, the 2010 Agreement was not le-
gally applicable to Western Sahara.7 After the CJEU’s judgment in this case, 
the Council enacted Decision 2019/217, which adopted a new EU/Morocco 
treaty extending EU/Morocco trade preferences to products originating in West-
ern Sahara.8 
The Polisario has already initiated a direct challenge to this Decision.9 It may 
be supposed that the Polisario must have standing to commence such proceed-
ings given this new development. However, as this paper shows, any confidence 
that an EU court will find such a challenge to be admissible may well be mis-
placed. In this respect, it highlights the danger that the outstanding challenge 
may be dismissed due to a combination of: (i) the prophylactic character of the 
extant jurisprudence regarding direct challenges to legislative acts; and (ii) the 
scope which exists to re-characterize a dispute involving the exploitation of 
natural resources, belonging to the people of Western Sahara by virtue of their 
right to self-determination, as a narrow dispute about commercial privileges 
where the principal stakeholders are deemed to be the exporters of qualifying 
products based in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Such a potential rein-
terpretation of this dispute would have the effect of not only disaggregating any 
trade preferences dispute from the UN-sponsored process to determine West-
ern Sahara’s ultimate status, it would also ignore the strong correlation between 
Morocco’s continuing occupation of this Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT) 
4 General Court, case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, [2015], EU:T:2015:953.
5 The 2010 EU/Morocco Liberalization Agreement, oJ [2012] L 241/4; and the 1996 EC/
Morocco Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, oJ [2000] L70/2; and 2010 EU/Morocco 
Liberalization Agreement, oJ [2012] L 241/4.
6 Polisario v. Council, Case T-512/12, supra note 4, para. 247.
7 CJEU, C-104/16P, Council v. Front Polisario. 21 December 2016. EU:C:2016:973.
8 Council Decision 2019/217 (28 January 2019) regarding the conclusion of an Agreement 
the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the EU/Morocco Association Agreement, oJ L 34/2. Also 
see S. Allen, ‘Exploiting Non-Self-Governing Territory Status: Western Sahara and the New EU/
Morocco Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement’ 9(1) Cambridge International law Jour-
nal 2020 (forthcoming).
9 Front Polisario v. Council was initiated on 27 April 2019, General Court, Case T-279/19, 
OJ C 220/41, 1.7.2019. The Polisario has repeatedly instituted direct challenges against EU acts 
which affect Western Sahara. See General Court Order, Case T-180/14, Front Polisario v. Coun-
cil Fisheries Case, 19 July 2018, which involved a challenge to the 2006 EC/Morocco Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement and its 2013 Protocol; and General Court Order , Case T-275/18, Front 
Polisario v. Council, 30 November 2018, which concerned a challenge to the 2006 EC/Morocco 
Aviation Agreement.
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and the exploitation of its natural resources. Against this background, the Polisa-
rio’s claims in the EU courts test the reality of the EU’s commitment to contrib-
ute to the promotion of human rights and the strict observance of international 
law as far as its external actions are concerned.10 
The following section provides an overview of the pivotal standing require-
ments for direct challenges to legislative acts and it outlines the barrier that 
locus standi presents in this regard. The third part examines the General Court’s 
reasons for deciding that the Polisario had standing to challenge Council Deci-
sion 2012/497, in Polisario v Council, and the basis upon which the CJEU 
overruled this finding on appeal. The subsequent section considers the way in 
which the Council and Commission responded to the CJEU’s judgment in Coun-
cil v Polisario. The significance of the Polisario’s outstanding challenge to 
Council Decision 2019/217 and the obstacles that it is likely to confront are then 
assessed in the essay’s final substantive section. 
2. STANDING REqUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT CHALLENGES TO EU 
LEGISLATIvE ACTS
The question of standing cannot be treated as a threshold matter which is iso-
lated from the factual and legal context that gave rise to the challenge in the 
first place. Moreover, the structures of legal argumentation apply just as much 
to considerations about admissibility as they do to the articulation of substantive 
legal claims.11 In order to institute a direct challenge to a legislative act, under 
Article 263(4) TFEU, a natural or legal person must show that s/he is directly 
and individually concerned by the legislative measure in question.12 As to the 
requirement of direct concern, an Applicant must be able to prove that: (i) his/
her legal situation is directly affected by the contested act; and (ii) its implemen-
tation is automatic rather than being dependent on the exercise of discretion by 
the authorities of the Member State in issue (i.e. the act must flow from the ap-
10 Art 3(5) TEU provides that the EU shall contribute to the strict observance and development 
of international law. Art 21(1) adds that its international action is guided by respect for the princi-
ples of the UN Charter and international law. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the 
EU’s relationship with international law is a complex one. See J. Klabbers, ‘Straddling the Fence: 
The EU and International Law’ in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers, The oxford Handbook of European 
union law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), at 52-71.
11 See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to utopia: The Structure of International legal Argu-
ment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005 reissue); P. Wrange, ‘Western Sahara, the 
European Commission and the Politics of International Legal Argument’, in E. Kassoti and A. Du-
val (eds.), Economic Activities in occupied Territories (Asser Institute, forthcoming). SSRN: avail-
able at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507037>; A. Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement and the Law of the 
Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction’, 46 International and Compara-
tively law Quarterly 1997, 37-54, at 39; and S. Allen, ‘Remembering and Forgetting – Protecting 
Privacy Rights in the Digital Age’, 1(3) European Data Protection law Review 2015, 164-177, 
available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2776048>.
12 The standing requirements in relation to a ‘regulatory act’ are less stringent. Art 263(4) 
TFEU provides that: ‘Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first 
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which 
is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern 
to them and does not entail implementing measures’. 
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plication of EU legal rules alone). The operation of this requirement, particu-
larly in relation to challenges brought by individuals situated outside the EU, 
was well-illustrated by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami.13 In this case, several Applicants 
brought a direct challenge against the EU Parliament and Council in response 
to the adoption of Regulation 1007/2009, which prohibited the placing of seal 
products on the EU market (subject to an exception in favour of Indigenous 
peoples engaged in the prohibited activity). The General Court acknowledged 
that the ban would have negative consequences for those persons working in 
the sealing industry whose economic activities were either ‘upstream’ or ‘down-
stream’ of the placing of seal products on the EU market. Nevertheless, the 
Court observed that such a negative factual impact did not affect the legal situ-
ation of these individuals.14 Consequently, it held that only those Applicants who 
were directly involved in the act of placing seal products on the EU market were 
able to satisfy the requirement of direct concern.15 This conclusion was upheld 
on appeal.16 
The second requirement for establishing standing pursuant to a direct chal-
lenge to a legislative act, is that of individual concern. This test was first formu-
lated by the ECJ in the case of Plaumann v Commission. It provides:
‘Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be 
individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differ-
entiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually just as in the case of the person addressed. In the present case the ap-
plicant is affected by the disputed Decision […], that is to say that, by reason of a 
commercial activity which may at any time be practised by any person and is not 
therefore such as to distinguish the applicant in relation to the contested Decision 
as in the case of the addressee.’17 
The EU courts have consistently endorsed the Plaumann test in the post-Lisbon 
era.18 It allows an Applicant to establish that s/he is in equivalent position to a 
person who is expressly identified in a contested measure by two overlapping 
routes. First, an Applicant can satisfy the requirement of individual concern by 
showing that s/he is in possession of exceptional attributes that enable him or 
her to be treated as though s/he is an unnamed addressee of the act in ques-
tion. This approach works well in situations where an Applicant alleges that s/
he is a member of a closed group of individuals who are affected by a con-
13 General Court Judgment, Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament and Council, 
6 September 2011.
14 Ibid., para. 75.
15 Ibid., paras. 79 and 81-85.
16 See the CJEU’s judgment in C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kantami v. Parliament and Council, 
ECR, EU:C:2013:625, paras. 71-73. However, both Courts decided that even those individuals 
who could satisfy the requirement of direct concern had not shown they were individually con-
cerned by the contested measure.
17 Plaumann v. Commission, 25/62, ECR, EU:C:1963:17, 107. Italics added.
18 Notwithstanding the strong criticism it has attracted from some influential scholars and 
practitioners. See, e.g. P. Craig and G. De Búrca, Eu law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 6th edition 2015), at 515-533.
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tested measure. For example, in Stichting Woonlinie, the CJEU accepted the 
Applicants’ argument that they were individually concerned by a Decision, which 
was addressed to the Netherlands, because they could show that they belonged 
to a closed group where membership was conferred on the basis of specific 
criteria (namely by royal decree).19 In the Court’s view, the existence of such a 
limited class rendered its members identifiable and it added that such an ap-
proach was particularly justifiable where established rights would be affected 
by the adoption of the contested measure.20
The Plaumann test also provides that the requirement of individual concern 
can be satisfied where an Applicant can prove that his or her factual situation 
is such that s/he is effectively distinguished from everyone else in connection 
with the implementation of the contested measure. The significance of this ap-
proach was demonstrated, in relation to challenges initiated by individuals lo-
cated beyond the EU, by a series of cases which involved certain safeguarding 
measures, adopted by the EU Council and Commission, that had the effect of 
preventing certain undertakings, based in the Netherlands Antilles, from export-
ing rice products to the EC market. In Antilles Rice Mills v Council, the CJEU 
reached the conclusion, based on the Plaumann test, that the Applicant was 
engaged in an open commercial activity and that Regulation 304/97 applied to 
all Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) on an objective basis and so the 
requirement of individual concern was not satisfied.21 In this context, the Court 
reiterated its settled position that even if a small number of undertakings were 
affected by the contested measure such that their identity could be ascertained 
as a result, this state of affairs was not enough to satisfy the test of individual 
concern.22 
Subsequently, in Commission v Nederlandse Antillen, the CJEU overturned 
the Court of First Instance’s ruling regarding an annulment challenge to Regu-
lations 2352/97 and 2494/97.23 On this occasion, the government of the Neth-
erlands Antilles argued that the Plaumann test could be satisfied on the ground 
that most of the rice exported to the EC from the OCTs came from the Nether-
lands Antilles.24 However, the Court held that this fact was not enough to sat-
isfy the requirement of individual concern.25 In arriving at its decision, the CJEU 
observed that the undertakings in issue were engaged in a commercial activity 
that was open to any economic operator in any OCT.26 Moreover, it added that, 
19 ECR, C-133/12 P, Stichting Woonlinie and others v. Commission, EU:C:2014:105.
20 Ibid., paras. 46-47. This case was cited by the General Court in Polisario v. Council, supra 
note 4, para. 67.
21 CJEU, C-451/98, Antilles Rice Mills v. Council, 22 November 2001, para. 51. The Overseas 
Countries and Territories Association includes many of the EU’s special territories. The Nether-
lands Antilles was a Non-Self-Governing Territory until 1954. 
22 Ibid., paras. 51-52.
23 CJEU, C-142/00P, Commission v. Nederlandse Antillen, 10 April 2003. This case was iden-
tified by Advocate-General Wathelet in his Opinion in Council v. Polisario Case C-104/16 P, 13 
September 2016. However, surprisingly, he discounted it because he thought that this case was 
not sufficiently analogous to the dispute under consideration, paras. 206-210.
24 Ibid., CJEU judgment, paras. 66.
25 Ibid., paras. 70 and 77.
26 Ibid., para.78.
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as this specific activity accounted for only 0.9% of the Netherlands Antilles’ GDP, 
the contested measure did not generate serious economic consequences for 
this Territory.27 The Court accepted that the Commission and Council may be 
under a duty to take into account the negative consequences of adopting leg-
islative measures where they was bound to observe pre-existing legal obliga-
tions.28 However, it held that such potential duties did not displace the evidential 
burden on the Applicant to satisfy the requirement of individual concern.29 
The jurisprudence discussed in this section shows that the threshold for 
establishing direct and individual concern pursuant to a direct challenge to EU 
legislative acts is very high, and this is particularly so where externally located 
Applicants are seeking to institute such proceedings. It may be argued that such 
individuals should initiate an indirect challenge instead.30 To be sure, preliminary 
rulings have played an important role in the context of both tariff disputes and 
public interest actions concerning the exploitation of natural resources by third 
parties.31 Nonetheless, this indirect route was devised as a means of co-ordi-
nating the proper interpretation of EU Law rather than as a way of challenging 
the validity of EU acts. Moreover, it is apparent that preliminary rulings provide 
a highly contingent mode of redress, insofar as they may be used to establish 
the legality of such acts. The claim that such a route provides a thin form of 
justice is particularly true for externally located individuals who may have lim-
ited options for challenging any implementing measures that may exist through 
the national courts of a Member State. More broadly, it is suggested that an 
examination of the direct challenge route provides a better gauge of the EU’s 
commitment to contribute to the development of international law and the pro-
tection of human rights. 
3. THE POLISARIO’S CHALLENGE TO THE 2010 EU/MOROCCO 
LIBERALIzATION AGREEMENT 
3.1 The general Court’s Approach in Polisario v council (2015) 
As noted above, Polisario v Council involved a direct challenge to Council De-
cision 2012/497, which approved the 2010 EU/Morocco Liberalization Agreement 
that amended the 1996 EU/Morocco Association Agreement regarding the tar-
iff preferences applicable to certain products originating in Morocco. The 2010 
Agreement did not include a territorial application clause but Article 94 of the 
27 Ibid., paras. 67-68.
28 Ibid., paras. 68 and 72-73.
29 Ibid., para.76.
30 See Art 267, TFEU. The criticisms of the persistently narrow interpretation of the standing 
requirements for direct challenges are discussed in P. Craig, Eu Administrative law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 2016), 305-319. 
31 See e.g. Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen [2010] EU:C:2010:91; C-266/16, 
R (Western Sahara Campaign uK) v. HMRC & Secretary of State for the Environment, 
EU:C:2018:18; and CJEU, C-363/18, vignoble Psagot ltd v. Ministre de l’Économie et des Fi-
nances, 12 November 2019. 
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1996 Agreement specified that it was applicable in relation to ‘the territory of the 
Kingdom of Morocco’. The Polisario argued that these preferences were being 
applied to products originating in Western Sahara, in contravention of interna-
tional law and, during the proceedings, the Council and Commission conceded 
that the Agreements had, in fact, been applied to products coming from Western 
Sahara.32
The General Court ruled that the Council’s Decision qualified as a legislative 
act, thereby requiring the Polisario to prove that it was both directly and indi-
vidually concerned by the contested measure.33 It also accepted that the Polisa-
rio constituted a legal person for the purpose of instituting the proceedings, 
notwithstanding the fact that it has not acquired this status by recourse to a 
(recognised) national legal system.34 The Polisario argued that it was individu-
ally concerned due to its possession of certain attributes that singled it out as 
an unnamed addressee of the contested measure. Specifically, it claimed that, 
as the legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara, (a quality 
confirmed by its status as a party to the UN sponsored process to determine 
the fate of this NSGT),35 it could satisfy the Plaumann test.36 The Polisario also 
contended that it was directly concerned because the contested measure was 
intended to generate legal effects for the people of Western Sahara.37 In re-
sponse, the Council argued that the 2010 Agreement produced legal effects 
only for its parties and that the political dispute between the Polisario and Mo-
rocco in respect of Western Sahara was unconnected to the trade preferences 
granted under the EU/Morocco Agreements.38 
The General Court chose to address the question of admissibility by examin-
ing whether the 2010 Agreement applied to Western Sahara.39 It sought to divine 
the meaning and scope of the territorial application clause contained in Article 
94 of the 1996 Agreement by reference to the terms of Article 31 of the vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.40 Ultimately, it arrived at the conclusion that 
the conduct of the EU and Morocco showed that their successive Agreements 
were intended to be applicable to Western Sahara.41 The Court went on to 
decide that the terms of the 2010 Agreement were such that they generated 
legal effects for the part of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco.42 As a result, 
32 Case T-512, supra note 4, para. 87.
33 Ibid para. 72.
34 Ibid., para. 60. It has been suggested that such a conclusion is without precedent: see 
P. Hilpold, ‘Self-determination at the European Courts: The Front Polisario Case or The Unintend-
ed Awakening of a Giant’, 2 European Papers 2017, 907–921, at 916. But see E. Kassoti, ‘The 
Front Polisario v. Council Case: The General Court, völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit and the External 
Aspect of European Integration (Part I)’, 2 European Papers 2017, 1-17, at 11-15, for a more criti-
cal assessment of the General Court’s approach. 
35 See Case T-512, supra note 4, paras. 61 and 73.
36 The General Court recited the Plaumann test, Ibid., para. 112.
37 Ibid., para. 63.
38 Ibid., paras. 64-66. 
39 Ibid., para. 73.
40 vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vCLT)(1969) 1155 UNTS 331, Ibid., paras. 88 
and 98.
41 General Court judgment, Ibid., paras. 101-103.
42 Ibid., paras.108-109.
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it held that the Council’s 2012 Decision, directly concerned the Polisario because 
Western Sahara’s international status had yet to be determined.43 For the same 
reasons, the Court found that the Polisario was individually concerned by the 
contested act.44 Specifically, it took the view that the facts conferred a special 
quality on the Polisario, which was apparent from the Polisario’s participation 
in the UN-led negotiations concerning the fate of the Western Sahara (along 
with Morocco). It ruled that this attribute had the effect of distinguishing the 
Polisario from all others.45 Accordingly, pursuant to the Plaumann test, this had 
the effect of giving it membership of a closed group – along with the parties to 
the 2010 Agreement – on the basis that the treaty was applicable to Western 
Sahara. As a result, the General Court held that the Polisario’s direct challenge 
to Council Decision 2012/497 was admissible.46
3.2 The CJEU’s Approach in council v Polisario (2016)
On appeal, the CJEU undercut the General Court’s interpretation of direct con-
cern by holding that the 1996 Association Agreement and the 2010 Liberalization 
Agreement were only applicable in respect of territory over which Morocco 
exercises sovereign authority in accordance with international law.47 It added 
that these Agreements did not generate legal effects for the people of Western 
Sahara because they had not consented to them, in keeping with the customary 
norm pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.48 In support of this reasoning, the 
CJEU noted Western Sahara’s separate legal identity, arising from its NSGT 
status, and as a consequence of the customary right to self-determination, which 
belongs to its people, and which generates obligations erga omnes that bind 
the EU.49 It is worth recalling that the CJEU chose not to address the matter of 
individual concern specifically in its judgment. This may have created the im-
pression that it would have agreed with the General Court’s finding on this 
facet of standing (in the event it had found that the EU/Morocco Agreements 
were lawfully applicable to Western Sahara); however, the basis for such a view 
is questionable. Indeed, it is notable that the CJEU took great care to assess 
the question of the Polisario’s standing solely by reference to the arguments it 
had advanced during the proceedings.50 Consequently, it should not be assumed 
that the CJEU would have necessarily found the Polisario to be individually 
43 Ibid., para. 110.
44 Ibid., para. 111.
45 Ibid., para. 113. 
46 Ibid., para. 114.
47 Case C-104, supra note 7, para. 95.
48 Ibid., para.106. It holds that a treaty cannot create rights and/or duties for a third State 
without its consent. The principle is now codified in Art 34, vCLT.
49 Ibid., paras. 106-107. The Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations provides that: ‘the territory of a […] Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, 
a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it […]’. UNGA Res 2625 
(XXv) 24 October 1970.
50 See Case C-104, supra note 7, paras. 131 and 133.
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concerned by the Council’s Decision, especially given the stringent way in which 
the Plaumann test has been applied over the years. 
4. THE RESPONSE OF THE EU’S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO 
CouNCIl v PolISARIo 
In Council v Polisario, the CJEU decided that the EU/Morocco Agreements could 
not be legally applicable to Western Sahara without the consent of the people 
of that Non-Self-Governing Territory – irrespective of whether any such applica-
tion is likely to benefit (or harm) that Territory.51 According to Hans Corell’s 
widely-accepted formulation, the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural re-
sources, by third parties, is permissible, if it can be shown that: (i) the consent 
of the people of Western Sahara has been obtained; and (ii) any benefits ac-
cruing from such activities are enjoyed by them.52 However, the Council and 
Commission’s interpretation of the relevant international legal requirements was 
much more qualified. In particular, rather than focusing on the requirement of 
consent, the Council instructed the Commission to undertake a process of con-
sultation with ‘the people concerned’ to ensure that they are ‘adequately involved’ 
in the arrangements to extend the EU/Morocco trade agreements to Western 
Sahara. In addition, the Commission was given the task of evaluating the ben-
efits that would be conferred on this constituency under the EU/Morocco trade 
preferences regime.53 These arrangements were negotiated through an EU/
Morocco Exchange of Letters by which amendments were made to Protocols 
1 and 4 to the 1996 Association Agreement.54 This treaty had the effect of ex-
tending those trade preferences relating to qualifying products originating in 
Morocco to those products coming from Western Sahara and it was subse-
quently adopted by Council Decision 2019/217.55 
51 Ibid., para. 106.
52 Corell’s widely accepted test is consistent with the approach adopted by the General As-
sembly in a series of resolutions addressing the exploitation of natural resources in NSGTs. H. 
Corell, ‘Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the 
Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council’, 12 February 2002: UN Doc 
S/2002/161. Also see UNGA Res 73/104, 7 December 2018 for the General Assembly’s current 
approach on this issue. 
53 The Council authorised the Commission to negotiate an amending treaty with Morocco on 
29 May 2017, subject to these conditions. In this context, the Commission produced its ‘Report 
on Benefits for the People of Western Sahara and Public Consultation on Extending Tariff Prefer-
ences to Products from Western Sahara’, (2018) 346 (15 June 2018).
54 See the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Decision regarding the signing of an 
Agreement the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the EU/Morocco Association Agreement: 
COM/2018/481 (15 June 2018). See E. Kassoti, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: The Council Decision 
Amending Protocols 1 and 4 to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement’, 4 European Papers 
2019, 307-317; and Wrange, supra note 11.
55 Council Decision 2019/217, supra note 7.
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5. THE POLISARIO’S OUTSTANDING CHALLENGE TO COUNCIL 
DECISION 2019/217 
The Polisario has instituted a challenge to the legality of this measure on various 
grounds, including that the amended arrangements contravene the CJEU’s 
judgment in Council v Polisario. Its most important arguments, for the present 
purpose, are two-fold.56 First, it contends that the revised arrangements violate 
the people of Western Sahara’s right to self-determination; and, secondly, it 
claims that, according to the pacta tertiis principle, its consent is required for 
the de jure extension of such arrangements to Western Sahara. However, as 
outlined above, any direct challenge by the Polisario would confront two major 
obstacles at the admissibility stage, namely: (a) the serious difficulty it would 
encounter in establishing that it is directly and individually concerned by the 
contested measure; and (b) the risk that the dispute may re-characterized to its 
disadvantage during the preliminary phase of such proceedings. 
5.1 Characterising the Dispute 
A long-standing criticism of the CJEU is that it is not fully conversant with the 
priorities and processes of human rights adjudication.57 There is now ample 
evidence in the Court’s own jurisprudence to rebut this charge,58 but there is 
little doubt that the EU courts remain far more attuned to the task of applying 
technical legal rules in relation to trade disputes than to the job of weighing the 
effect of broadly-articulated human rights norms against the backdrop of seem-
ingly intractable legal-political disputes.59 The different ways in which the Gen-
eral Court and CJEU approached the Polisario’s direct challenge to Council 
Decision 2012/497 may be illustrative of this point. In Polisario v Council, the 
General Court seemed to view the Polisario’s representative character, and the 
wider UN-sponsored process concerning Western Sahara, as a reason to treat 
it as a member of a closed group. To this end, it was willing to accept the con-
nection between the people of Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, 
which generated natural resource entitlements in their favour, and the applica-
tion of the EU/Morocco trade preferences regime to that Territory. This was 
apparent from its concern that the EU should not be acting in a manner that 
encourages third parties to profit from the exploitation of natural resources 
56 The Polisario’s challenge in Case T-279/19 is based on ten pleas. They are set out in OJ C 
220/41, 1.7.2019., supra note 9.
57 See G. de Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a 
Human Rights Adjudicator?’ 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative law 2013, 168-
184, at 176-178; and v. Perju, ‘Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice’, 49 virginia 
Journal of International law 2009, 307-378, at 322-327. 
58 See, e.g. Case 131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de 
Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez [1984] oJ [2014] C212/4.
59 See, e.g., Brita, supra note 31; and G. Harpaz and E. Rubinson, ‘The Interface between 
Trade, Law and Politics and the Erosion of Normative Power Europe: Comment on Brita’, 35 
European law Review 2010, 551-570.
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belonging to this NSGT.60 The Court was not preoccupied with the question of 
the Territory’s final legal status instead it was content to observe that Western 
Sahara’s current status is ‘undetermined’.61 However, in sharp contrast, the 
CJEU’s focus on analysing the text of the EU/Morocco Agreements, at the ex-
pense of how they were being applied in practice, was out of kilter with a more 
conventional approach to the adjudication of human rights norms.62 
An EU court hearing the Polisario’s current challenge to Decision 2019/217 
may be willing to take the view that the Commission’s consultation and evalu-
ation exercise and the subsequent Council Decision are sufficient to satisfy 
international law’s requirements regarding the extension of the EU/Morocco 
trade arrangements to Western Sahara. Accordingly, such a court might rule 
that the legal-political question, which underpinned the Polisario’s challenge to 
Council Decision 2012/297 has now been answered. However, such a conclu-
sion would only be tenable if, at the admissibility stage, it is shown that: (a) the 
people of Western Sahara have, prima facie, consented to the extension of the 
EU/Morocco arrangements to their Territory; and (b) the Polisario satisfies the 
admissibility requirements contained in Article 263(4) TFEU. 
5.1.1 The Consent of the People of Western Sahara 
As noted above, the CJEU mentioned that the EU/Morocco Agreements could 
be lawfully extended to Western Sahara by reference to the customary principle 
of pacta tertiis, if the consent of the people of Western Sahara had be secured. 
However, it chose not to set out the modalities by which such consent could be 
obtained. The Court evidently understood that Morocco controls the vast major-
ity of Western Sahara. Accordingly, it must have known that any attempt to 
establish the consent of this constituency through direct means would not be 
feasible, especially given MINURSO’s lack of success in organising a referen-
dum regarding the Territory’s final status. Conversely, the Court may be taken 
to have assumed that the Polisario is the only institutional actor capable of 
granting (or withholding) consent on behalf of the people of Western Sahara in 
this regard.63 However, such a surmised viewpoint is not without its problems. 
Self-determination is a group right which is, typically, exercised through the 
holding of plebiscites.64 Moreover, such processes of direct consultation are not 
60 See Case T-512, supra note 4, para. 231 and Wrange’s reading of the way in which the 
General Court, and the other actors understood this dispute, supra note 11, 15-19.
61 Ibid., judgment, para. 56.
62 For detailed analysis of the decision’s shortcomings from an international legal perspective, 
see E. Kassoti, ‘The ECJ and the Art of Treaty Interpretation: Western Sahara Campaign UK’, 56 
Common Market law Review 2019, 209-236.
63 It is notable that international law has often taken a generous view regarding the interna-
tional legal personality of National Liberation Movements. See A. Cassese, International law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 2002), at 141-142.
64 This accords with the ICJ’s general understanding of the principle of self-determination 
which it ‘defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion (1975) ICJ Rep 12, 59. Also see the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA Res 1514 (Xv)(1960)(14 December 1960).
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necessarily restricted to questions of independence, integration and/or asso-
ciation pursuant to decisions about postcolonial political arrangements.65 Instead, 
they may also be required in connection with other decisions which have a 
significant impact on the people concerned.66 This does raise the question of 
whether any decision regarding the extension of the EU/Morocco Agreements 
to Western Sahara is so important that it requires the directly expressed consent 
of the people concerned. This is a moot point but the application of the tariff 
preference to products originating in Western Sahara is not an inconsequential 
matter. Further, the standpoint that the Polisario qualifies as the sole represen-
tative of the people of Western Sahara is complicated by the fact that it does 
not control the vast majority of Western Saharan territory, or many of its people. 
Consequently, even though the Polisario is an established National Liberation 
Movement which is widely acknowledged to perform a representative function, 
the facts would militate against the assertion that the Polisario should be viewed 
as the sole interlocutor for this purpose. 
Against this background, the Commission was in something of an invidious 
position. It was given the task of finding a way of engaging in direct consultations 
with the people of a third Territory despite its limited access, information and 
means. Clearly, the Commission’s endeavours to ensure that the ‘people con-
cerned’ were ‘adequately involved’ in the arrangements being devised for the 
application of EU/Morocco trade preferences to this NSGT is not the same thing 
as obtaining the consent of the people of Western Sahara for such an exten-
sion.67 In the circumstances, the Commission adopted the stance that the con-
sultation amounted to an ‘exchange of views and comments’ concerning the 
potential benefits of extension with ‘a wide range of socio-economic and politi-
cal operators’ based in Western Sahara.68 The results of the evaluation exercise 
were also ambiguous. In its 2018 Report, the Commission admitted that the 
absence of reliable statistics as well as the indirect nature of any benefits derived 
from the tariff privileges in question meant that concrete benefits for the indig-
enous (Sahrawi) inhabitants were hard to discern.69 As a result, the Commission 
and the Council embraced the working assumption that any trade flows which 
benefited the Territory’s economy would, benefit the people concerned in the 
long run, in terms of jobs, investment and development initiatives.70 The Com-
mission’s Report concluded that the consultees were broadly in favour of exten-
sion, although it noted that some stakeholders, such as the Polisario, were 
65 See the provisions of ‘Principles which should guide Members in deciding whether or not 
an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73(e) of the Charter’, UNGA 
Res 1541(Xv)(1960) (15 December 1960).
66 For instance, the ICJ recently confirmed that the elected political leadership of the British 
colony of Mauritius did not possess the constitutional authority to agree to the excision of the 
Chagos Islands from the Mauritius without obtaining the consent of the people of this NSGT 
through a referendum or general election. legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos 
Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory Opinion) 25 February 2019, para. 172.
67 Wrange, supra note 11, at 7.
68 See Report 346, supra note 52, at 10.
69 Ibid., at 9; also see Wrange, supra note 11, at 23-25.
70 Report 346, ibid 32-33; the Commission’s proposal for a Council Decision, supra note 54, 
at 6; and the Council Decision 2019/217, supra note 8, recitals 9 and 10.
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against this course of action and refused to participate in this exercise.71 Nev-
ertheless, the Commission and the Council took view that the proposed exten-
sion would have positive overall benefits for Western Sahara. Clearly, the 
Commission’s consultation and evaluation process suffered from considerable 
weaknesses, especially as far as ascertaining the positive consent of the peo-
ple of Western Sahara was concerned. However, it is possible that an EU court, 
hearing the Polisario’s current challenge, would be prepared to accept that the 
Commission took ‘all reasonable and feasible measures in the current context 
to properly involve the people concerned in order to ascertain their consent’,72 
and that such limited direct consultations to establish some kind of validating 
assent to the extension of the EU/Morocco trade preferences regime to Western 
Sahara were the most that could be expected given the difficult circumstances 
on the ground. However, whether such a generous position would be enough 
to enable a court to uphold the legal validity of Council 2019/217 would depend 
on how the Polisario’s outstanding challenge is characterised. 
5.1.2 The Separation Thesis 
A persistent argument, advanced by the Commission and Council in response 
to the Polisario’s challenge to Council Decision 2012/297 was that the UN-led 
political process concerning the determination of Western Sahara’s final inter-
national status is divisible from the issue of applying third party trade prefer-
ences to goods coming from this NSGT. This approach seeks to separate the 
protracted legal-political question from commercial activities undertaken by 
private economic operators, and it amounts to an attempt to characterise the 
dispute as being about trade flows rather than one involving human rights and 
international law.73 This separation thesis is predicated on a widely-accepted 
view that the right to self-determination is a process right focused on the legiti-
macy of the conditions of its exercise rather than an entitlement which gives 
rise to substantive outcomes.74 Indeed, this perspective is consistent with the 
way in which the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General have addressed 
the dispute about Western Sahara’s fate. Specifically, in a series of resolutions, 
the Security Council has maintained its commitment to help Morocco and the 
Polisario to reach: ‘a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide 
for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara’.75 The EU Council 
has echoed and supported this commitment and it acknowledges Western Sa-
hara’s current NSGT status.76 Nevertheless, because it does not want to disrupt 
established trade flows, the Council also accepts Morocco’s de facto administra-
71 Report 346, Ibid., at 28-32.
72 Council Decision 2019/217, supra note 8, recital 10.
73 Advocate-General Wathelet had some sympathy with this characterisation of the dispute in 
his Opinion in Case 104, supra note 23.
74 See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International law and How we use It (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1994), 111-128.
75 See, e.g. UNSC Res 2468 (30 April 2019); and the UN Secretary-General’s Report 
S/2019/282 (1 April 2019).
76 Council Decision 2019/217, supra note 8, recital 3.
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tion of Western Sahara, while declaring that there is nothing in its arrangements 
with Morocco that could amount to implied recognition of its sovereignty claim 
to this Territory.77 
The procedural conception of self-determination breaks down when it en-
counters specific entitlements to natural resources belonging to the people of 
a NSGT, such as those generated by the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources, which is widely understood to be founded on the right 
self-determination.78 However, one predictable response would be that if: (i) the 
people of Western Sahara have consented to the exploitation of the Territory’s 
natural resources by third parties; and (ii) the resulting benefits have been 
passed on to them, then such activity is permissible under international law. 
Consequently, it is plausible that an EU Court could separate the broader self-
determination dispute from the Polisario’s challenge to Decision 2019/217. Not-
withstanding the argumentative latitude which exists for the recharacterizing 
this direct challenge as a narrow technical tariff privileges case, any finding that 
the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources is divisible from the 
exercise of the right to self-determination and the question of the Territory’s final 
status is deeply problematic as these matters are connected at a causal level. 
Clearly, Morocco’s ability to extract valuable natural resources from Western 
Sahara provides the means, at least in part, by which its control can be main-
tained thereby frustrating the exercise of the right to self-determination by the 
people of this NSGT.79 This connection was well understood by the General 
Court in Polisario v Council, when it expressed the view that the EU was con-
tributing to the human rights violations being perpetrated by Morocco ‘by en-
couraging and profiting’ from the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural 
resources.80
5.2 Direct Concern and individual Concern
As previously stated, the test for direct concern concentrates on whether the 
measure in question generates effects for an Applicant’s legal situation. In the 
present context, it is worth noting that, in his 2016 Opinion in Council v Polisa-
rio, the Advocate-General agreed with the Council’s submission that the Polisa-
rio’s representative role had only been recognised, by the UN, in relation to the 
political process concerning the realisation of the people of Western Sahara’s 
right to self-determination and not in connection with any commercial activities 
involving that Territory.81 He went on to express the view that the trade prefer-
77 Ibid., recitals 3, 6 and 10.
78 See UNGA Res 1803 (XvII)(14 December 1962), which has since acquired the status of 
customary international law. 
79 For a detailed assessment of the relationship between the exploitation of natural resources 
and the perpetuation of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara see J. Smith, ‘The Taking of 
the Sahara: The Role of Natural Resources in the Continuing Occupation of Western Sahara’, 27 
Global Change, Peace & Security 2015, 263-284.
80 Case T-512/12, supra note 4, para. 231.
81 See Advocate-General Wathelet’s 2016 Opinion, supra note 23, paras. 184-186.
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ences dispute did not form part of the UN-sponsored process.82 Consequently, 
he concluded that the link between the contested measure and the Polisario’s 
representative role was not strong enough to satisfy the requirement of direct 
concern.83 The way in which the CJEU approached this dispute in Council v 
Polisario and the subsequent extension of the EU/Morocco trade preferences 
regime to Western Sahara have markedly altered the Polisario’s position since 
the Advocate-General delivered his Opinion. In such changed circumstances, 
the Polisario would be able to show that the Council’s Decision has generated 
legal effects for the organisation in its representative capacity and, in particular, 
that it is directly affected by any contention that the Commission and Council 
have satisfied international law’s requirements concerning the exploitation of 
Western Sahara’s natural resources. 
The issue of individual concern is complicated by the two background argu-
ments discussed in the previous sub-sections. First, the dispute regarding West-
ern Sahara’s final status may be distinguishable from the trade preferences 
challenge on the basis that the former is the subject of an ongoing UN-sponsored 
process, while the latter could be seen as a dispute about commercial arrange-
ments undertaken by private economic operators. Second, the exploitation of 
natural resources belonging to the people of a NSGT, by third parties, is permis-
sible under international law, if certain conditions have been fulfilled. The Coun-
cil’s response here would surely be that EU/Morocco arrangements have ensured 
that these conditions have been met. An EU Court might be persuaded by this 
argument, especially if it is prepared to accept the way in which the Polisario’s 
tariff privileges challenge can be characterised in a way that separates it from 
the wider self-determination/final status dispute. 
Against this background, it is worth considering the way in which the available 
evidence, such as it is, might support such a characterisation of the Polisiario’s 
outstanding action. In Polisario v. Council, the General Court noted that the list 
of approved exporters, pursuant to the EU/Morocco Association Agreement 
identified 140 undertakings established in Western Sahara.84 According to the 
Commission’s 2018 Report, 64,000 tonnes of early-growing crops were grown 
in an area covering approximately 900 hectares in Western Sahara in 2016.85 
It indicated that this form of agricultural production is export-driven and the EU 
is one of the key markets for such products.86 The Report estimated that the 
savings generated by the application of EU/Morocco trade preferences to qual-
ifying products would have amounted to €6.6million in the year in question.87 It 
also noted the presence of a significant fish-processing industry in Western 
Sahara.88 The Report also stated that 55,000 tonnes of processed fish products 
82 Ibid., para.186.
83 Ibid., paras. 193-194 and 213-214. The Advocate-General repeated this manoeuvre in rela-
tion the requirement of individual concern.
84 See Case T-512, supra note 4, paras. 80 and 86.
85 Report 346, supra note 53, at 16.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., at 16-17. However, this figure was calculated on the assumption that all such products 
are exported to the EU. The Report also estimated that this activity generated some 14,000 jobs.
88 Ibid., at 20.
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were exported from Western Sahara to the EU in 2016 at a value of €134m (an 
amount that would attract EU customs duties of some €9-9.5m).89 
It is possible to use this limited information to bolster the claim that a sub-
stantial number of economic operators exporting agricultural and processed-fish 
products to the EU from Western Sahara are direct stakeholders in a trade 
preference dispute about whether, or not, products originating in Western Sa-
hara qualify for tariff privileges as a result of the extension of the EU/Morocco 
agreements to this NSGT. Moreover, it could be argued that the activity of pro-
ducing and/or exporting such products amounts to a commercial activity which 
is open to any economic operator based in Western Sahara. In such circum-
stances, the claim that the Polisario is a member of a closed group and/or that 
it is distinguishable from all others does not seem to be sustainable on the facts, 
at least not by reference to the Plaumann test. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis undertaken in this paper is not offered in support of a narrow read-
ing of the Polisario’s current challenge to Council Decision 2019/217. Instead, 
it sought to highlight the restrictive nature of the EU courts’ established response 
to direct challenges to EU legislative acts, a jurisprudence which is facilitated 
by the considerable scope which exists for human rights cases to be character-
ized as narrow technical disputes. The way that the General Court resolved the 
question of the Applicant’s standing in Polisario v. Council may have been out 
of step with previous rulings concerning the interpretation of individual concern 
but such a holistic approach is indicative of the way in which the EU courts 
should be adjudicating claims brought by externally located individuals who 
allege that their human rights have been violated by EU trade agreements. Any 
finding that the Polisario does not have the standing to institute a direct chal-
lenge to Council Decision 2019/217 would mean that the EU courts will not be 
able to address the substantive issues raised by the Western Sahara litigation, 
including the consequences, for the EU, of the erga omnes obligations gener-
ated by the right to self-determination belonging to the people of Western Sa-
hara and whether the EU’s trade agreements with Morocco amount to 
recognition of its sovereignty claim to this Territory. To reject such a challenge 
as inadmissible would clearly be at odds with the EU’s solemn commitment, 
enshrined in Article 3(5) TEU, to contribute to the protection of human rights 
and the strict observance of international law. In order to ensure that that the 
full range of remedies is available to Applicants instituting direct challenges to 
EU acts, the EU courts must broaden their interpretation of the procedural 
prerequisites through which the legality of the EU’s external actions can be 
challenged by affected individuals, especially those who are located beyond the 
combined territory of its Member States. A more generous approach is justifiable 
on practical grounds, as externally-situated individuals will invariably have few-
89 Ibid., at 21-23. The Report claimed that an estimated 6,500 jobs were directly dependent 
exporting processed fish products to the EU.
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er opportunities to instigate indirect challenges to any implementing measures 
through the national courts of Member States, but such a change is also attrac-
tive at a normative level since it would facilitate the advancement of the EU’s 
constituent values.
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